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ABSTRACT  
 
This thesis documents a study of the factors affecting the sustainable growth and 
performance of the Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs). Despite the increased interest of 
governments, analysts, central bankers, academics and SWF managers and the 
unprecedented growth in the last two decades, SWFs research is still in its infancy. 
Two main problems are: current debate between sponsoring and investee countries 
about governance and transparency of major SWFs including Oman SWF; and how 
these SWFs can manage their sustainable growth, performance and success rate. These 
two issues are addressed in this thesis.      .   
 
An extensive review of the industry and academic literature was done in order to find 
the relevant facts about the domain of SWFs. The case study research strategy was 
adopted and primary data were collected by questionnaire survey and semi-structured 
interviews from employees and other stakeholders of Oman SWF. Norway SWF was 
analysed for the purposes of data triangulation, comparison and validation. The 
theoretical framework comprising factors affecting growth, performance and success 
rate was proposed and tested using multiple evidences from secondary data, interviews 
and statistical analyses of the questionnaire responses.  
  
The literature reveals that existing theories of trade, finance, economics and 
management are able to resolve conflicting issues within SWFs and between 
sponsoring and investee countries. Results reveal that qualitative factors such as 
governance, policy and planning and quantitative factors such as structure, investment 
strategy and decision making ultimately affect the long term growth and success rate of 
global SWFs. It is also found that external or investee country laws do not affect the 
SWFs as much as issues within the SWFs.  Findings suggest that Oman SWF has 
issues of concern in many aspects such as governance, transparency, accountability, 
investment strategy, organisational structure, asset allocation, updating laws and policy 
mechanisms; thus requiring overall restructuring and transformation of Oman SWF 
into a professional organisation. This thesis makes a significant contribution by linking 
theories to SWFs, an extensive literature review, a theoretical proposition comprising 
factors affecting the growth of SWFs, methodological combination and creating further 
research streams in the SWF domain.  
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
1.1 Research context   
This thesis presents research in the form of an analytical study of sovereign wealth 
funds (SWFs), their policies and investment strategies. The research study involves 
two different perspectives. Firstly, this study includes analyses of underlying 
theoretical patterns of development of sovereign wealth funds, their investment 
strategies, operations, objectives and impacts on financial markets. This results into the 
theoretical proposition formed by factors affecting growth, performance and success 
rate of SWFs.  Secondly, based on the global patterns and analyses of the other 
successful funds outside the GCC region such as comparison between Oman and 
Norway, the primary data analyses and synthesis present testing of the theoretical 
proposition and the final recommendations for global SWFs in general and for Oman‘s 
SWF which can lead to their sustainable growth. The research study also involves 
investigations of the conceptual development of sovereign wealth funds in the form of 
links with existing theories and the influence of SWF on various components such as 
economy, trade, regional development, financial system and capital markets. These 
analyses allow review of SWF‘s operations in detail to further recommend the 
development of investment strategies and policy issues whilst preparing a set of goals 
for future actions in SWFs globally and for Oman SWF. This future plan of action for 
SWFs suggests what can be done by the sponsoring governments of these SWFs along 
with institutional and global industry views so as to achieve the sustainable growth and 
required performance. Thus, the context of the thesis is defined within the domains of 
international system of SWF operations and policies along with solutions set for long 
term success of SWF by identifying factors affecting sustainable SWF growth.  
This would also help in realising the future strategic plan of the government of Oman 
to develop non-oil dependent economy in the next decade. In addition to the above 
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mentioned context, thesis identifies political, economic, legal and financial issues 
between investee and sponsoring countries. Next section explains the background of 
sovereign wealth funds.  
 
1.2 Background of sovereign wealth funds  
As the name suggest, SWF is an array of financial instruments, owned by a sovereign 
state, where a nation‘s savings are accumulated. For these funds, the primary focus is 
on the development of a foreign portfolio of investments. Other definitions of SWFs in 
the literature suggest their funding, purpose and objectives of setting up (Hassan, 
2009). There is no single definition of these funds but the term ‗Sovereign Wealth 
Fund‘ (SWF) was first provided by Rozanov (2005) as SWFs are created from foreign 
exchange reserves earned by a sovereign state to meet specific purposes. From then on 
an overwhelming response for SWFs research from academic researchers, industry 
analysts and government institutes has led to the number of definitions in the literature 
outnumbering the actual number of funds. In general, SWFs are large amount of funds 
managed by governments and are generated from accumulating foreign exchange (FE) 
reserves, commodity exports, privatization proceeds or fiscal surpluses. 
 
The emergence of SWF has changed the underlying assumption in the international 
finance world that money would always flow from developed economy countries to 
emerging and developing markets that is from USA, UK and Germany to Middle East 
and Asia. Central bankers outside USA in UK, Japan and China were always investing 
and buying national bonds (treasury notes) from USA considering it as a safe and risk 
free investments. These two aspects in the global financial markets for money flow and 
secured place of investments has been fundamentally re-written and it is more 
influenced by economic recession or credit crunch in the last three years. Major 
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reasons for establishment of SWFs stem from the fact that central bankers have learned 
from earlier experiences that it is better to have a substantial account of money in the 
foreign exchange accounts because if sufficient cash is available in readily accessible 
accounts then it could help the governments during any fiscal crisis, currency 
devaluation, national economic emergency and even change in the government 
(Anderson, 2009). Major sources of funding to these SWFs come from oil income or 
non-commodities. For example, GCC region SWFs have utilized their oil income to 
establish SWFs where as China and Singapore are non-commodity based funds and are 
funded from trade surpluses. SWFs serve the purpose of having necessary cash or to 
meet short term requirement while investing remaining excess securely in low return 
investments. The pool of SWF cash is usually separate from currency and liquidity 
management (Lam and Rossi, 2010; Kotter and Lel, 2011). US treasury defines SWFs 
as  
―Government investment vehicles funded by foreign exchange assets that are managed 
separately from official reserves. They seek higher rates of return and may be invested 
in a wider range of asset classes than traditional reserves. SWFs generally fall into 
two categories based on the source of their foreign exchange assets: commodity and 
non-commodity funds‖ (US GAO Report, 2008, p46). 
 
The major characteristic and issues of concern as portrayed by western governments is 
the return of state power and influence within global financial system and their 
political economy (Wolf, 2007; Garten, 2008; Helleiner and Lundblad, 2008). Other 
key traits of SWF include high foreign currency exposure, lack of explicit liabilities, 
high risk tolerance and long investment horizons (Jen, 2007; www.IMF.org, 2008; 
Anderson, 2009). SWFs‘ characteristics can be defined as: state ownership, separate 
management from official FE reserve, high foreign currency exposure, no explicit 
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liabilities like pension funds, high risk tolerance and probably long term investment 
motives (Singh, 2008; ). Their investment choices and asset allocation strategies may 
create implications worldwide for example, increasing investments in risky businesses 
for high return may reduce liquidity issues in market for low risk businesses (Balin, 
2010); or less inclined investment strategy for high tech, research and development 
based industry would reduce development of the specific industry in the investee 
country (Fernandes and Eschweiler, 2008). Thus, growth and investment strategy of 
SWFs lead one to the debatable aspects of how much recipient countries can allow 
SWFs influence on their industries and markets considering their bilateral relations 
and; how much investments SWFs would allocate considering the risk and return 
balance. For example, which investment is better  from these two:  US treasury notes at 
low secured return or high return equities in volatile stock markers of developing 
economies with more than 8% GDP growth rates. Detailed discussion of emergence of 
SWFs is provided in the next chapter of the literature review. Many current issues 
involve dilemma for both investee and sponsoring countries about growth, return, 
transparency and protectionism which are discussed in the following section. 
 
1.3 Current trends and management of SWF   
1.3.1 Current trends  
Publicly managed government institutes have large amount of assets and they are 
currently influencing the global financial industry significantly while drawing attention 
as an important investor of global equity. They can be categorised into three types: 
sovereign wealth funds (SWF), foreign exchange reserve funds (FERF) and public 
pension funds (PPF) (Mitchell et al, 2008). Their governance, investment strategies and 
political value may be different but their usage in financial terms can be defined as 
 18 
common to use them for country‘s economic growth (Bernstein et al, 2009). This thesis 
discusses about sovereign wealth funds only and not any other type of funds.   
Sovereign wealth funds are in existence from more than half a century but their size 
and impacts have been recently increased in the last decade. Growth of SWF is evident 
from total assets increased from US$500bn in 1990s to more than US$3.5 trillion as of 
today (Kotter and Lel, 2011). For example, these wealth funds have contributed 35% of 
mergers and acquisitions activities in 2007 and in a year span, have purchased equities 
worth US$ 83bn in 183 deals for various financial and high tech institutions like 
Barclays, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley (Kern, 2007; 
Drezner, 2008). According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts, SWF 
assets‘ accumulation may reach more than US$ 8 trillion by 2011 (Surprisingly this 
has not happened by December 2011) and US$12 trillion by 2015 respectively 
continuing the current growth rate. Major reason for the growth during 2006 to 2008 
may be the oil prices soaring to a level ofUS$150 a barrel because leading funds like 
Abu Dhabi, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar are oil income based 
SWF (Truman, 2008; Anderson, 2009). Recent surge in the investments made by 
SWFs and their sponsoring governments‘ role of high finance and high politics with 
unapproved but likely inherent or apparent motives is widely criticised by American 
and EU Governments (KPMG, 2007; Patelis, 2007).  
On the other hand, SWF investments look large but they are actually small in size 
compared to other global financial industry sectors since SWFs share less than 2% of 
the total global financial assets worth more than US$ 190 trillion (Davidson, 2010). 
For example, in 2007, pension funds were managing assets worth US$ 28 trillion, 
mutual funds US$ 25 trillion and insurance funds US$ 18.5 trillion which make SWF 
less than 5% of when compared to these funds. The total market capitalization of all 
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publicly traded companies in the world is approximately US$ 57 trillion and USA GDP 
is US$ 12 trillion which proves again that SWF are not much significant in size to 
other financial segments (www.swfinstitute.org, 2009; Balin, 2010).       
1.3.2 Management issues   
Generalization about SWF as a legal entity or their structure is not possible because 
across the world, every country has different sources of funds, governance structures, 
operations, investment patterns, financial policy and goals, company and laws of 
institutional formation (Singh, 2008; Anderson, 2009).  
Amount and investment deals‘ size of SWF may not be the issue always as known 
from above discussion but policy researchers, analysts and governments of investee 
countries view SWF assets‘ buying behaviour as more political rather than financial. 
The reason being cited for this view is; credit crisis provided these SWF to exercise 
power and existing liquidity with them to acquire strategically vital targets in investee 
countries. Their acquisition pattern when analysed clearly supports this view (Drezner, 
2008).  
However, view point of business lobbyists is in the favour of SWF since these funds 
are a way of tackling the current and any future financial turmoil, if dealt with a non-
destructive competition for growth and profitability without adding more protectionism 
and having unnecessary fright from SWFs‘ investments. Just like any other growing 
industry, new benchmarks of transparency, accountability, governance and other 
regulatory standards can be formulated for SWF without dragging into the debate of 
objecting their motives. This can be attributed to more of a development perspective 
rather than political (Stiglitz, 1993 as cited in Bernstein et al, 2009). Many such issues 
of transparency, best practices, ideological implications, bargaining leverage in 
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economical – political decisions and finally, the shift of global power away from 
advanced and industrialized nations to developing countries are major issues emerging 
out of this sudden growth and recent investment activities of SWFs (Truman, 2008).  
Limited transparency and investment motives of SWFs are growing issues of investee 
countries which lead investee counties to create more protectionism mechanism. This 
ultimately results into the management of SWF to a sustainable growth level becoming 
crucial for governments who have sponsored them and investing money to acquire 
assets anticipating profitable returns from deals. These complex issues of SWF 
management can be better understood from their various definitions, objectives, 
purposes to set up, investment strategies and type of deals.  According to Mitchell et al 
(2008) sovereign wealth funds are developed by governments utilizing various 
resources such as natural, taxes, fiscal or trade surpluses. SWFs usually manage assets 
separately from foreign currency reserves and tend to be investing internationally and 
when needed, in domestic operations, infrastructures and in stabilizing the industries. 
These SWFs are at present very important to global financial world for two reasons. 
Firstly, it holds liquidity worth more than US$ 3.5 trillion and other unknown figures 
in their portfolios. Secondly, their performance and management impact on economy 
in their own countries. Hence, these SWFs require asset increase and profitable returns 
(Lyons, 2007; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009). In principle the financial perspective 
of SWF leads them to seek higher profits, asset diversification so as to improve the 
fund‘s efficiency of asset allocation and reduce risk for wealth of their citizen on 
whose behalf they make investment (Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009). But, SWF 
policies of many countries in the present situation is mixed and not standardised as 
they tend to invest in open economies of USA and Europe, attempts to increase their 
portfolios but when it comes to receiving or allowing foreign direct investments from 
other countries they turn to protectionism (Koyama and Golub, 2006). Also, the 
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transparency agenda and their investment strategies have created big concerns. It has 
been repeatedly stated by Western countries that their investment objectives are 
politically motivated (Summers, 2007). For example in 1988, Kuwait Investment 
Authority was asked to reduce 22% stake acquired in British Petroleum (BP) to 9.9% 
by UK monopoly and merger commission on the grounds that such an acquisition 
would exercise considerable influence over BP. In another example, Dubai Ports 
World of UAE acquired P&O British owned shipping company in USA in 2005 giving 
it controls over several USA port facilities, then a year after Dubai Port World was 
asked to divest the operations citing national security issues (Singh, 2008; 
Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009). These types of cases can be reduced with 
standardization and common principles such as Santiago principles when followed by 
both investee and sponsors of SWF. In 2007 major SWFs sent a hostile response to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in reply to the code of conduct compliance request 
from G-7 countries. USA treasury department has persuaded two large and influential 
SWF of Singapore and UAE to adhere to governance and transparency standards with 
a commitment to have commercial criterion for investments rather than politically 
motivated (Greene and Yeager, 2008; Anderson, 2009).  
Above discussion explains that not only scope, definition and investment strategies in 
managing SWF are important but concerns about transparency, decision making 
policies, governance, planning also shape the growth, performance and 
transformational agenda of SWF. Next section discusses current status of economy of 
Oman and issues emerging for Oman‘s SWF.   
 
 
 22 
1.4 Oman’s economy and SWF 
The ruling of Oman since 70s by Sultan Qaboos has provided growth and development 
to the country whilst acquiring a good reputation among GCC countries. Oman has 
become a major hub of global trade, finance and economy in the Middle Eastern and 
Asian region. However, country‘s major source of income is from oil and gas exports. 
Therefore, government of Oman has planned series of developments in terms of policy 
reforms, restructuring hierarchies and industry support to create non-oil dependent 
economy.  This is where the major contribution can be made by SWF of Oman. The 
SWF of Oman is however affected by national culture, political economy and the 
issues within SWF such governance, strategy and structure. This study attempts to find 
the factors affecting and their impacts on SWF growth which would lead to create the 
solutions in the form of recommendations for Oman SWF.  The statistics also reveal 
that Oman started SWF in 1980 however Oman SWF was not able to create a large 
asset base such as Kuwait or ADIA. Oman SWF has reached to US$ 8 to 13bn here as 
its competitors Kuwait and ADIA have reached more than US$ 250 billion and US$ 
850 billion respectively. Therefore, one must find the factors affecting growth, success 
rate or overall performance of SWF which is major component of the problem 
statement as discussed next.      
 
1.5 Problem statement  
Sovereign wealth funds‘ current trends of unprecedented growth, governance and 
profitability issues with global debates of transparency and protectionism mechanisms 
from sponsoring and investee countries make management and operations of SWFs 
and their investment decisions very difficult and complex. Also, each SWF in its own 
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is affected by political economy and cultural background of respective sponsoring 
country and issues within the SWF organisations. Therefore, it is very important for all 
SWF sponsoring countries and their executive decision makers to know which factors 
are crucial for its long term growth and success rate. Thus, this is the first problem 
addressed in this thesis.     
Secondly, with a significant decrease in the oil prices from its peak beyond US$ 130 
per barrel to a range of US$ 40 to 60 per barrel and economic recession worldwide has 
affected the income and growth of GCC region. The oil revenue dependent economies 
of GCC and OPEC have less to take into SWF with more sales of oil resources. Oil 
price more than US$100 a barrel during 2008 has given boost to the large assets buying 
behaviour of oil income funded SWFs before the global credit crunch, however big 
investments have also been made during the same period (Drezner, 2008; Truman, 
2008). With economic downturn and decreased demand of oil, multiple problems have 
emerged for GCC region such as sudden collapse of stock market indices, weaker 
currency exchanges against British Pound sterling, Euro and US Dollar, less liquidity 
for local developments and loss making transactions in SWF investments. The 
government of Oman has realized that sustainable growth needs to be drawn from 
development of non–oil sectors such as construction, manufacturing exports, retail, 
tourism, transportation and financial services. Economies of these countries can be in 
more disastrous position if oil prices falls below US$ 40 a barrel but this may not 
become the reality as global oil demand increases every year. To survive further 
economic downturn many GCC governments have already saved large amounts from 
their excess oil revenues which has provided larger than expected liquidity to SWF 
(Santiso, 2008; Farrell et al, 2008; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009). From this context, 
what if the broader recession continues with tight credit markets, lower house prices, 
lower oil demand and slow GDP growth.  
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Thus, a major question for smaller SWFs such as Oman‘s SWF with only US$ 8.2bn to 
13bn is how to manage SWF better to increase financial leverage, consumption, and 
profitability so as to be more sustainable before an economic recovery can happen. The 
technological innovation and political stability are crucial for survival or growth in 
industries and SWF. Countries with large SWF may survive by continuously 
monitoring opportunities and making right choices for their investments.   
During such period, the economic growth or transformation depends on how 
successfully governments can formulate their policies, investment strategies and 
reforms of privatization or de-regulation. How government takes actions as a regulator 
of the market dynamics would decide the level of turbulence among the businesses and 
industries. Other countries may not want to replicate highly leveraged debt based 
economic growth as in case of development of Dubai in the last two decades since they 
can see the problems of re-paying high debt or re-negotiating further finances. This 
provides difficult financial outlook for GCC region. Thus, SWF as a major source of 
liquidity and large cash reserves emerges as a feasible solution to manage the domestic 
financial turbulence however, willingness for investments from SWF sponsoring 
Governments and can they manage SWF sustainable for a longtime is again poses a big 
question.  
These recent financial and economic problems, SWF characteristics and current trends, 
situation of Oman‘s SWF collectively enable one to formulate the following major 
problems to be addressed in this thesis.  
 
1. Which factors are vital to the success and development of SWF in general 
and for Oman‘s SWF?  
2. What shall be the approach to be adopted by SWFs to be more competitive 
and profitable in the long term?  
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3. What changes are required in terms of new policies, reforms, preventive 
measures, specialized systems or control mechanisms?       
4. How can Oman‘s SWF adopt and implement new initiatives in terms of 
economic policies, investment strategies and operations of SWF?  
 
Finding answers to these specific issues from factors to implementation of 
recommendations would form the basis of this research study. This study aims the 
wider scope of contribution in finding what is crucial for global SWFs and also, aim to 
recommend changes required by SWF of Oman.  
 
1.6 Aim and objectives 
 
The main aim of this research is ―to review sovereign wealth fund strategies and 
policies; and to find out the factors impacting sovereign wealth fund so as to 
provide recommendations for their long term growth and development‖.  
Following objectives would be met in the process to achieve the main aim of the study.   
a. To understand the concept of SWF in detail with existing theoretical linkages in 
finance, trade, economics and management. This may help in analysing SWF 
problems and findings the root causes of the problems in SWFs.  
b. To find out factors significantly impacting SWF growth and success rate based 
on the analyses of sovereign wealth funds.   
c. To validate the factors identified based on the analyses of multiple evidences 
from selected sovereign wealth funds.   
d. To analyze present status of strategies and policies of Oman‘s SWF so that one 
can recommend an action plan comprising new initiatives such as investment 
strategies, policies and asset allocations.   
 26 
1.7 Focus and significance of the study   
1.7.1 Focus of the study  
SWF has attracted much attention from researchers and governments for investments, 
growth, transparency and other related issues. This is evident from the recent surge in 
number of academic papers and reports from banks and investment analysts. However, 
overall research in case of SWF is limited in terms of in-depth analyses of SWFs for 
policies, investment strategies, global patterns, comparison of deals between SWF. 
And, there is not much evidence found in the literature presented by professionals 
engaged in managing or administering SWF and its relevant components.  
This research study is based on the following major research themes which form the 
main features of analyses in the thesis.  
 Scope, size and operations of SWF 
 Investment strategies, regulatory standards and policies of SWF  
 Management issues of SWF for their sponsoring countries and investment 
recipients  
 SWF performance and its impact on global and domestic finances 
 Factors impacting positively or negatively the growth of SWF     
This study is not directly extending the work from any previous research however it 
uses the literature analysis as a foundation to develop the research, for example studies 
of Pistor and Hatton (2011) about political economy of SWF; Bernstein et al (2009) 
about the investment strategies of SWF; Meggison et al (2008) about the investment 
patterns and performance of SWF and Mitchell et al (2008) about how to manage the 
public investment funds. Such studies are recent and concentrate on analysing SWF 
structure, operations, factors affecting, investment deals, investment strategy, 
performance and objectives of SWF.  
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The research study is divided into three parts:  
 Collecting and analyzing literature and industry data to formulate the theoretical 
proposition comprising factors affecting the growth and success rate of SWF 
 Collecting and analyzing primary and secondary data from Norway and Oman‘s 
SWFs to validate the proposed framework  
 Preparing a set of recommendations for global SWFs and Oman‘s SWF  
1.7.2 Significance of the study  
The detailed literature review offers insights into the various aspects as listed in earlier 
sections. This research study utilizes the secondary and primary data from SWF such 
as their characteristics, performance indicators, investment strategies and patterns, 
policies, operations and management issues. This thesis mainly concentrates in the 
following four domains: 
a. To identify the key literature and review this would contribute to the body of 
knowledge.  
b. To develop and validate the research framework by way of testing hypotheses 
which enables addressing key research questions. The proposed framework 
comprises factors affecting long term growth, performance and success rate of 
SWFs.    
c. To provide insights to practicing SWF professional managers to use the 
findings and set of the practical and logical recommendations from this study to 
improve their investment strategies.  
d. To enable Oman‘s SWF to utilise the results of this study in the form of 
practical recommendations with a proposed action plan to improve long term 
growth.   
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e. To yield validated methodology which has further scope of research for 
example, study using longitudinal data sets.   
  
1.8 Research methodology  
In this study, it is proposed to utilize both the inductive and deductive research 
approach for developing and testing the theoretical proposition based on the case study 
research strategy. The data collection would be done in the form of secondary data 
from documents and primary data through interviews and questionnaire (Saunders et 
al, 2009). The research methodology proposed for this study can be explained by both 
process and stage models. According to the process model given by Philips and Pugh 
(1994), the research process for this thesis can be as follows.  
Back ground theory – This would enable one to identify topic, problem; to carry out 
review of literature and evaluate the existing research.  
Focal theory – This would enable to formulate the framework, hypotheses and to 
specify the main idea of the research to push forwarding the subject area.  
Data theory – This would justify appropriateness of research methods selected; 
relevance and validity of the data collected and analysed to support the research aim. 
Utilization of theory – This is basically an application of derived theory based on 
findings and practical recommendations. Such an application validates the findings and 
allows generalizations whilst correlating findings and recommendations to the existing 
literature, theoretical framework, adopted research methodology and practice of the 
field.  
The above explained research process can correspond to various stages in the following 
diagram which provides details about research activities proposed in this study.  
 
 
 29 
Figure 1.1 Proposed research stages 
   
Source: Philips and Pugh (1994); Saunders et al (2009) 
 
 
 
Direct experience, Participation, current performance of Oman’s SWF & 
Secondary data leading  
To define the research problem, aim and objectives – Background Theory 
Review of Literature – Background Theory 
History, Evolution, Definitions and Concept of SWF; 
Number of factors affecting any SWF; 
Current and global trends in SWF investments 
Research Design– Data Theory 
Approach, strategy, Sampling,  
Data collection and data analysis methods 
Data collection – Data Theory 
a. Secondary data of Oman and Norway SWFs to understand factors and 
investment objectives and strategies  
b. Interviews to understand management and operational issues in Oman’s 
SWF 
c. Questionnaires to test hypotheses of research framework to find factors 
impacting any SWF and develop further strategy from its analyses  
 
Analyses of Findings – Data theory  
To analyze Secondary and Primary data 
Testing hypotheses and validating factors proposed in the model 
based on the multiple evidences from the data analyses 
For Global and Oman SWFs – Utilization of theory 
Final derived framework of factors affecting SWF growth 
Recommendations for global SWFs  
Recommendations and restructuring plan for Oman SWF 
Research framework – Focal Theory 
and Hypotheses formulation 
Pilot testing the data collection instruments - Data Theory 
Conducted in Arabic & translated into English 
Feedback from academics, managers and experts for  
Interview Question Set and Questionnaire  
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1.9 Structure of the thesis  
This research thesis is divided into eight sections, each one described as a chapter as 
follows. First chapter comprises of history, back ground and main research themes‘ 
overview with problem statement and significance of this study to academics and 
managerial communities. Second chapter discusses academic literature and its 
criticism and analyses to understand various factors related to sovereign wealth funds. 
Third chapter introduces the proposed theoretical research framework based on the 
literature reviewed which would be tested by primary data. Fourth chapter outlines 
the selection and reasoning behind choice of all research methodology components 
selected into this research. Fifth chapter analyses the secondary data of the two cases: 
Norway and Oman. Chapter six analyses the results of primary data collected through 
interviews and questionnaires. This chapter include testing of the theoretical 
framework, analysis of findings and discussion. Finally seventh chapter is in the form 
of conclusion which details the research summary, recommendations for global SWFs 
and Oman SWF, implications for theory and practice, novelty and utilization of this 
research, limitations encountered during the research and further research scope in the 
SWF domain. Appendices include graphs and tables from questionnaire data analysis, 
final questionnaire and interview transcripts.   
 
1.10 Conclusion  
This chapter outlines the scale and scope of the entire structure of the thesis. It presents 
the conceptual development of the central theme of research and what is involved in 
the study whilst explaining research problem, aim, objectives and significance of the 
study.  
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Chapter 2  Literature review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to review the existing literature relevant to the roots of 
sovereign wealth funds to understand these funds in detail. The chapter attempts to find 
information regarding main research questions, major components and characteristics 
of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). This chapter provides analyses of SWFs history, 
growth, role, investment strategies, regulations, operating standards, current trends and 
their debates about impacts on the global finances. Such analyses of each different 
aspect about sovereign wealth funds allows one to identify the factors affecting SWFs. 
Current issues having worldwide attention in the media are governance, transparency, 
accountability, investment motives which are discussed within domains of assessment 
of SWFs. It shall identify key issues within the global trends about SWF such as their 
influence on the economy, regional development and impacts on global financial 
markets and international trade. Such a reflective and critical analysis of literature 
would provide the comprehensive view of these sovereign wealth funds and its 
systematic management. This section of thesis can be considered as explaining back 
ground theory as it presents critical analyses of the existing literature from the previous 
research studies in the academic and industry for sovereign wealth funds and their 
related topics (Philips and Pugh, 1994).  
 
This starts with the development of SWF as a pure financial institution from years back 
when it was considered just another government owned national capital reserve entity. 
Next sections follow entailing SWF into their importance, strategic influence and 
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different implications. This literature review chapter finally outlines the literature 
analysis summarising from analyses, inferences and limitations from the literature. 
 
First formal and official setting up of SWF dates back to 1953 and then few GCC 
region SWFs started in 80s; however, much attention has been given to these SWFs 
very recently by investors, analysts, governments and researchers after 2005. Much 
less research is published till end of 90s for SWFs. Due to this fact this literature 
review has been limited to data from the last decade. Hence, this review can be defined 
as ‗post- 2001‘ research study.  The next section starts the review of literature 
explaining different definitions of SWFs.   
 
2.2 Definitions, history and concept of sovereign wealth funds 
This section discusses definitions, historical evolution and conceptual development of 
sovereign wealth funds.  
 
2.2.1  Definitions of SWF  
Following definitions of SWF provides different perspectives of these funds‘ origin, 
purpose, sources of money and their major aim or objective of starting a wealth fund. 
 
―SWFs can be defined as government owned investment vehicles with no explicit 
liabilities to their owners other than internal to the government, significant exposure 
to high-risk foreign assets, and a long-term investment horizon‖(Kotter and Lel, 2011, 
p.3). 
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―SWFs are the investment vehicles managing portfolios on behalf of their governments 
and their investment capital is usually derived from either petroleum revenues such as 
GCC region funds, Russia or Norway; or persistent current account trade surpluses 
such as China or Singapore‖(Dewenter et al, 2010, p.1-2).   
 
―SWFs are state owned investment funds set up for the investment of excess foreign 
exchange reserves or natural resource export surplus. These are part of the large 
collection of sovereign investment tools including state owned pension funds‖ (Zhang 
and He, 2009, p.2). 
 
―The term SWF generally describes state-owned or state-controlled pools of capital 
that are actively invested, at least partially, outside the country‖ (Helleiner, 2009, p1).  
 
“SWFs are government owned investment entities, set up for a variety of 
macroeconomic purposes. They commonly take the form of long term investments of 
foreign exchange assets in overseas holdings‖ (Bahgat, 2008, 2010, p.1).   
 
 ―Rather than all aspects of SWFs, the crux of issue is state capitalism. That is the use 
of government controlled funds to acquire strategic stakes around the world‖ (Lyons, 
2007, p.1). 
 
These definitions explain the sources of input reserves to sovereign wealth funds and 
funds‘ utilisation of that input into investments. The following sections explain history 
and conceptual development of SWF which enables one to understand the theoretical 
links of sovereign wealth funds and their existing roots.  
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2.2.2 History of SWF  
The development of transactions shifting financial power from west to east has its roots 
in the re-adjustment, re-emergence and post world war balancing theories. Major 
countries included in this balancing of financial power or relative decline of USA 
economy‘s control over the world are BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India, China), Japan 
and an energy rich GCC or Middle East countries.  
 
The western countries in recent years have suffered from various problems like 
financial imbalances, increased dependence on service economies, ageing population 
and workforce, disintegrated leadership and competition issues. However, these 
problems can be solved but consequences of these issues are long term and far reaching 
which can create new world order of global economy. This provides a new perspective 
on the old assumption that money would always flow from developed countries to 
developing countries (Hassan, 2009).  This assumption has been proved wrong as these 
SWF have started acquiring stakes and created investments and assets portfolios worth 
over US$ 3 trillion. These funds are best understood as national investment vehicles or 
state repository of wealth from the meaning of their structured name in three parts: 
‗sovereign‘ – state entity or government ownership, ‗wealth‘ – savings, assets or 
investments and ‗funds‘ – financial institution or financial vehicle different from 
normal a bank or private equity company (Anderson, 2009; Hassan, 2009). These are 
best understood as govt. owned enterprises with excess cash on hand for liquidity, 
currency stabilization and investments. The idea behind these SWF creation is to keep 
funds available for origin country to meet the demands of market fluctuations, cover 
import bills due in a year time or other foreign liabilities. History dates back their 
starting of these SWF to 1816 in France, 1953 in Kuwait and 1956 in Kiribati. Later on 
in 70s and 80s major Gulf countries funds have come up. SWF have two major criteria: 
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to use excess money for reserve adequacy measures and other to make profit out of it 
with minimum risk. Once, the monetary requirement of origin country is met then the 
remaining excess or surplus is left for investment. But, this surplus is used in risky 
investments also with short term profit making goals. Definitions applied by academia 
and industry provide fair view of this concept of SWF.  
 
2.2.3  Concept of SWF  
Main participants in the financial markets are either surplus or deficit funds units. 
Federal governments usually act as deficit units in this. These units control the flow of 
money and other institutional operations in money and capital markets. Non-depository 
institutions have a major motive of generating funds from sources other than deposits 
and they have a vital role in the financial intermediation. These institutions include 
banks, finance companies, wealth funds and insurance firms to name a few (Madura, 
2003). These national reserve and pension funds were earlier comprised of gold 
reserves before gold standard was dropped in 1930s. Then onwards, the objectives of 
regulatory control and reserves for managing any future economic turbulence have 
provided an origin to the concept of foreign currency reserves which are finally 
branched out as investment and development funds, called as Sovereign Wealth Funds 
(SWF). The term ‗SWF‘ came in the last decade but set up of SWF can be dated back 
to 1953 when Kuwait launched first GCC SWF (Singh, 2008; Hassan, 2008, Pistor and 
Hatton, 2011).  
There is not a single overarching definition or meaning of SWF, however as Kirshner 
(2009) analyses them as S + W + F, they are investment agencies– funds that deals in 
maximising assets and return on the investments – wealth and is controlled or managed 
by ministries of respective national governments – sovereign, which is actually owned 
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by population of particular sovereign state. SWF is a capital flow from surpluses to 
recipient countries which is generated from current account surpluses. This was 
followed by developed countries in 1870 as well. For example, such income has 
provided surplus benefits to UK government investment account since 1870s. The 
major differences between past and today‘s SWF are: a century ago, developed 
countries invested funds where capital was scarce and natural resources high and hence 
the high returns. Investors were mainly the private sectors. In the present scenario, 
capital is moving from emerging to developed economies by SWF and investors are 
majority central reserve banks and government entities. Oil is not a renewable source 
and hence, it is sensible move from GCC region that profit margins of this oil income 
is spread as a saving investment which can provide income when cases arise of ‗no oil 
income‘ or ‗reduced oil income‘ or to tackle ‗inflated economy‘ in future. This makes 
emerging markets shift their position from debtors to being creditors. Post-Asian 
economy crises a decade ago, at least 10 SWF are set up and more over India, Brazil 
and Japan are planning to join the same competition. Emerging markets current 
account position was in surplus of US$ 685bn i.e. 1.3% of global GDP and developed 
countries were running 5% of global GDP in current a/c deficits these include USA, 
UK, Australia, New Zealand, Greece, Iceland, Portugal and Spain. Another evidence of 
this scenario is 60% higher than the required foreign exchange reserve held by 
emerging markets economies i.e. approx. US$ 3 trillion (Gieve, 2008).           
Major aims of such these funds are to improve liquidity in the system while monitoring 
the process and to increase the profitability and asset base as set out by regulations by 
their respective Governments or ministries managing the funds. Alternatively, inferring 
the basic meaning of SWF from name itself: ‗Sovereign‘ component adds the strategic 
and state ownership means to these funds whereas ‗wealth‘ as a term in the SWF is 
said to be more associated with creation and maintenance of different financial assets, 
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for example, stocks of equities, bonds, properties, precious metals and other financial 
instruments. To a large extent, SWF can be defined as asset and investment fund 
owned and managed by the government. The inflow fund sources for SWF are foreign 
exchange reserves, commodity exports, privatizations proceeds or fiscal account 
surpluses. Apart from wealth creation, the SWFs have major objectives of currency 
stabilization, bilateral trade improvement or economic controls within the country such 
commodity prices or inflation (Singh, 2008; Bahgat, 2008, 2010). It is not possible to 
consider them homogeneous according to characteristics as their fund sources, 
governance structures, investment patterns, objectives and operations management are 
very much different. For example, Norway‘s government pension fund is not separate 
legal entity from nation‘s central bank where as Korea has created another legal entity 
as Korea Investment Corporation (Berstein et al, 2009).  
 
Based on resources, they can be broadly categorised as stabilization, savings and 
pension funds. Stabilization funds are set up during commodities price increase and 
funds are sourced usually when prices are low. For example, reserve fund of Russia. 
Savings funds are created with aim of long term wealth accumulation to manage future 
liquidity requirements. Pension funds are created to provide finance for future pension 
disbursements. These are directly managed and owned by governments and often 
considered as SWF. Examples are Irish national pension reserve fund and Oman 
Government‘s nine different pension funds (Singh, 2008; Mitchell et al, 2008).   
 
But, these funds are not new and as history claims, the first SWF was set up in 1816 by 
France, namely Caisse des Depots Et Consignations. The next fund took more than a 
century gap with Kuwait investment board in 1953 and Kiribati revenue equalization in 
1956, both by British administration when these countries were still operating as 
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colonies. The next wave came in 1970 – 80s when Middle Eastern oil producing 
countries set up SWF. For example, Temasek – Singapore (1974), Abu Dhabi – UAE 
(1976), Oman (1980) and Brunei (1983) and Norway (1990) set up reserve or 
stabilization funds as investment and development vehicles. The difference between 
pension funds and SWF is not always obvious as suggested by Truman (2008) while 
analysing all 56 SWFs on a common scorecard. Many governments linked SWFs hold 
significant stakes in the listed companies. The best examples are France and Russia, 
who holds US$ 280bn and 250bn respectively in listed equities (Balding, 2008).  
 
The concept of developing SWF is to switch ‗debt economic regime‘ to ‗credit 
economy regime‘ by developing countries or emerging markets where growth and 
expansion of SWF can lead to economic transformation by higher returns on 
investments and increase in asset portfolio (www.Pimco.com, 2007). This has worked 
well for the central banks in developing countries as SWFs are increasing US$ 500bn a 
year since start of this century.      
 
Another rationale being reason for setting up SWF by developing countries can be 
utilization of accumulated foreign exchange can help protecting economy in the times 
of higher capital inflow–outflow and speculative attacks on currency and to meet 
challenges generated by economic, trade and financial liberalization policies. The 
massive global trade differences have also become significant reason for SWF. 
Following table provides few more clear examples of SWF creation sources and 
purposes.  
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Table 2.1  Various SWF sources and purposes 
Source 
Purpose  
Commodity/ 
Revenue 
Fiscal sources Foreign exchange  
(FE)  reserves 
Stabilizing revenue 
stream  
 
Kuwait reserve fund,  
Mexico oil 
stabilization fund  
  
Public pension or 
future utilization  
 
Russian national 
welfare fund,  
Norway govt. global 
pension fund  
Future fund of 
Australia, New 
Zealand super 
fund  
 
Govt. holdings 
management  
 
 
 
 
Oman Investment 
company,  
Mubadala (UAE)   
 
Temasek 
(Singapore), 
Khazanah 
(Malaysia)   
China bank holdings 
managed by China 
investment 
corporation  
Wealth or risk/return 
optimization  
 
Oman state reserve 
fund,  
Abu Dhabi 
investment authority 
(ADIA)   
 
Govt. 
Investment 
Corporation 
(Singapore)  
Singapore FE 
reserve managed by 
govt. investment co. 
Or Korean foreign 
reserve by Korea 
investment co.  
 
Source: JP Morgan (2008) 
 
As any increase or decrease in oil prices and GDPs of Asian economies can make or 
break these SWF as they are predicted in range of US$ 5 trillion in 2012 based on the 
economic downturn (Fernandez, 2008) or US$ 12 to 14 trillion in 2014 by positive 
outlook and results (www.IMF.org, 2008).  
 
It can be seen from the above table that government bodies and wealth management are 
interwoven to each other. As these funds are managed by ministries (political bodies) 
and are managed for economic developments of their respective countries. Therefore, 
one can say that there is relation between politics and economics in the conceptual 
evolution of SWF. To explore more such links of SWFs with existing theories are 
reviewed in the next section of this chapter.   
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2.3 Theoretical foundations of sovereign wealth funds 
The following theoretical foundations of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are existing 
theoretical underpinnings from various subjects in business and management. Such 
analyses reveal the identity of sovereign wealth funds in terms of their creation, source 
of income, objectives, structure. More importantly, these theories explain the factors 
affecting sovereign wealth funds and impacts on markets and industries as implications 
of investments made by these funds.  
 
2.3.1 International trade theory 
International trade can be defined as an exchange of capital, goods or services between 
countries. The international trade represents a major share of gross domestic product 
(GDP). The factors such as industrialization, advanced modes of transportation, 
globalisation, growth of multi-national corporations and outsourcing activities can 
impact an international trade. Increasing international trade is required if countries 
want stable economies and to continue with globalisation process. Without the 
international trade, countries would have access to limited goods and services produced 
within their own country; and no access to the products or services from around the 
globe. Now, the trade is carried out using international currency system and exchange 
rates of currencies during each transaction of export and import. This makes all 
countries with either deficit or surplus in their total trade activities annually. To meet 
any trade uncertainties within and outside the country, each nation‘s central bank 
attempt to reserve the foreign exchange earned through the exports revenue.  
 
Today, the international trade mechanism involves currencies, accounts, standards, 
central banks, trade unions such as EU, NAFTA and GAFTA; and regulatory bodies 
such as IMF and WTO. Each country attempts to reserve the foreign currencies earn 
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through the international trade because they want to be in the stable conditions of 
economical components such as interests rates, own currency exchange rates with 
global reserve currencies such as US dollar or Euro or foreign exchange reserves to 
meet the import bills payment demand and in case of any emergency arises within the 
country. For this purpose, they try to hold the current and capital accounts in surpluses 
within the balance of payments (BOP) system. Foreign currency reserves and gold 
reserves are considered to be two major sources of economic stability and wealth of 
nations. Thus, countries with excess foreign exchange reserves go for wealth 
multiplication or at least secured earnings on their reserves. This is one of the basic 
purpose, countries with surplus wealth set up the Sovereign Wealth Fund. Hence, 
SWFs has its first root in the foreign exchange reserve generated from favourable 
international trading system of export and imports made by the sponsoring country. 
Thus, accumulation of foreign exchange plays a crucial role in creating an economic 
climate for the country where they can set up a SWF. For example, world‘s total 
currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves (COFER) has increased 
from USD 1389bn in 1995 to 9258bn at the end of 2010 and gold reserves has 
increased to more than 7800bn. The rapid increases in gold and foreign currency 
reserves are observed after 2002 (www.imf.org, 2011). This rise in the reserve growth 
has become an international policy agenda and is viewed from different perspectives, 
such as financing of fiscal deficits, increasing reserves of developing and GCC region 
economies, sustainability of this foreign exchange funds and low returns within and 
outside the US (Pineau et al, 2006 at European Central Bank). This accumulation of 
foreign reserves through international trade facilitates main sources of funding to SWF. 
 
An important development in the financial markets post-Asian crisis in 1997–98 is that 
developing Asian economies have become surplus in their balance of payments being 
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net capital exporters from previous status of net capital importers. This transformation 
came from the persistent current account surpluses maintained by developing Asian 
economies through their post-crisis reforms and mechanisms to avoid another such 
crisis in the future. These reserves have increased to a level beyond traditional 
requirements of liquidity purposes. Thus, these economies have started to shift their 
concentration from managing liquidity shortages to multiplying these reserves by 
making profitable investments. Hence, this is one of the basic motives of launching 
SWFs which provides a blueprint for transforming these excess reserves to profit 
making assets allocations (Park and Estrada, 2011). Therefore, main aim of these 
SWFs should be profit making or return on their investments as funds available for 
SWFs are beyond liquidity requirements and thus do not need guaranteed but low 
returns from investments such as US government debt papers. Thus, international trade 
explains the formation of SWF and its income sources. On the other hand, international 
trade with financial management forms international economic system which revolves 
around the demand and supply of goods and money. The commercial profit seeking or 
wealth creation from trade surpluses have to be balanced between risk and return with 
appropriate asset allocation based on the robust investment strategies of the financial 
management as explained in the next section.  
 
2.3.2 Financial management theory 
The above discussion regarding international trade allows one to understand that 
governments and central banks attempt to accumulate foreign exchange reserve and 
once it has accumulated beyond their threshold of required future import bills‘ 
liquidity, governments turn to increase their wealth by investing these foreign 
exchange reserves. This principle has given rise to the countries launching sovereign 
wealth funds for increasing returns (Rozanov, 2010). When it comes to the gaining 
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return on the investments in general, it has been observed by researchers that with 
increase in return, the risk increases. This clearly means that low level of uncertainty 
(or low risk) is proportionate to low return, whereas high level of uncertainty (high 
risk) is associated with high return (Madura, 2003). This is one of the fundamental 
assumptions of the modern portfolio theory which mainly categorises all investment 
strategies into two types: one that maximizes return for given risk and other that 
minimizing risk for expected return. Return increase or risk reduction is enabled by 
allocating investments in different types of assets to create a balanced portfolio (Daniel 
et al, 2001). This holds true in case of SWFs investments where a collection of 
diversified portfolio of assets as a whole have less risk as compared to an individual 
asset. Researchers have observed SWFs investment strategies to reveal that depending 
on the decision making structure, investment capital availability and targeted returns 
from the portfolio, the risk varies in the SWF investments. For example, investment 
decisions made by political leaders, domestic equity prices or influence of professional 
external managers have impacts on the return of investments made (Bernstein et al, 
2009). The implications of the riskier approach by SWFs towards higher returns can 
cause easy access to the capital for riskier businesses and tougher situation for low 
return businesses (Balin, 2010). Thus, SWFs risk and return approach can cause 
imbalances within the money supply system in the markets or economies if these 
investments are large enough for the markets as concerned raised by analysts and 
governments (Gieve, 2008). Apart from portfolio theory, other investment theories 
include capital asset pricing model (CAP), arbitrage pricing theory and efficient market 
hypothesis; however, their detailed analyses are not in the scope of this research study.  
These theories support the decision making process of selecting assets classes and 
investment deals with a main aim of higher returns at lower costs and risks (Crabbe, 
1996; Chandra and Shadel, 2007). Thus, SWFs investments can have effects from 
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financial and economic factors on their return as well as, they can impacts the money 
supplies and economic conditions of the markets. The next section deals with SWFs 
investments and their association with demand and supply of capital in the market 
economies.         
 
2.3.3 Economics theory 
The economics theory of supply and demand helps determine the status of markets, 
economic conditions, prices of goods, money supplies and changes required to be made 
in the monetary policy. This theory explains that consumers wants to buy more 
products at a decreasing price and suppliers wants to sell more products at an 
increasing price. Thus, equilibrium reaches when suppliers and consumers agree for a 
price at particular quantity supplied and till then price varies in the markets for goods.     
 
This is called economic equilibrium of price and quantity. The conditions of market 
changes from equilibrium when one of the demand or supply remains unchanged and 
the other attribute changes. These changes in consumers‘ demands and supplies from 
businesses or governments affect the prices of the products and services (Ahlersten, 
2008). Applying this concept to capital markets and financial system; one can 
understand that money supplies basically work from surplus financial institutions to 
monetary deficient financial institutions. For example, investors make a savings 
deposit at bank to earn interest and bank loans that money to the businesses at a fixed 
interest rate to earn margin and pass on to the investors. Thus, money is supplied from 
individuals and banks that are in surplus to the companies requiring money (Madura, 
2003). As seen from the previous discussion of the international trade theory, sovereign 
wealth funds are the financial institutions with surplus foreign reserves to make 
profitable investments for their countries citizens, governments and central banks.  
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These ―investments by SWFs are one type of capital flow between countries so they 
have always been closely related to global imbalances in trade. When countries run 
surpluses on their current account, they generate equal and opposite net capital 
outflows of one sort or another and those capital flows produce an investment income‖ 
(Gieve, 2008, p.196; www.BIS.org, 2010). 
 
The supplies of capital to markets from SWF can change the stock prices, costs of 
capital for businesses and in turn can affect the supplies and demand of money. On the 
other hand, their current and future estimated growth does not make them bigger than 
2% to 6% of the global financial assets. Their current position compared to other 
financial industry segments is shown in the chart below. Hence, their overall impacts 
can be negligible; however, persistent foreign exchange accumulation by SWFs 
sponsoring countries can create vulnerabilities in the world economy and financial 
system. The advantage of SWF investments is multiplied: long term investment 
horizon can help moderating financial market downturns and their strategy for higher 
growth returns can bring efficiency of global asset allocation (Gieve, 2008).  
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Assets under management by SWFs and relative to other investors and size of 
capital markets at the end of 2006 
 
Source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October, 2007 
 
Thus, economics theory helps to analyse the effects of SWFs investments on capital 
markets.  
 
2.3.4 Agency theory  
Agency theory helps explaining the problems between principal and agent, owners and 
managers, employer and employee having a fundamental assumption that each of these 
parties has conflicting interests between them as well as their self interests on their 
own. It is a dominant approach in the economics and finance. This is basically an issue 
of motivation of agents and governance from principals in one perspective; that is 
either of them blames other for not achieving their functional targets or not doing their 
moral duties (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989). The solutions for removal of 
such conflicts are mechanisms by organizations for efficient wages, profit sharing 
schemes, performance measurement, bond or contractual terms, employee stock option 
plans, counselling and training for competency and motivation development. The 
principal – agent relationship can be affected by basic problem of organisation 
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management such as delegation of authority, bureaucratic management style or 
financial incentives or performance. For example, shareholders hire top management 
executives to run the corporation and their differences can be within strategy and 
financial domains of what is the top priority. Thus, agency theory issues requires 
governance and management control mechanisms to be in place as either side of 
principal – agent is responsible and accountable for their actions within the 
organisation and their results. 
 
In the context of sovereign wealth funds, agency theory framework is observed to 
replicate in three different types of conflicts. Since it is a sovereign wealth, the real 
owners of the accumulated wealth are citizens of the SWF sponsoring country. Thus, 
citizens are the actual principals and custodian/ mangers of the wealth that is 
government officials or central bank managers are agents. Hence, it is government 
officials‘ moral and professional responsibility to make SWF profitable and growing 
which can help the economy of the country. The second principal – agent conflict is 
between top management of SWF and employees or external managers who are hired 
to run the organisation. This is same as discussed above in the agency theory. Third 
type of conflict is between SWF as an investment vehicle and investment recipient 
company. In this case, company avails the finance / capital in return of equity and 
profit of the company to SWF. Hence in this type of conflict, the principal is an 
investee company and an agent is the SWF. Thus, one can observe that in a single 
transaction of sovereign wealth being invested in a foreign company, agency theory 
can explain all three major types of conflicts and thus required mechanisms to control 
or to mitigate those conflicts. However, there is not much evidence of academic 
research in this domain of SWF in the literature. There are critics of agency theory that 
it has negative impacts on corporate and national cultures and it enables the conflicts to 
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arise instead of providing solutions for it (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Huse, 2005). One 
cannot agree with critics of agency theory, since agency theory can be viewed as a 
fundamental concept which helps to increase the understanding of these principal – 
agent conflicts. The evidence of these conflicts can be seen in the recent political 
upheavals in the form of revolutions in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. In these cases, 
citizens are principal who entrusted the governments and ruling elites that the 
economies and interests of citizens will be protected by substantial resource and 
accumulated wealth; however, increasing adversaries and turmoil provides the strong 
evidence to the agency theory concept. SWF can help resolving these issues, if their 
legitimacy and transparency is increased and the wealth is used to mitigate domestic 
issues and to signal the growth of economies and industries in these countries. This 
highlights the importance of these political economies and their strong relationship 
with SWF objectives, governance structures and their behaviour. There were few 
protests in specific regions of Oman. These protests could have risen to larger scale 
conflicts; however, Sultan Qaboos – the current ruler of Oman took the right decisions 
of more reforms, committing to funds to domestic demands and complete restructuring 
of the council ministers and portfolios of ministers with new and young faces having 
more opportunities to serve the country. Thus, agency theory can explain the 
differences between SWF management and the sponsoring countries‘ citizens and 
enable to resolve the issues such as current issues in Oman and restructuring of 
ministerial portfolio allocation by the Govt of Oman.      
 
2.3.5 Stewardship theory  
The alternative theory of agency theory is that, managers when allowed to act without 
instructions or supervision on their own initiatives, will act with due responsibility as if 
they are the stewards or custodian of the assets under their management (Barney and 
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Hesterly, 2008). This is the basic principle of hedge fund operations where investors 
rely on the performance of stewards of their wealth. In the SWF context, citizens at 
first rely on government as their stewards of national wealth; then top management, 
central bank, or ministries rely on the recruited employees or hired external wealth 
managers, investment banks as their trusted stewards of sovereign wealth or public 
finances. For example, this is similar to president is expected to govern or to manage 
the national administration within the domain of constitution set by country‘s legal 
framework. The central bank and government officials are the stewards of the 
sovereign wealth for SWFs management. This has been extensively claimed in the 
literature and global practices in SWF management (Bernstein et al, 2009; Norway 
GPFG report, 2010).    
 
The stewardship theory assumes that principal would be satisfied by the agents‘ single 
handed performance or collective success of agents would reflect in the organisation‘s 
overall success (Davis et al, 1997). Thus, stewardship theory suggests that managers 
are assumed to be self-motivated and have no vested self-interests such as corruption. 
This means that goals of principals and agents are closely aligned and matching. The 
only conflict arises when in reality decisions made by stewards on behalf of their 
principals turned out to be not profitable, for example, GCC region SWFs lost 
approximate US$100bn in banking industry investments during 2007 – 09. If 
principals and agents can reconcile their differences over non-profitable decisions 
made such as banking industry example of GCC SWFs then they can move forward in 
pursuing organisational goals rather than putting blames on each other. Thus, success 
of stewardship theories depend on the acceptance of accountability by managers and 
decentralization of power and control by top management as these work together to 
bring results for organisations (Barney and Hesterly, 2008). Following the stewardship 
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theory for SWF, one can understand that citizens of the sponsoring nation expect the 
government and central bank to work together in the national interest. The successful 
examples are SWFs of Norway, China, Singapore and Saudi Arabia where central 
banks have active roles in managing SWFs and providing the legal and regulatory 
mechanisms for financial and non-financial decision making (Anderson, 2010).   
 
2.3.6 Resource based view (RBV) and resource dependency view  
The resource based view is concerned with resources available to determine strategic 
position of the company as compared to their competitors. Thus, fundamental principle 
of the RBV is that firm can create or sustain the competitive advantage by utilizing the 
resources available to the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984). The edge over competitors is 
possible when these resources are valuable, rare, in-imitable and non-substitutable 
(VRIN) as suggested by Barney (1991). These resources can transform the short term 
advantage into long term competitive advantage for the firm if they are heterogeneous 
in nature and not mobile (Peteraf, 1993) and thus, these resources become in-imitable 
and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991). These characteristics of internal organisational 
resources make them necessary to be important; however, they are not alone sufficient 
for organisations to create sustained competitive advantage. Thus, organisations need 
external resources or conditions to be favourable to sustain or to create competitive 
advantage. This concept of external resources dependence is called resource 
dependency theory. The resource dependency theory is based on the assumption that 
procurement of external organisational resources is of strategic importance for 
behaviour of an organisation. Basic argument of resource dependency theory can be 
defined as organisation A‘ competitive advantage over organisation B is equal to the 
organisation B‘s dependence over the organisation A (Salancik, 1979). This means that 
organisations even when competing with each other are dependent on resources, 
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resources are generated within the external environment and resources required by one 
organisation can be a power in the hands of another organisation. This theory attempts 
to establish a direct link between competitive advantage and resource dependence 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Boyd, 1990; Hayward and Boeker, 1998). These resource 
can be employees‘ knowledge or expertise about business or technology, financial 
resources, suppliers alliances, information know how or an advanced technology. The 
interdependency between two organisations for power of such resources would vary 
based on the availability of resources, VRIN characteristics of resources, resource 
allocation by an organisation, dynamic capabilities to generate or to utilise these 
resources by an organisation which has these resources. The arguments of external 
environment and internal resources develop these two concepts as if they are 
contradictory to each other; however, they are not contradictory but they are 
complementary to each other. Because, resource dependency theory (RDT) argues 
about resources in the external environment which is owned by other organisation as a 
power but these resources are the VRIN characteristics resources which are owned by 
other organisation as explained by the resource based view (RBV). Hence, these are 
two different perspectives discussing same resources an organisation can develop, own 
and utilise to sustain a competitive advantage. Thus, in the context of SWFs these 
resources can be country‘s accumulated foreign reserves, national and political 
economy supporting the business and investments culture or profit making asset 
portfolio which is lacked by other SWF. Comparing Oman SWF current portfolio 
worth of US$ 8bn to 13bn with other GCC SWFs having more than US$ 250bn; it can 
be said that Oman SWF requires more VRIN resources. Resource based view and 
resource dependency theory explain that what is required by SWFs to grow as an 
organisation and also help to analyse any conflicting issues regarding resources 
development, availability and utilisation.         
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2.3.7 Stakeholders management theory 
The traditional view of the firm considers that organisations‘ prime duty is to create 
value for their shareholders and in the process satisfy employees, suppliers and 
consumers. On other hand, concept of stakeholders theory given by Freeman (1984) 
suggests that apart from these direct stakeholders: investors, suppliers, employees and 
consumers; there are other parties which must be considered by organisations in their 
operations and relationship management such as government bodies, political groups, 
pressure groups like campaigners, trade associations or unions, associated corporations, 
potential employees, potential consumers, community in which business operates and 
even their competitors in the industry. This stakeholder approach of organisation is 
able to explain both internal – resource based view and external – market based view 
as it integrates which stakeholder group can exert how much pressure on the 
management of the organisation. Also, stakeholders can be identified based on their 
social acceptance, behaviour, time sensitivity and urgency of the organisation to 
manage the stakeholder demands (Mitchell et al, 1997). Also, it enables the managers 
to list out specific stakeholders which are crucial to the survival of the organisation – a 
normative view as well as why these groups shall be treated as important stakeholders 
– a descriptive view (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). The stakeholders‘ relationships 
with organisations can be examined by analysing compatibility of each others‘ interests 
and necessity of connections as defining attributes of the relationships (Friedman and 
Miles, 2002). When analysing every stakeholder or attempting to satisfy every 
stakeholder, managers in organisation come across solving inconsistencies in their 
management style, behaviour, accountability and governance. Thus, stakeholders can 
affect the decision making of the organisation and vice versa, decisions and policies of 
the organisation can affect the specific group of stakeholders (Clarkson, 1998). The 
stakeholders‘ management and decision making differs in private companies and 
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government agencies. Sovereign wealth funds will have different criteria in this regard 
because their primary objective is to improve country‘s economy and portfolio of 
assets to growth and profitability. SWF management have six major stakeholders: 
government, citizens and industry of the SWF sponsoring country; company, 
government and community of investments recipient country. Decision making of 
SWF management shall be in such a way that the interests of these six types of 
stakeholders are maintained. This criterion enables the development of transparency 
and governance mechanisms. The major obligation for SWFs is to citizens of their own 
sponsoring country; their interests are similar as investors or shareholders in the private 
profit making companies because citizens are the actual owners of sovereign wealth.    
 
2.3.8 Isomorphism view  
Institution theory researchers suggest that organisations are socially constructed 
templates from actions within the organisations and interactions with the environment. 
Thus, they consider organisations operating with precise procedures and mechanisms. 
The neo-institutionalism explains social theory as a basis while developing a 
sociological view of institutions in ways that they interact and affect society, a view 
different from economical threads. The theory explains using social environment 
fundamental that why many organisations end up being evolved in different ways still 
having same or similar organisational structures. This is defined as isomorphism view. 
The concept of isomorphism was introduced by Dimaggio and Powell (1983).  
Institutional theory researchers argue that organisations achieve legitimacy, stability 
and resources from the environment by adopting procedures and mechanisms. Four 
basic types of isomorphism achieved by organisations are: competitive isomorphism – 
pressures on organisations due to market competition; coercive isomorphism – 
stemming from political influence and legitimacy issues; mimetic isomorphism – 
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standard or similar responses by organisations to uncertainty or market dynamics and 
normative isomorphism due to same level of professionalism. The concept of 
isomorphism hold true in case of sovereign wealth funds as they attempt to imitate 
each other in terms of organisational structure, political influence, asset creation and 
investment strategy for growth and similar responses to western countries demand for 
governance and transparency. For example, similar protectionist approach is adopted 
by many GCC region SWFs in response to Santiago principles for governance and 
transparency of SWF operations and investments (Anderson, 2009). Isomorphism can 
increase the chances of survival together as it may reduce the impacts of uncertainty 
for a group of organisations such as SWFs from a region; however, it may lead to 
formation of a cartel or a group being isolated in a wider industry perspective.                 
 
2.3.9 Strategic leadership theory  
Strategic leadership has two major functions: management of communication internal 
and external to the organisation and refinement of decision making process 
(Cornelissen, 2004). The roots of the strategic role of the leadership are in the 
managerial roles (Mintzberg, 1989) and upper echelons perspective developed by 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) and organisational behaviour of the firms. Hence, 
decision making of the top managers is affected by many factors as explained by these 
theories; however, economically rational decisions are often difficult to make as 
decision making is influenced by various factors such as external environment, social 
context and multi-purpose stakeholder demands. This holds true in case of sovereign 
wealth funds as many sponsoring countries of SWFs do not have democratic political 
economies where decisions can be influenced by non-financial motives. Therefore, 
their decision making can reveal what are the values and objectives of their leaders. 
The extension of this concept is called strategic leadership theory (Finkelstein and 
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Hambrick, 1996). Thus any observations regarding managerial cognition or 
organisational outcomes can help predict each other (Knight et. al., 1999). This theory 
gives strong emphasis to executives own orientation rather than governance conflicts 
as a cause of poor performance. Thus, analyses of decision making or managerial 
perception can explain the operations and predict the future of sovereign wealth fund. 
Both these methods are applied as part of this study: interviewing managers and 
structured questionnaire about decision making in Oman SWF.  
 
2.3.10   New mercantilism theory  
The mercantilism is considered to have economic exchange resulting in a zero – sum 
gain with capital is accumulated by winner in the exchange. Gilson and Milhaupt 
(2008) have defined SWFs as neo-mercantalism stating that SWFs use company level 
behaviour to maximize the return for country level benefits such as economic, social 
and political benefits. According to this theory SWF objectives and management 
should aim country level benefits. Gilson and Milhaupt (2008) found similar 
characteristics in Chinese economy, trade policy and China Investment Corporation 
(CIC). This is not same for other SWFs such as Norway or GCC region funds. 
Schweitzer provides alternative explanation that SWFs are imperialist – capitalist 
institutions and they can exploit the capitalist system for their own. Thus, neo-
mercantalism theory is not able to explain the behaviour and structures of all SWFs.        
 
 
2.3.11      Autonomy maximization theory  
Sovereign Wealth Funds have received much of attention in this decade and more 
during the global financial crisis as critical investors. Mixed reactions have ranged 
from their political motives, state intervention and long term investors who will take on 
higher risks for new technologies and higher return. The fact overlooked by investors 
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and researchers is that SWFs are deep rooted in their respective political economies of 
sponsoring countries. Pistor and Hatton (2011) analyzed the four large SWFs: Kuwait, 
Abu Dhabi, Singapore and China to conclude that strategies deployed by management 
of these SWFs can be better explained by autonomy – maximization theory. Each of 
these four SWFs are controled by political economies of decades of elite families 
ruling whose grip on power is attached to the economic fortune of their country and 
their ability to balance against any foreign intervention. The establishment of SWF is 
to balance the demands of capital to foreign markets / governments and profit sharing 
and welfare to their own citizens. Thus, setting of SWF has a major objective of 
continuing grip on power and wealth of the sponsoring country for these elite ruling 
families. SWFs help in protecting and maximizing their autonomy within the global 
financial system and reduce the risks of any turmoil at domestic level within the 
country; however, recent uprising in Middle Eastern and North African countries of 
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya are the examples that benefits of accumulated wealth were 
not shared to citizens of these countries. Under the concept of autonomy maximization 
theory, SWFs attempts to maximize the autonomy of the ruling elite over the 
management of SWF and within sponsoring country. Thus, SWFs are controlled by 
government without any direct beneficiary or liability except reporting and responding 
to ministry in government. Many SWFs sponsoring countries do not have democratic 
political economies and thus, SWFs are not directly accountable to their citizens. 
Internal structures of these SWFs make sure that they are directly accountable and 
managed by ruling elite or their trusted stewards. Thus, SWFs first objective is to help 
maintain the position and autonomy of ruling elites in the sponsoring country. This was 
evident in the analyses of four large SWFs done in their research of SWFs management 
and behavior by Pistor and Hatton (2011). Next sections review the literature of SWF 
development and management in detail beyond their theoretical roots.  
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2.4 Development of sovereign wealth funds in the last two decades    
This section discusses how SWFs have grown into current status of more than US $ 3 
trillion from its early stage developments and how trade and regulators view SWFs.  
 
2.4.1 Early SWFs  
The SWF is not to be considered as a new phenomenon because the concept of 
utilizing execess national income for long term investments is over 60 years old, with 
establishment of Kuwait investment authority (KIA) in 1953 and Kiribati Revenue 
Equalization Reserve Fund in 1956. The goal of the fund was to ensure that state‘s 
population will benefit from revenues of their diminishing resources (Anderson, 2009). 
SWF of Kuwait is an example of the commodity funds because of investing surplus oil 
revenue, now having approximately US$ 250bn. The two first SWFs (Kuwait and 
Kiribati) were set up so that wealth from a finite commodity source can be channelled 
wisely with a vision for the future. Thus, the primary goals of the funds‘ establishments 
have been reducing the fluctuations in government revenues, countering the boom-bust 
cycles of oil and phosphate prices, and building up savings for future generations from 
an exhaustible natural resource. The logic and motivating factors behind establishing 
these funds have been based on the idea of spending some wealth on current 
consumption, some on current investment and yet some saved for future generations 
(Hassan, 2009). The ADIA (Abu Dhabi Investment Authority) was established in 1976, 
but its foundations date back to the 1960s when Abu Dhabi was under colonial rule and 
advisors to royal family managed their investments. Therefore, ADIA has global level 
management and investment strategy well before its establishment (Hassan, 2009). The 
underlying attribute is the same, which is to invest earnings of exhaustible natural 
resources which can bring returns for the next generations to safeguard an existing 
regime and to create incrementally the non-oil dependent economy structure 
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(Anderson, 2009; Oman Vision 2020 report). The first few GCC funds have been oil 
income based commodity funds; however in 1981, the Singapore launched Global 
Investment Corporation (GIC) which was non-commodity based whilst having its 
primary aim of getting higher returns from Singapore‘s international trade imbalances.  
 
2.4.2 Trade and regulators’ view of SWF  
The owner of a SWF is a ‗sovereign‘ or a state – it is an account for the nation‘s 
savings so it has to do with ‗wealth‘ but it is also a ‗fund‘ because it is a basket of 
financial instruments or, in short, it could be termed as ―a state repository of wealth‖. 
There is a great variety of definitions of SWFs (Hassan, 2009, p. 11) used within the 
literature and practice, some of them are as follows: 
 ―Pools of money derived from a country’s reserves, which are set aside for 
investment purposes to benefit the country’s economy and citizens. The funding 
of SWFs comes from central bank reserves that accumulate as a result of 
budget and trade surpluses, and even from revenue generated from exports of 
natural resources‖ (Hassan, 2009, p.11 from Investopedia.com, 2007). 
 ―Some governments create special-purpose government funds, usually called 
SWFs, to hold assets of the economy for long-term objectives. The funds to be 
invested commonly arise from commodity sales, the proceeds of privatizations, 
and/or the accumulation of foreign financial assets by the authorities‖ (IMF 
Balance of payments and international investment position, www.IMF.org, 
March 2008). 
 ―At a most basic level, SWF is a mechanism for moving a country’s savings 
from the present to the future. SWF can be ranging from central bank’s section 
to being an independent financial corporation‖ (Ang, 2010, p.1-2). 
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There are some common characteristics of the SWFs regardless of the various 
definitions. Firstly, more and more the SWFs comprise of ―alternative assets such as 
stocks, property, venture fund, private equity fund or hedge fund holdings, 
infrastructure assets or other non-bond type financial assets.‖ (Hassan, 2009, p. 11)   
 
The goal is to realise higher returns from these assets as opposed to the low return 
environment which has been dominant in the treasury markets (where historically the 
official reserves have invested). In order to attain the higher returns, the SWF 
managers can take more risks than the private companies‘ managers as the leverage of 
SWF is nil as this money comes from government‘s excess reserves and not created by 
issuing debt. Therefore, SWF managers can have more aggressive approach towards 
profit seeking and make investment for longer term without worrying about depositors. 
This is how SWFs are different from private equities, hedge funds and wealth 
management banks as they do not have any liabilities or coupon redemptions like 
bonds or debentures (Clark and Monk, 2009; Hassan, 2009; Ang, 2010). As a result of 
this, SWFs‘ investment strategy has long term outlook with capacity to be resilient for 
short term volatility.  
 
In the most general terms, SWF can be described as a surplus capital which is a 
national investment tool of its own, considered to be in excess of a country‘s foreign 
reserves and thus also managed separately. These excess funds can be used in ways 
which have never been common for the managers of foreign reserves. The latter have 
very specific usage – typically they can provide short-term currency stabilization and 
liquidity management and that has determined, in historical perspective, the preferred 
size of a nation‘s foreign exchange reserve. In addition, because there is a need to 
provide ready availability in times of crisis or market fluctuation, usually the practice 
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has been to invest foreign reserves in short-term ‗safe‘ markets. When a country 
possesses excess monetary holdings, above the foreign reserve requirement, then they 
are a surplus which could lead to increasing the currency in circulation, support 
consumption, and/or be invested to meet future needs. However, in cases when such 
surplus is accumulating faster than it could be used in the economy (without the risk of 
currency devaluation, inflation or both), it could become a sovereign wealth fund. The 
latter provides a tool for investments which do not have to immediately result in a 
profit or could even generate a loss over a short period. 
―This makes the sovereign wealth fund a pool of money that can be put back into 
international circulation through corporate acquisitions, stock purchases, and even 
real-estate speculation‖ (Anderson, 2009, p.14–17).  
 
Consequently, the sovereign wealth fund managers can be the new instrument of 
national power, making investments previously limited to hedge-fund managers, and 
with the capabilities to acquire, invest and sell in a way which could profoundly affect 
a competitor‘s domestic and foreign policies.  
 
The usual accumulators of such excess funds are the oil-producing states but some 
non-commodity exporting countries are also making a fortune. For example, in 2006 
China had reserve assets which were 12.5 times the size of Beijing‘s short-term foreign 
debt; also Japan and Korea ―had roughly twice the reserves required to defend against 
a repeat of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis.‖ Essentially sovereign wealth funds can 
be used for risky investments because they supply cash without the need to secure 
outside audit, partners, or tangible collateral deposits (Anderson, 2009, p. 14-18). For 
examples, ADIA of UAE and GIC of Singapore are among top ten SWFs having assets 
worth approximately US$875 bn and US$330 bn in 2007 (Appendix-G).  
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The few large and wealthy multinational companies which already have this option can 
hardly compare to the sheer size of some of the sovereign wealth funds. Next section 
discusses the importance of such bigger asset base SWFs and their growth in the last 
two decades.  
 
2.4.3 Growth of SWFs in the last two decades  
SWF in the last decade has grown to a considerable in size where it can influence the 
composition and participants in the global capital markets. Mc Kinsey analysts Farrell 
et al (2007) suggest that new pool of investors such as GCC funds, central banks from 
Asian developing economies, private equities and hedge funds from Middle East 
together hold approx. US$ 170 trillion assets at the end of 2007 which may grow 
beyond US$ 200 trillion by 2013 which may help strong formation of existing and new 
SWFs in coming years (Farrell et al, 2007; Greene and Yeager, 2008). Rise in oil 
prices to the level ofUS$150 per barrel during 2002 to 2008 has given total known 
liquidity of approx.US$3.4 to 3.8 trillion in SWF as shown in Appendix G.  
 
As one can see in the Appendix G, that SWFs are divided into mainly two sections: 
first section of Oil income based SWFs which are GCC funds, Norway, Russia, 
Venezuela and Indonesia; and second other non-commodities based funds such as 
China and Singapore. Their collective assets are approx. US$ 3.4 trillion; however it is 
far less than pension funds - US$21.6 trillion, mutual funds US$19.3 trillion and 
insurance companies US$18.5 trillion. This emphasizes less influence of SWFs over 
the market movements as compared to other asset classes. But these private capital 
markets have continued to grow in recent years, for example private placement of 
equities has been increasing at the rate of 60% whereas initial public offerings‘ growth 
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at a rate of 17% since 2002. Bulk of global foreign exchange reserve is still held in 
dollars (Gieve, 2008; Greene and Yeager, 2008).        
SWFs investments have earned more publicity than profit in recently which has 
become a political issue in terms of foreign governments getting control over strategic 
assets of an investee country, its economy and markets (Yi-chong, 2009). This went 
onto emerged in democratic party primary debate in US presidential campaign between 
the then Senators Hilary Clinton, Barack Obama and John Edward on 14
th
 January, 
2008 (www.nytimes.com, 2008). This may overemphasize SWFs as a threat which 
may be unnecessary and not advantageous in terms of economic advantages globally 
(Kotter and Lel, 2011). Before branding SWF as a negative aspect for an investee 
country, it would be necessary to look at their varying investment objectives and 
strategies, their existing and long term benefits and to see if present system can be 
improved for transparency and accountability (Greene and Yeager, 2008). This 
unprecedented growth of SWF can be attributed to following reasons:  
- Commodity prices boom and heavy tax on private commodity exporters in 
SWF countries   
- Accumulation of foreign reserves from current account surpluses  
- Fundamental difference from monetary authorities, central banks or private 
equity or hedge funds operations (Aizenman and Glick, 2008).  
 
These reasons allow SWF to operate on long term and high risk investments creating 
them as separate type of financial institution or industry. This summarily changes their 
determinants and influence of global finance which is explained in the next section.     
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Most of the SWF growth is recent; hence there is a greater effort to systematically 
generate data. In 1990 fund assets were estimated at US$ 500bn and new suggestions 
point that SWFs may reach over US$ 10 trillion in a decade time (Jen, 2007; Hassan, 
2009). Much of this growth is due to the rising price of oil and gas, and is 
predominantly concentrated in producing nations: Saudi Arabia, Norway, the United 
Arab Emirates (particularly Abu Dhabi), Russia, Qatar and Kuwait. However, other 
important countries, such as China, have achieved trade surpluses and generated 
reserves as a result of their exports.  
 
SWFs establishment from governments around the world has increased dramatically in 
the last decade. Analysts have found that out of 20 largest SWFs only seven SWFs 
were there prior to 90s (Anderson, 2009). Hassan (2009) points out that 45% of the top 
40 SWFs came into existence during 2000 and 2007, while 21% of SWFs were 
established during 1990 and 1999. The success and assets of Singapore SWF has made 
Korea and China establishing SWFs. India and Japan are considering to launch similar 
non-commodity based sovereign wealth funds from their foreign exchange reserves 
(Anderson, 2009).  
 
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 which resulted in the collapse of currencies and 
created fears about a global economic meltdown, led to a boom in the Asian SWFs 
because Asian governments set up pools of funds to protect against currency crisis. 
Firstly, it was international institutions which recommended that ―countries have 
reserves that should be a multiple of their import bills‖ (Hassan, 2009, p.31). Then, 
there was a significant growth in such funds, above the countries‘ immediate needs as a 
result of the international trade imbalances. Exchange rates also fuelled the growth as 
stronger currency rates for China and other East Asian countries‘ exports reached high 
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levels. Such excess sums of money led to the formation of SWFs which would provide 
sponsoring countries the means for diversifying their reserves for asset creation in 
terms of foreign investments. Particularly, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries, including Russia, generate resources for their SWFs from oil revenues and 
these resources are far above their immediate needs. Regardless of domestic spending 
and fiscal requirements, GCC countries managed to save vast sums from oil exports in 
last decade when oil price was more than US $ 50 per barrel as anything more than 
import bills requirement was utilized for asset accumulation (Hassan, 2009). This 
created net private inflows above the official asset accumulation for many Asian and 
GCC economies. Here, it is important to note that all SWFs do not have same sources 
of fund. As one can see in the Appendix G, top six funds are far ahead of others in 
asset base and they control more than 75% total assets owned by all SWFs. Next 
section details these SWFs current investment strategies and related performance issues 
stemming from their current attempts to grow their asset base as discussed above.  
 
2.5 Investment strategies of SWFs 
 As defined in the previous sections, SWF is a state controlled investing entity as 
contrary to state controlled operating companies which can be categorised based on 
their fund sources, investment objectives and perspective of setting up SWF (Greene 
and Yeager, 2008). As cited in Bernstein et al (2009), there can be three major 
categories of SWF perspectives, i.e. development perspective – broader expansion 
objectives with savings collection and long term view of sustainable development, 
political perspective – investments made with political agenda or favouring the projects 
of political leaders or ministerial decision making or agency perspective – for example 
a state owned bank with an idea to maximize community welfare. Their findings of 
2662 deals of SWF between 1984 and 2007 suggest that investment strategy differs 
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with ‗who takes decisions‘: political leaders or professional managers. This can even 
lead to high or low return before or after investment. Also, it influences the numbers of 
investments made within the country or out the country or region in case of GCC 
nations. Hence, governance structure can affect the investment strategy, objectives and 
performance of the fund.        
  
Megginson et al (2009) claim from their study of 1216 investments made during 1986 
to 2007 that average investment is of US$ 55million and over 30% are made in 
financial firms. They suggest that there can be two rationales behind SWF investment 
patterns and that affecting firm performance and value. If SWF act as passive investors 
then recipient firm and SWF both loses the money and value. This is also true in case 
of short term buy and hold investments by SWF. On the other hand, if long term and 
large stake investments are involved then it helps both SWF and investee firm to derive 
value and profitable return leading to growth from it. Therefore, it can be inferred that 
better governance and transparency with larger stake involvement is necessary but it 
can arise conflicts with minority shareholder and create negative influence in most 
cases. There could be reason of SWF picking poor investment opportunities due to 
political pressures and that leads to investments blocked in matured or deteriorating 
industries with no regulatory framework.  
 
Rose (2008) suggest while supporting this fact, existing regulations induce passive 
investor behaviour to SWF which actually reduces the threat of SWF as politically 
motivated investors. Passivity may be of two types: one by rule that investors cannot 
buy the stake to control the issuers of securities and secondly, SWF may voluntarily do 
not take any interest in engaging to management of the firm. In either case, it may 
trigger the divestment by SWF in case firm could not perform and deliver the 
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profitable returns. This may turn push – pull effects in the investment patterns of SWF 
as they inject the money seeking the opportunity but passivity lead to pull out the 
funds. This can lead to the conclusion that SWF as a long term co-share holder is a 
better perspective than highly leveraged hedge and private equity fund. In dealing with 
this qualitative issues of governance, objectives and investment purpose, SWF have 
become trend follower even though having US$ 3.1trillion of wealth accumulation. 
Thus, SWF management shall pay at the least equal attention to pure quantitative and 
financial measures of asset allocation, profitability and risk – return balance. While 
these management tradeoffs happen in decision making within SWF, they fear to 
disclose little information of their investment activities (Balding, 2008). This raises the 
performance issues of SWF stemming from maintaining a balance between qualitative 
and quantitative fund management practices and measures. Also, the performance can 
be affected by in country rules and management of SWF by decision makers in 
addition to regulatory frameworks and investments controlling laws such as in EU or 
USA. These regulations of recipient countries and standards of sponsoring countries 
are explained in detail as follows.   
They differ from private equities (PE) where funds follow the managerial expertise and 
every intricate details of investment receiving company is analysed by PE groups. In 
case of SWF, decisions are taken by political leaders and ministers of the government 
and only suggested by professional managers. This can have counter effects on the 
performance of SWF investments made and management of the rest of financial 
reserve. Bernstein et al (2009) found that profit earnings ratios and post-investment 
performance of the industries which receive the money differ in both cases where 
politicians are involved in the decision making and external managers are involved. 
Bernstein et al (2009) analysed 2662 investments deals done during period of 1984 to 
2007 by 29 different SWFs in various forms such as acquisitions, venture capital, PE 
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investments and other structured public firms positions. This investment strategy 
difference found in their research study can be attributed to capabilities of politicians 
and managers in addition to the ultimate goals of SWF as it can be social needs, 
economical balance needs or political influence. In this study, it is attempted to analyse 
SWFs in all three different perspectives: development, political and company. This 
shall enable to provide recommendations comprising investment strategies, new 
regulatory reforms and policies to strengthen the SWF system and business process in 
case of Oman. Next section provides more detailed overview of these global 
perspectives regarding SWF and their management in terms of policy and investment 
strategies. 
Major characteristics of SWFs investment strategies include being passive investors, 
long term fund flow guarantee, no liabilities, minimal FDI component, no high 
leverage like PE or Hedge funds and gradually moving towards diversified portfolio. 
For example, GCC funds from Qatar and UAE have increased their exposure to PE 
group and alterative assets. The following table shows composition and asset allocation 
of selected SWFs as of December, 2006.  
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Table 2.3 Composition and asset allocation of SWF investments  
 
Source: Singh (2008) 
Focusing on the SWF‘s direct private equity investments is one way of analyzing their 
investment strategies since the private equity market has greater information 
asymmetries than public markets. Therefore, such an analysis exposes differences 
among institutions (Lerner et al, 2009; Bernstein et al, 2009). Bernstein et al (2009) 
have analysed such differences in terms of SWFs investment styles and performance; 
and focused their analyses on three factors: domestic investment level, equity prices at 
the deal time and size of the acquired stakes. As a result, there are six patterns 
emerging with regard to SWFs (Bernstein et al, 2009, p.3), which can be summarized 
as follows: 
i. The high level of domestic and foreign equity prices determines directly the 
likelihood of investing home or abroad respectively; 
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ii. Domestic investments happen at lower price-earnings (P/E) ratios when higher 
P/E levels are outside mainly in case of Asian and GCC funds while the 
opposite is true for the Western funds‘ investments.  
iii. Asian and GCC SWFs to a lesser extent experience drop in the P/E ratios of 
their domestic investments in a year time whilst their foreign investments see 
appreciation and increasing P/E ratios.  
iv. When politicians are involved in the governance or decision making, it is likely 
to have higher investments domestically as compared decisions of external 
managers. Bernstein et al (2009) observed ―trend chasing‖ and ―worse 
performance‖ because of ―less sophisticated decision structures within these 
funds or outright irrgularities in the investment process due to political or 
agency problems‖. The politically motivated investments select industries with 
higher P/E ratios.  
v. When the variable ―propensity to invest domestically‖ is controlled for, 
external managers tend to invest in lower P/E ratio industries whereas 
ministerial decisions tend to invest in higher P/E ratio industries.  
vi. Since, external managers invested in lower P/E ratio companies, their 
investments see higher P/E rations later in the deal as compared to investments 
involving politicians.  
 
Bernstein et al (2009) state that what the various accounts by practitioners and 
observers suggest is that institutional investors vary substantially in their investment 
criteria and sophistication, some concluding that institutions often rely on excessively 
rigid criteria or do not have ―a sufficient understanding of key asset classes.‖ The 
reasons behind this is, they are connected to inappropriate incentives, e.g. restricted 
compensation and autonomy for investment officers (resulting in frequent turnover), 
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choosing safe investments even with modest returns, pressure to invest in locally 
sponsored projects even if the social benefits and returns again will be modest. Across 
different types of institutional investors one can identify great heterogeneity in 
investment strategies and returns (Gompers and Metrick, 2001 and Lerner, et al., 2007 
as cited in Bernstein et al, 2009). The examples of Singaporean SWFs investing in 
China and India and Norway‘s Government Pension Fund decreasing the shares of 
Icelandic banks, show that the choice of certain investment strategies of SWFs, or the 
abandonment of particular investment intentions, can be the result of political interests 
and geopolitical strategy. Next section details how these strategies and performance 
issues of SWF affect them in their role for sponsoring and investee countries.     
 
2.6 The role of SWF for sponsoring and investee countries  
This section attempts to explore the role of SWFs can play for sponsoring and investee 
countries as they are interwoven with different components such as international trade 
or money supply. This review would bring more policy implications and factors 
affecting SWFs to the fore.   
 
SWF are part of a tectonic shift of decoupling financial markets where growth is no 
longer belongs to OECD  (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
of 30 developed countries consortium) countries but emerging markets have more to 
contribute in the form of investments made by many Middle Eastern and Asian 
countries‘ SWF (Pimco, 2008). The figure 2.1 below shows the contribution of 
emerging markets and developing countries to global output growth. For example, the 
Latin American companies like Cemex, Vale, and Petrobras are actively worldwide 
and becoming major influencers in their respective industries with expansion and 
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investments. The trend is followed by companies from Russia, India, China and South 
Africa.  
 
Figure 2.1 Developing countries & emerging markets contribution to world GDP 
 
Sources: OECD Development Centre and IMF (2008) 
 
Asian markets were not always on the periphery but they are re-emerging in the 
context that India and China were actually contributing more than 40% of world GDP 
during 1700 to 1820 then reduced to less than 10% and now again increasing and 
already reached to a level of 22% expected to become 32% by 2030. In terms of capital 
inflows, emerging markets received US$ 953bn and outflow was US$ 1600bn in 2007 
(Santiso, 2008). In 2007 foreigners invested US$ 920bn in US markets, bonds and 
govt. securities in which 39% came from emerging market economies. This flurry of 
activity is attributed to consolidation of their national wealth from various sources like 
commodity revenues or foreign exchange reserves leading social, financial and 
economic consolidation. This is proved in figure 2.2 below from rise in the last decade 
value and number deals by sovereign wealth fund management.     
 
 
 72 
Figure 2.2  SWF deals quantity and value 
 
Source: OECD Development Centre; based on David Marchick, Carlyle Group 
Thomson Financial as mentioned in Santiso (2008) 
 
The advantages from these deals can be materialised to both SWF and country 
receiving funding only upon positive performance of the businesses. There is obvious 
positive outlook on the intervention of SWF investment on businesses such as SWF 
involvement can create positive atmosphere to stock market about the firm which is 
receiving funds. Research conducted on 166 investment announcements during 1990 – 
2009 show that there was no destabilization effects on the markets and companies 
whilst SWF acquisition took place after these announcements (Sun et al, 2009). This 
proves the positive financial impact of SWF investments in the stock market. For 
example, Fotak et al (2008) find positive mean returns of SWF holdings in publicly 
traded companies. As far as funds and investments are concerned, behaving same as 
other investment vehicles such as private equities, SWF may provide improved 
governance and profitability in the acquired holding by acting as monitors at the least. 
Some SWF portfolio analyses suggest that they act as economic driven investors 
having greater influence than expected on the global capital markets (Balding, 2008). 
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Since, SWFs are not only managed as investment vehicles but are managed by central 
reserve banks and their respective finance ministries, as in the case of Oman, these 
funds shall be aligned with risk reducing approach to monetary and fiscal policies, 
treasury and debt management decisions leading to wide scope of government 
operations. Within the country SWF is a key resource safeguarding the economic 
progress and foreign currency stabilization but to achieve such a macro-economic 
objective, SWF shall operate on the basis of best practices in meeting the challenges 
and trade offs in the decision making for investments (Mitchell et al, 2008).   
 
Western countries governments specifically few EU countries and USA were started 
worrying about motives of SWF investment and claim that the extent of SWF 
acquisitions must be regulated and controlled with full disclosure of investments by 
SWF to avoid any catastrophic effects on financial markets as debate continues for 
their potential impact on global finances and trade. Western countries may pay 
attention to the emergence, progress and development perspective of SWF which 
shows the larger section of investment activities by SWF comprise domestic 
development issues (Reisen, 2008). This wave of fear in western governments is 
possibly generated from the fact that 75% SWF are from Middle East and Asia and 
only 15% are from OECD countries. For example, few SWFs have sole agenda of 
industrial development in homelands like Malaysia‘s Khazanah (Radhi, 2008). The 
debates about western countries‘ fear of low governance, transparency and objectives 
of SWF investments have its roots in long standing policy issues such as EU neglecting 
Gulf region except its energy needs, market access and security motives (Baabood, 
2006). However there is no need to be wary of SWFs for western governments mainly 
in EU and USA because improved relations between GCC and EU/USA can bring in 
enormous benefits to both regions by sharing their experiences for regional 
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cooperation, economical and political reforms and business interests such as in 
education, training and media beyond trade and politics (Baabood, 2009). Also, SWFs 
are not only coming from GCC region as that can be seen from their worldwide origins 
in table 2.2. Further, the losses made in the banking industry investments amounting to 
US$ 31bn by SWFs during 2007 – 2009 are also evidence that there is no need to 
spread unnecessary fear of their investments by western governments.     
 
Table 2.2 SWF origin in 2008 
 
Region Number 
of SWFs 
Total assets in 
US$ billions 
% of 
total 
Middle East 7 1533 48 
Asia 9 867 27 
OECD 10 489 15 
Russia& central Asia 4 177 6 
Africa 7 109 3 
Latin America 5 23 1 
Pacific Islands 6 1.2 .04 
Total 47 3194  
 
Source: Santiso (2008) 
 
Hence, this poses two major questions for SWFs: how to invest funds for nation‘s 
profit? And, if returns are low in OECD countries like what happened in USA banking 
industry investments then is it wise enough to invest in short term liquid securities of 
industrial countries? Many professionally managed funds have diversified their 
investments towards MENASA region (Middle East, North Africa and South Asia) 
which shows their major motive is to be development oriented with profit 
maximisation for their investments (Summers, 2008).      
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This has happened as OECD countries have really low returns rate, for example as 
calculated by a fund manager and cited in Kjaer (2008), the rerun on a dollar invested 
in oil for a century long period is just another dollar more by 2005 but the same dollar 
can generate 375 dollars return if invested in equities and 5 dollars if in fixed income 
instruments. Hence, asset allocation and portfolio management is very important if 
SWF want to be a major growth vehicle for their national economies. The simulation 
conducted by European Central Bank shows that SWF asset allocation strategies are 
more like a capital asset pricing model (CAPM) which is more market capitalization 
based rather than liquidity base. This can results into high return – high risks strategies 
and fund flow to high GDP growth countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China 
(BRIC) group. This results into increasing role of SWFs those countries plus money 
supply available to riskier businesses rather than low return less risky businesses (Beck 
and Fidora, 2008; Balin, 2010). In this slow paced manner, SWFs can bring change to 
the economies and market conditions rather than affecting stock markets all of a 
sudden. The only issue here is: emerging markets are very volatile, commodity 
dependent and exhibit low risk and high return but politically not more stable than 
OECD countries. More investments for higher return to emerging markets can crate 
need for financial policy restructuring in low and middle income countries of emerging 
and developing markets. These fund winning countries shall understand that SWFs are 
development and financing institutions with profit and long return motive. Neither 
SWF are donating money nor do they have regional development goals like World 
Bank. Many SWFs are professionally managed and not by ministers so they are 
rational and economic driven investors (Balding 2008; Mitchell et al, 2008).               
 
Apart from this, there is no evidence that SWF have destabilized any market. Because, 
western government concerns that SWF holdings in key assets could pose threat to 
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prices, volatility in stock markets and imbalance to complete system. This may not be 
true as SWF are small in size compared to other markets and institutional assets. Many 
SWF have also adopted professional approach such as Norway uses globally designed 
divestment process to avert price and stability pressures. Unlike hedge funds and 
private equity groups, SWF do not use any debt or leveraged to raise the finances 
which could prove more stabilizing than disturbing to markets. Also, SWF have long 
term investment criteria with no liabilities so that they can have longer funds locked-in 
period. SWF are more diversified than central banks, have no investors which would 
force them to divest, have stable incoming revenue sources, all these in turn allow 
SWF to contribute growth and stability in the markets and buffer against commodity 
prices‘ volatility (Singh, 2008).       
Sir Gieve (2008) in his speech emphasised that SWFs are a result of persistent large 
global imbalances and have helped in creating vulnerabilities in the world economic 
and financial systems. Major cause of this is SWF and their respective central banks 
have started to invest for higher returns and for diversifying their asset allocation. This 
actually shall improve global asset allocation but this is possible by increase in long 
term investment vision, improved transparency and different approach by recipient 
countries to collectively move towards global financial integration instead of new form 
of protectionism. Much debate about SWF has focused recently on political concerns 
after their steady growth in the last decade and emergence as strong financial vehicles. 
Such as, do SWF help pursuing political motives or will resistance to SWF investments 
can create protectionism issues. 
The above discussion confirms that SWF have a critical and larger role to play in 
global finance. Their present size is not considerable compared to other financial 
markets. The arguments of political motives, conspiracy and lack of transparency have 
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emerged which can be resolved with co-operation between growing SWFs and 
knowledge pool for financing and investments from developed countries such as USA, 
UK and Germany (Santiso, 2008). The fact is that SWF help in stabilizing the markets 
where they invest and based on the earnings long term higher return in their nations 
also.  
There are multiple reasons for creating a SWF and it is likely that its creation would 
lead to wealth accumulation. One of the primary objectives of the SWF is income 
stabilisation, i.e. the SWF can act as a stabiliser for the respective government, 
especially with the commodity based funds. Some of the benefits for a domestic 
economy are due to the fact that the government can rely on the SWF to smooth out the 
discrepancies between the price of a commodity in an international market (which 
price may fluctuate) and the needs of domestic spending. For example, when 
commodity prices are high, governments can increase funds inflow to their respective 
SWFs to reduce the events of an excessive inflation. This increased inflow however 
reduces the domestic spending.  On the other hand, when commodity prices are low 
governments can utilize returns from the increased inflow of SWFs for fiscal purposes 
such as to balance budget and provide services to population (Hassan, 2009). 
According to Alberola and Serena (2008, p.326) ―SWFs are the result of a policy 
action to smooth extreme economic impact—and drastic adjustments—derived from 
large exogenous shocks‖.  
 
Hence, according to economic theories SWF setting up is more beneficial as compared 
to simple reserve accumulation by central banks (Ang, 2010). The SWF set up can also 
benefit income transfer across generations, i.e. there is an inter-temporal effect created 
by the SWF. Some of the income which is earned from the sales of commodities or 
export earnings can be saved for future generations by placing it into secure assets such 
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as government securities or US treasury bills (Anderson, 2009). Alternatively, some 
income can be allocated to different assets by diversifying the portfolio to reduce the 
risk for meeting any future pension liabilities (Hassan, 2009). The industry sectors and 
regional economies in which SWFs have invested the results tend to be value creation. 
Therefore, there are certain benefits from quick and large infusions of liquidity. SWFs 
are a stabilising force for sectors and economies because they are long-term investors 
which do not have pressures to liquidate their holdings on short-term needs. To have 
capital available for the long duration means managers can have recovery time from 
short to medium economic downturns. This can have an especially positive effect on 
companies with general stability but which may have been experiencing the effects of 
an overall economic downturn. Another advantage of the SWFs is that, unlike publicly 
listed companies, they do not have extensive processes for disclosure. So, if their 
investment committees take a decision, then the SWFs can also react with a quick 
decision. Thus, the combination of size and speed in times of market turbulence can 
prove to be very beneficial. The recent global credit crunch example has shown how 
SWFs can support the capital base of distressed companies in a situation in which even 
the important banks were under threat. However, as the crisis deepened, the SWFs had 
to step aside and wait for calming of the markets, while the governments via Central 
Banks had to interfere and shore up or even nationalise distressed financial institutions. 
In general, SWFs are not affected by market volatility as their reserves are not leverage 
based whilst having no investor pressure for investments sell off. Hence, SWF as an 
investor can support long term stability of investee companies (Hassan, 2009). Also, 
the SWFs contribute to the stabilisation of asset prices because of their large and 
prompt liquidity. There is a psychological factor when SWFs enter into a market – 
when a major firm has a turn around, then other firms in the same sector are positively 
affected.  
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The presence of SWFs has the effect of reducing interest rate in the investee countries 
since businesses have option of funding from SWFs (Hassan, 2009). The fact of SWFs 
can take a longer term view of their investments that enables them to make strategic 
bets, and they can accept short-term volatility in return of a long-term gain. SWFs can 
protect the costs of borrowing because their investment allows ―the firm soliciting the 
investment to not disclose their troubles in public‖ (Hassan, 2009, p. 74-77). 
By avoiding public disclosure the company could be saved from a possible downgrade. 
Assuming the position of a recipient of SWF funds, its benefit derives from the 
potential of having privileged access to the markets of the SWF‘s country. For 
example, if Singapore invests in Merrill Lynch, then the latter will also receive the 
support of the Singaporean authorities to access the Asian market. Also, after a 
substantial investment by Singapore in Merrill Lynch, ―then if Merrill is planning to 
locate a hub in the Asia region, there will be natural predisposition to locating it in 
Singapore.‖  
Thus, the benefits can be two-way, similar to a joint-venture undertaken across markets 
– ―one of the benefits is that the outside firm gets access to new markets, along with the 
added benefit of getting an infusion of capital‖ (Hassan, 2009, p.74).  
SWFs have started to shift their previous two decades old policy of market engagement 
through equity funds to the new investment strategy by direct acquisition of stake in 
companies for example deals of Qatar Investment Authority in Barclays in 2008 during 
credit crisis or deals of Citigroup or Credit Suisse by other GCC SWFs. The benefits of 
old policy were more favourable for hedge funds and private equity groups as money 
from SWF to their accounts were low cost debts as compared to market rates (Hassan, 
2009). During March 2007 to June 2008, SWFs have invested approx. US$ 59bn in 
financial institutions such as Citigroup, Barclays, Credit Suisse, Morgan Stanley, 
Merrill Lynch and UBS; such a buying spree has resulted in 35% merger and 
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acquisition deals of 2007 accounted for SWF investment deals. The entry into real 
estate market was also remarkable as UAE SWF bought 90% of Chrysler building in 
New York in July 2008 (Farrell et al, 2008 as cited in Drezner, 2008). This shows the 
―explosive growth‖ of SWFs has started raising questions and concerns over their 
buying behaviour of strategic assets, regulatory – transparency and geopolitical issues 
(Drezner, 2008, p. 115).   
Next sections provide detailed view of how these SWFs are being regulated by 
investee and sponsoring countries which may hamper their spiralled growth of the last 
two decades.  
 
2.7 Effects on SWFs from barriers by investee countries      
The rise of the SWFs has provoked security concerns in the US; mainly the issues are 
with respect to macro-economic imbalances and diversification of energy supply for 
USA. These issues lead one to think about the influence and interdependence of Asia - 
Pacific and Middle Eastern countries with USA which is the result of the SWFs 
investments (Drezner, 2008).  
Ultimately, these investments can have potential negative consequences, for example 
adversely influencing the promotion of democracy in the developing world, while also 
making global financial co-operation more unstable (Drezner, 2008, p.115-116). 
  
This gives rise to issues related to SWFs such as corporate governance and 
transparency of SWFs for western countries; limited investor rights and protectionism 
frameworks of recipient countries for SWFs sponsoring countries. The problems with 
insufficient transparency are even more acute when coupled with the size and 
sovereignty of the SWFs. Anderson (2009) observes that since SWFs are state 
extensions and are maximising the country‘s long-term strategy more than profit per 
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se, and it is exactly the emerging strategic pattern of acquisitions which is a cause of 
concern (Drezner, 2008). With SWFs the missing ingredient to safeguard against 
potential financial misbehaviour is ―counterparty surveillance‖ (Drezner, 2008, p. 
118). This is echoed by IMF and other regulatory institutions as well as researchers 
(Lyons, 2008). In a country like Norway, there are existent democracy checks (through 
National Parliament) on investment strategies; however same cannot be true where 
political economy is different and also, standards for governance, legitimacy, 
transparency and accountability changes with every SWF, for example Russia and 
China SWFs (Monk, 2009; Ang, 2010). There is a strong relationship between 
characteristics of SWFs and the political situation (law, democracy, accountability 
factors) of that SWF sponsoring country (Pistor and Hatton, 2011). SWFs can also 
control recipient country‘s policies and capabilities by gaining control over strategic 
assets or infrastructure; or by threatening the divestments. In the recipient countries, 
the size of capital for companies and domestic economic interests can increase the 
lobbying for SWFs investment deals acceptance. This can block any protectionism 
measures from OECD countries to SWF sponsors (Drezner, 2008; Bean, 2010).  
 
However, one can argue about the lack of evidence in the economic coercion and 
interdependence literature to prove that SWFs have the capability to influence the 
OECD economies because the SWFs must be significantly more powerful at the least 
financially, if not technically and politically than their target economy. One of the main 
arguments emerges that considering the ambiguous political configurations between 
SWF sponsoring countries and the investee countries, it is possible that investee 
countries would be reluctant to create policy frameworks and operational barriers that 
may require these SWFs to disclose their intention. This is because at some point 
liquidity and investments become more important for businesses than political agenda 
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and protectionism of investee country governments (Santiso, 2008; Kotter and Lel, 
2011).  
Furthermore, SWF sponsoring countries‘ regulatory mechanisms in response to 
protectionism barriers and disclosures rules such as Santiago principles can fuel the 
debate of regulating SWFs further with the developed countries in Europe and USA. In 
particular, the USA has taken initiatives to scrutinize foreign investments in depth such 
as formation of FINSA – an act and CFIUS – a senate committee (Greene and Yeager, 
2008, p.266). In a response to protectionism approach by recipient countries, the 
sponsoring countries have created various mechanisms and regulations to safeguard 
their economic position, currency and markets. One such example is the China and the 
review of foreign investments of China has been seen as non-transparent.  
―The 2006 provisions for merger and acquisition of domestic enterprises by foreign 
investors require prior approval for foreign investments that affect national economic 
security, involve a major industry or result in the transfer of a famous trademark or a 
traditional Chinese brand‖ (Greene and Yeager, 2008, p.267).  
OECD considers this measure from China as advantageous to them for increased 
transparency according to global standards. China has further categorized foreign 
investments on the basis industry targeted such as encouraged, permitted, restricted or 
prohibited (US GAO Report as cited in Greene and Yeager, 2008). Following China, 
UAE also has current requirements in company law which states foreign companies 
can not own more than 40% share of any Emirati (UAE) company. In case of Russia, 
the Federal Law of 1999 on Foreign Investments is not considered as fully protective 
of national interests so Government of Russia is reviewing the situation to implement 
US style mechanisms to assess foreign investments (Greene and Yeager, 2008). 
Therefore, responses from investee and sponsoring countries to create more and more 
investment barriers against each other affect the trade, market access and investment 
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decisions for SWFs and investee companies. This ultimately results into negative 
effects on the growth of SWFs.   
 
2.8   Current trends and impacts on the global finance 
 
 If one considers the amount in numbers then being it more than US$ 3.5 trillion looks 
very much significant; however the assets held by all SWFs collectively is less than 5% 
of what is held by other financial segments such as pension funds, hedge funds, mutual 
funds and insurance companies and private equities. SWF accounts for less than 2% of 
equity and bonds market globally. Morgan Stanley (2007) projections for 2012 by the 
fastest rate consideration also do not take SWF beyond 6% of global financial assets. 
Since having no commercial liabilities as such like private investors, during the 
economic crisis time, SWF have positive effects on markets to reduce the pressure of 
liquidity issues. They play vital role as a stabilizer in saving the firms with their 
investment at the time of stressed markets (Gieve, 2008).      
 
According to the IMF foreign currency reserve data, the overall share of US dollar as a 
foreign reserve currency worldwide has declined from 68.1% to 64% during 2003 to 
2007 (Greene and Yeager, 2008; www.imf.org, 2008); still global foreign exchange 
reserve (FER) currency is US ($) dollars. The dollars share of FER can decrease more 
as money flow into SWF from oil and other commodity exports by MENASA region 
economies.  Lyons (2007) in his testimony to US senate committee on banking said 
that if central banks were to switch reserves to match the countries with which they 
have trading accounts, they would require to sell an amount to a level of US$ 1.39 
trillion, that is approx. 25% of global FE reserves. This FE reserve accumulation 
system has decreased US long term interest rates and rates of investments from petro-
dollars. Also, exporting countries have inflationary pressure. Five out of six GCC 
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countries have their currency reserve pegged to US dollar. Kuwait has started to 
diversify its currency portfolio from 2007 to higher yielding rates which could lead to 
significant effect on US current account. These facts and figures show that sovereign 
wealth is shifting away from US dollar (Greene and Yeager, 2008; Santiso, 2008). 
Major numbers of GCC and Asian countries have not limited their investments in 
OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development of 30 developed 
countries consortium) countries. The institute of international finance has reported in 
2007 that foreign investments of GCC SWFs have become global during 2002 to 2006 
as 20% outflow was to Europe and 11% each to MENA and Asian regions. As the 
unrest grows in the two forms for SWF, getting branded as politically motivated 
investment vehicles from western governments and losing money like US banking 
investments in billions during 2007– 09, they tend to find alternative routes of 
channelling the money into profitable investments. In doing so, SWFs have started to 
shift away from the dollar and also more inclined towards aggressive asset categories. 
That shows SWF have started to move investments from low return and government 
debt to higher return – high risk assets and to leave the traditional investment style of 
fixed and equity deals (Greene and Yeager, 2008).  So far, no research study has made 
firm conclusion about effects and impacts of SWF on global financial markets but 
research shows SWF impact on individual firm performance and it has been debated to 
that extent and other governance and investment strategy issues of SWF. These issues 
are covered in the next topic of discussion.                    
 
2.9  Implications based on the challenges of SWF 
 
The last two decades have seen exponential growth of SWFs from less than US $ 
500bn in 1990 to current approximate US $ 3500bn; and more large economies like 
India and Japan may join the race of developing profitable SWFs. Morgan Stanley 
 85 
estimates SWFs can reach to a level of US$12 to 13 trillion by 2015 (Jen, 2007; 
Anderson, 2009). The major exporters BRIC countries and Korea, Japan, Singapore 
can each accumulate FE reserves to an amount of US$ 400bn and create trade 
imbalances for EU and USA. The non-commodity funds of China, Korea, Singapore, 
Japan and India (provided Japan and India develop SWFs in the near future) can catch 
up to an asset growth with similar to Abu-Dhabi, Norway and Kuwait; however many 
researchers and analysts believe that such a change may be incremental over long 
duration and not quickly (Anderson, 2009). Many researchers warn that potential 
impact and control of SWFs can be significant (Lyons, 2007; Drezner, 2008; Bean, 
2010). Many on the other hand argue that there is no danger from SWFs to investee 
countries (Hassan, 2009; Kotter and Lel, 2011) and this is just re-emergence of BRIC 
countries where in a century ago only India and China were contributing more than 
40% of world‘s total GDP (Santiso, 2008). SWFs managers have avoided risks taking 
but now trend is changing, for example Asian banks have invested somewhere between 
65% and 70% of their foreign exchange reserves in US dollar assets such US treasury 
notes (Anderson, 2009; Zhang and He, 2009; Bahgat, 2010). Many aspects of such an 
investment focus have been beneficial for the US economy and the US consumer, 
including managing lower levels of the interest rates. But there will be negative 
consequences for the US economy if foreign governments decide to look for a more 
profitable return on their investments, for example by leaving the country‘s money at 
home rather than receiving a lower return on U.S. bonds and securities. Those who can 
afford more risky investments (Seoul, Beijing, Singapore, Taipei and Tokyo) are those 
―whose foreign reserve holdings have now dramatically exceeded even the most 
conservative definition of a prudent foreign reserve account‖ (Anderson, 2009, p. 18). 
It is highly likely, that two factors: recession in the developed nations and higher return 
from risky investments in MENASA region will make SWFs realize that it is beneficial 
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to invest either at home or restructure their portfolios which are currently dominated 
with mainly US treasury notes. China is likely to be the primary beneficiary of the 
transition and change in investment patterns as their foreign exchange reserve is more 
than US $ 1.5 trillion (Anderson, 2009). Because the oil income based GCC region 
SWFs (like their counterparts) do not need to show a return immediately, they can deal 
with higher levels of risk by taking a long-term approach to investing. For example, 
analysts at the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority justify their 14% allocation of fund‘s 
portfolio to emerging markets‘ equities based on their assessment that atleast 33% 
global growth in coming years would come from emerging markets. This figure can 
even grow according to the current investment patterns of CIC and Temasek Holdings 
(Anderson, 2009). Another trend forecasted by the McKinsey Global Institute is the 
increased flow of capital between Middle East and Asia which is evident in a growth 
rate of 22% during 2001-2005 at cash flow on US $ 15bn in 2006 alone. At this rate it 
could reach as high as US$ 300bn by 2020 (Barton and Boer, 2007; Zhang and He, 
2009). The Middle Eastern and Asian SWFs are not only seeking markets abroad but 
also increasingly keen on investing (and stimulating investment) in the domestic 
markets. Some of the choices made by the SWFs have led to policymakers including 
the governments of US, France and Germany express concerns about macro and micro 
economic impacts of SWFs (Mitchell et al., 2008). With the growth of GCC region 
SWFs, developed OECD countries have increased protectionism. However the factual 
evidence suggests a different perspective, for example, UK, Japan and Germany are 
three leading countries for investments in the USA and 94% of foreign assets in US are 
owned by 25 industrialized and democratic OECD member countries (Eizenstat 2006 
as cited in Anderson, 2009). Mitchell et al (2008) point out that the exact magnitude of 
SWFs impacts is unknown; however SWFs are far smaller than existing currency 
stabilization and pension funds. Alberola and Serena (2008) state that SWFs can 
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increasingly contribute to global trade imbalances provided commodity and oil prices 
continue to be at high levels. The new SWFs formation may take place as Asian 
economies have increasing trade balances and accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves. Such a trend can lead to increased growth for SWFs (Alberola and Serena, 
2008). On the other hand, debt economies of developed countries may face higher 
costs of financing and negative trade balances due to growth of SWFs (Truman, 2007; 
Alberola and Serena, 2008; Gieve, 2008; Anderson, 2009).  
 
Another issue as argued by Truman (2007, 2008) is globalized and developed 
economies have private companies larger than government enterprises and government 
decision making is supported by private agencies where as in SWFs sponsoring 
countries total control is in the hands of government decision making agencies such as 
MoF or Central banks. This again leads to management influence on governance, 
transparency and accountability on part of SWFs. Drezner (2008) warns that SWFs 
may not disrupt macro-economy or security of the country however SWFs can 
influence overall governance and co-operation levels in the global financial system and 
can diminish the power of developed economies in the coming years. This fear also 
may not be true, if one can analyse the political and economic structures of regions 
such as Gulf, EU, America and South Asia. These regions require the growth of one 
another as they depend of one another for needs such as energy, markets, security, 
currency stability through trades and fiscal – monetary balances (Baabood, 2006 and 
2009). Thus, it is in the best interests of investee and sponsoring countries to reduce 
barriers or protectionisms for SWFs investments and consider SWFs as market friendly 
investors whilst helping sponsoring countries‘ governments to implement governance 
and transparency reforms.     
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2.10   Implications of SWF investment decisions  
This section analyses different views on the positive and negative implications of 
SWFs in the global economy, politics and capital markets which may emerge as a 
result of their continued growth or divestments from world markets.  
a. Because of assured long term and adequate capital into stock markets from SWF, 
companies may see higher demand of their stocks and thus increased liquidity in 
the market while lower costs of capital for businesses resulting ultimately in the 
higher equity prices. Any collective divestments by group of funds and political 
instability in SWFs sponsoring countries can create market risk leading to 
operational and liquidity risks. SWF growth may increase demands for the 
investment banking industry, asset managers and advisors (Chhaochharia and 
Laeven, 2009; Balin, 2010). 
b. The high return high risk, profit seeking investment strategy by SWF will provide  
easy access to capital for riskier businesses and a tougher access to capital for low 
return, low risk investment opportunities, for example Government bonds. On a 
larger scale, this can skew the global capital distribution to riskier investments 
(Balin, 2010).  
c. Major funds such as the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, China and Russia have 
ruled out seeking any national security interest or political objective through their 
SWFs. And to assure this, these SWFs have opted for professional management 
style, hired professionals and crafted their investment strategy for profit seeking 
as number one priority. However, their policy of invisible investments and asset 
allocations in specific equities have raised concerned within western governments 
(Balin, 2010; Pistor and Hatton, 2011).   
d. Less opacity in the investments infuses speculative behaviour in the financial 
markets. However, if recipient countries and their companies demand compliance 
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to strict disclosure rules then these investments will be eventually visible within 
annual reports of investee companies, even if they are not visible in the documents 
of the funds. This will attach a price tag to investments‘ announcements while 
bringing speculation and increased volatility to stock markets of recipient and 
sponsoring countries both (Truman, 2008; Balin, 2010; Dixon and Monk, 2010).    
e. The more SWFs grow in their asset size and geographical reach, the more will be 
the demand of reciprocity or openness in their transaction which may bring a 
crackdown on these funds through number of laws, operational principles and 
protectionism tactics from investee countries similar to Santiago Principles in 
2008 (Santiso, 2008).  
f. Unless there is consideration of making SWFs investments a separate industry 
status like private equity or hedge funds, these funds may continue to exert legal, 
political and administrative load for regulatory organizations like security and 
exchange commissions, central banks and IMF.  
g. The impacts on financial market prices and government bond yields generated 
from SWFs capital flows is difficult to measure and to quantify. No rigorous 
research study has been performed to address these issues. However, the literature 
suggests that SWFs can affect the asset prices and exchange rates through changes 
in price or risks. These effects developed from SWF demand (e.g. equities) or 
supply (e.g. government bonds) can be considerable when the demand curve in 
the respective markets is downward-sloping (Beck and Fidora, 2008).  
These implications are resulting impacts of SWFs investments in the foreign assets. As 
one can see, these implications do not pose any direct security threats but like any other 
industry has effects from its investments. These implications can have more profound 
effects on the emerging market economies due to lack of proper regulatory frameworks 
and many companies requiring capital. In addition to this, effectiveness of these wealth 
 90 
funds in the form of governance, transparency and objectives raise questions over their 
investment practices. Finally, these funds can create volatility and power struggles in 
the sponsoring countries for funds disbursement and management control (Hassan, 
2009; Pistor and Hatton, 2011). Thus, a comprehensive and detailed analyses of the 
practices and goals of sovereign wealth funds is required if a country wants to develop 
the benefits of these funds without suffering from the less desirable drawbacks of the 
emergence of SWFs (Anderson, 2009; Monk, 2009). These required analyses to 
understand SWFs are carried out based on primary and secondary data in the later 
chapters of this thesis.   
 
2.11 Factors affecting SWF growth  
It is important to preserve a commitment to openness in markets and keeping to a 
minimum the restrictions of direct investments – often such restrictions are the result of 
cautiousness that direct investments coming from foreign entities. Unnecessary barriers 
may lead to retaliatory restrictions, so applicable existing guidance may need to be 
revisited as well as new initiatives proposed to resolve the issues stemming from the 
SWFs investments as stated in the previous section. It can be risky for SWF in case the 
investment made in an asset which is actually under the control of investee country 
government. For example, CITGO - a US company is owned by Venezuela SWF; 
however US can impose restrictions or regulate transactions between Venezuela SWF 
and CITGO (Greene and Yeager, 2008). 
 
Governance standards and transparency are two major factors which can influence the 
way SWFs function. With regard to governance, especially when the institutions are 
state-owned, there may be more acute problems than with comparable private 
institutions. These problems could be connected to a greater risk of corruption due to 
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lower salaries, problems suggested by agency theory such as trust, legitimacy, (Monk, 
2009) excessive control of political elite (Pistor and Hatton, 2011) and lack of 
accountability (Truman, 2008). Therefore, addressing these issues with an appropriate 
set of policies would be advantageous to both investee and SWF sponsoring countries 
to meet their investment deal objectives. As suggested by Greene and Yeager (2008), 
these SWFs require specific guidelines to be followed in the matters of responsibilities 
allocation within the fund and with stakeholders; investment policy objectives; 
governance and disclosure compliance; risk management and their operational 
autonomy from political influence. Lack of transparency or any such attribute as 
mentioned above can significantly influence the way SWFs make their investment 
deals. In turn, these deals and SWFs both may attract scrutiny from financial regulators 
and central government administration of investee countries. The issue of transparency 
can be resolved by having mechanisms in place for organisational structure, 
governance, information disclosure and other institutional procedures (Greene and 
Yeager, 2008; Truman, 2008; Santiso, 2008; Anderson, 2009).  
 
On the other hand, even if the best principles of transparency are implemented, is there 
any guarantee that it would solve the problem for investee and sponsoring countries? 
For example, Norway‘s SWF GPFG invests only if companies are socially responsible 
otherwise GPFG divests from them. It does not look for that Norwegian government 
can influence companies and social policies in other countries through their SWF for 
billions of dollar investments. At the same time in reply to Norway SWF investments, 
these investee companies and governments of other countries do not interfere 
Norwegian politics (Simms and Tomisawa, 2007 as cited in Anderson, 2009). Thus, it 
is difficult to differentiate between best practices in company management and 
politically aimed investment agenda. Hence, SWFs‘ transparency does not guarantee 
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promotion of non-political agenda (Anderson, 2009). Zhang and He (2009) provide an 
analysis of the internal weaknesses of China investment corporation (CIC) with the 
three major factors affecting the fund being vague orientation, mixed investment 
strategies and the bureaucratic management. It is unknown who the real shareholder of 
the fund is, as well as how much capital it owns, its debt is around US$ 200bn—this 
has led to certain disadvantages such restricting its ability to make free long term asset 
allocation and create low return – low risk steady income portfolio such as GPFG or 
SAMA. Here, the issues of decision making and organisational structures come to the 
fore. Mitchell et al (2008) and Bernstein et al (2009) suggest that involvement of 
political leaders in decision making tend to influence the two outcomes of the 
investments heavily: firstly where the investment would go – domestic or foreign; and 
secondly which industry or nation would get priority for the investments. Recent study 
by IMF found that most of the GCC funds lack a clear investment strategy and have 
large variation of governance, transparency and accountability (Ter-Minassian, 2007 as 
cited in Bahgat, 2008). Global markets not only may be affected by investment or 
divestment announcements of SWF but also can be affected by SWF decision making 
and how they address macro and micro economic indicators at domestic level. Hence, 
for the benefits of all involved stakeholders in the SWFs investment transactions, the 
improvement is suggested in governance and transparency along with investment 
strategy, fiscal measures and organisation structural developments for SWFs (Ilahi, 
2007, as cited in Bahgat, 2008). Following such debates in the global financial 
markets, both sponsoring and investee countries governments have taken the new 
policy initiatives which are reviewed in the next section.  
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2.12 New policy initiatives for SWFs 
There have been many initiatives, responses, and policy proposals as a reaction to the 
growth and increasing number of SWFs. USA treasury, IMF and OECD are working 
together to develop framework for the SWFs to control and assess the influx of foreign 
investments by SWFs (Zhang and He, 2009). The objective of this model would be to 
enable SWFs to become transparent, predictable, responsible and accountable to their 
population and investee countries (Truman, 2008). The response to Santiago principle 
was hostile from many large SWFs and CIC of China has hinted absence from the 
negotiation for the above said model as well to maximize its own interests (Zhang and 
He, 2009).   
 
Singh (2008) explains that voluntary codes for the SWFs by IMF, investee countries 
code by OECD, formation of International working group of sovereign wealth funds 
(IWG) have resulted into Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) of 
SWFs known as ‗Santiago principles‘. This set of 24 Santiago Principles covers issues 
of laws, governance and investment policies to risk management of SWFs (Singh, 
2008; Anderson, 2009). The voluntary nature of the Principles makes their 
implementation dependent upon member-countries. There is a proposition to create a 
permanent international body for SWFs. The major issues within the Santiago/ GAPP 
are transparency, public disclosure, stability and non-commercial objectives of SWFs. 
There have been proposals for World trade organisation (WTO) to manage and to 
regulate SWFs (Singh, 2008). OECD (2008) report calls for investee countries 
authority to be active in stating what is required for their national security, however 
report does not say about any instance in which the SWFs acted with objective of 
political goals. European Union has also come up with its own standards of 
transparency, accountability, asset allocations, investments, size and sources of funds, 
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governance structures, overall objective and risk management policies to be disclosed 
by all SWFs (Singh, 2008; Lyons, 2008; Truman, 2008). The USA has created its own 
mechanism of FINSA and CFIUS (Anderson, 2009; Hassan, 2009). After the detailed 
overview of SWFs in general and their global trends, the next section discusses 
importance of SWFs in the GCC region.  
 
2.13 Importance of SWFs in the GCC region  
All GCC region SWFs have accumulated assets and foreign exchange reserve from oil 
exports. This simply applies that when average oil price is declining in a year, their 
foreign investments capacity and liquidity to manage domestic demand reduces. In this 
case, their breakeven point of oil exports quantity and oil price increases, sending 
shock waves to GCC economies and large projects having vast debt leverage. Thus, it 
is not wise for these GCC SWFs to invest in riskier assets for higher return when their 
earning is correlated to global growth and oil prices (Setser and Ziemba, 2009). The 
big four GCC SWFs are ADIA, SAMA, KIA and QIA. For example, a gap of even few 
US dollars per barrel between paying imports and earning oil exports corresponds to 
billions of net trade balance increase in GCC region‘s foreign assets, roughly split 
evenly between SAMA and other five SWFs of GCC according to their oil exports. 
According to historical data, if oil averages US$ 50 per barrel, then GCC region 
requires interests and dividend income to support the imports. At US$ 75 oil price per 
barrel, they add US$ 140bn and at more than US$ 100 per barrel, GCC region gets 
flushing inflow of money. When production and prices fell, the revenues are reduced 
very much for GCC region. Thus, any capital spending would require sales of the 
assets hold by these SWFs. Following chart shows estimated GCC purchases of foreign 
assets at different projected oil prices (Setser and Ziemba, 2009).  
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Source: Setser and Ziemba, 2009 
 
Thus, SWFs are an important source for each country in GCC region to save and to 
accumulate the wealth. Therefore, SWF created based on oil income will have their 
size of fund and capital availability to invest hinge critically on the price of oil. Due to 
lack of transparency, their actual wealth and asset projection is difficult (Seznec, 
2008). Production costs, cut and decreased oil prices would create problem for GCC 
funds and protectionist measures or total oppose of GCC investments in western 
countries such as Europe and USA will take these investors to other countries such as 
emerging economies in Asia (Lyons, 2007; Karake-shalhoub, 2008; Monk, 2009). 
Hence, SWFs are not only important for GCC region but their importance is worldwide 
for every country aiming financial gains and a better economy.    
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2.14 Major inferences from literature review  
This section explains the major inferences in terms of theoretical links of SWF to 
finance, economics and management as well as lists the major studies enabling the 
development of theoretical proposition. The gaps found in the literature are explained 
in the next chapter of theoretical framework development.  
 
2.14.1  Theoretical links to SWFs  
According to the theoretical linkages of SWFs with existing theories reviewed in 
section 2.3 of this chapter, it can be inferred that these theories contain the roots of 
SWF development, investment strategy and decision making. To understand how these 
theories relates to the sovereign wealth fund, the following figure 2.3 shows a critical 
transaction showing all involved stakeholders, their decision making for a standard 
investment decision. The figure 2.3 also shows the path of decision making, theoretical 
links and factors generated from each link affecting SWF.    
 
The figure 2.3 shows the path of SWF formation to investee companies receiving 
money in the centre connected by arrows downwards; whereas from sides this 
transaction is connected by arrows explaining where each existing theory can influence 
the decision path. The figure also shows in each theory box that which factors affect 
this component of the decision path.    
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Figure 2.3 Typical SWF transaction showing links to existing theories and factors 
affecting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Citizens of the country crating 
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The following figure 2.4 reveals that sovereign wealth funds have their roots in the 
existing economics, finance, international trade, and management theories. The figure 
2.4 also shows that how each existing theory is contributing in the development and 
operations of sovereign wealth funds.    
 
Figure 2.4 SWF roots in EFIM Theories 
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Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Economics theories have links to effects on SWF and impacts generated from SWF. 
Their deals, size and decisions must be reviewed for this. 
 
Financial theories are attached to SWF investment behaviour, decisions, objectives 
and utilization of finances. This will help to understand their impacts on global 
industries and capital markets. 
 
Trade theories allow to study the motives, structures, laws and political economy 
of the SWFs and sponsoring countries. 
 
Management theories enable ones to analyse the organisational structure, decision 
making process, governance, managerial behaviour, conflicts and outcome of 
actions taken for SWFs.    
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Positive trade 
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Decisions of FDI 
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Management  
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management, hired 
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decisions and outcome 
of this behaviour.  
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2.14.2  Inferences about operations of SWFs     
Following table 2.4 shows key points relevant to the successful operations of sovereign 
wealth funds. These inferences are for all SWFs and not specific for any sponsoring 
country. This summarises the literature review about SWFs analyses of investment 
deals, strategies, buying behaviour or setting up objectives. These major inferences 
help in aspects: firstly, it enables identifying gaps in the literature and secondly, 
finalising the factors affecting SWF management.   
Table 2.4 Summary from the literature 
Authors 
and 
Year 
Source Main Inferences Factor affecting 
SWF 
Kotter and 
Lel,  
2011 
Journal of 
financial 
economics 
SWFs can be defined as passive institutional 
investors in terms of their characteristics, effect 
on target company‘s performance. SWFs‘ 
transparency influences investment activities and 
their impact on investment recipient company‘s 
market value. 
Policy, planning, 
sponsoring country 
laws, governance, 
transparency 
Sornarajah,  
2011 
Asian Journal of 
International Law 
Development and quick changes in the laws for 
SWFs  
Sponsoring country 
laws, Objectives, 
Planning  
Park and 
Estrada, 
2011 
Asian Journal of 
International Law 
Valuable role of Santiago Principles for SWFs  Policy, Planning, 
Objectives, Laws  
Pistor and 
Hatton, 
2011 
Nellco legal 
repository  
Autonomy maximisation theory explaining 
political economy dynamics of established 
SWFs 
Structure, Purpose, 
Governance, 
Decision making  
Thomas and 
Chen, 2011 
Journal of 
contemporary 
China 
A case of China's Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
origins, development, and future roles 
Sources, objectives,  
Heaney et 
al, 2011 
Australian 
Journal of 
Management  
A case of Temasek holdings, Singapore SWF. 
Temasek has a predisposition to invest in firms 
that are relatively large and have few director 
block holders. The incentive to invest also 
increases in firms with lower systematic risk and 
with compensation schemes. 
Investment strategy, 
Asset allocation, 
Risk management,  
Clark and 
Monk, 2010 
The Pacific 
Review  
A case of GIC, Singapore. They make case for 
SWFs positive aspects during the financial crisis.   
Governance, 
transparency, Less 
protectionism   
Jory and 
Hemphill, 
2010 
Thunderbird 
International 
Business Review 
The positive effects and role of SWFs in global 
financial intermediation  
Planning, Asset 
allocation  
Balin, 2010 Asian- Pacific 
Economic 
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2.15 Summary   
This chapter reviewed the concept and development of sovereign wealth fund and their 
links to the existing theories in trade, finance, economics and management. Major 
inferences show that each segment of SWF management can be analysed with the help 
of existing theories. The literature about SWF management shows that their 
investments are beneficial to both sponsoring and investment recipient countries. 
Collectively all SWFs are big asset base at US$ 3.5 trillion compared to private equity 
and hedge funds industries.  Developing SWFs as an industry would be advantageous 
to all counties and regulators. The chapter outlines factors affecting SWF and impacts 
of SWF on the markets; however their growth is restricted by many external and 
internal dimensions which are discussed as factors affecting SWF in detail in the next 
chapter.  
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Chapter 3  The conceptual framework 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In previous chapters, the research problem and aim of this thesis are defined. Then, 
relevant literature was reviewed and evaluated for finding crucial links between 
problem and aim of this study. The basis for the theoretical development in this chapter 
is the delineation of the research problem and the review of literature in the previous 
chapters. The theoretical background of investment strategies, portfolio management, 
economic policy formulation, organizational structure and environmental dimensions 
such as trade and legal aspects generated from literature are carefully reviewed and are 
applied in developing the concept. This chapter proposes the theoretical framework 
based on the inferences and gaps established from the literature review within the 
domain of sovereign wealth funds management and their links to existing theories. A 
set of research hypotheses is proposed for each factor affecting the SWF‘s sustainable 
growth as a basis of the initial theoretical research framework. The research framework 
mainly comprises factors affecting SWF as independent variables and performance and 
success rate of SWF as components of growth of SWF as a final dependent variable. 
These variables are then operationalized to measure them with data collection based on 
the questionnaires from SWF managers and stakeholders. Since this section deals with 
the development of specific framework and hypotheses development, this can be 
considered to be the focal theory explanation in the research process according to the 
process model concept given by Philips and Pugh (1994). 
 
Following section outlines gaps found in the literature which enables one to propose 
the initial theoretical framework which comprises various factors impacting 
performance and success rate of any sovereign wealth fund.     
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3.2 Gaps found in the literature    
The inferences from academic literature in the previous chapter provide confirmation 
to existing theoretical perspectives. This literature inferences support the theoretical 
proposition mentioned in the next section whereas this section details the gaps found in 
the literature related to management, operations and growth of SWFs. These gaps as a 
part of problem have enabled the process of developing the initial theoretical 
proposition consisting factors affecting SWF.  
1. Measures applied by governments and regulatory organisations are many such as 
Santiago principles; however they do not collate with each other to bring the right 
factors to the identification for problems faced by investments from sovereign 
wealth funds (Epstein and Rose, 2009; Yi-Chong, 2009; Bean, 2010).   
2. Although there are numerous studies that have examined oil prices, investment 
deals or case studies of sovereign wealth funds; there is no study carried out to test 
the impacts of various factors on the growth of SWF. Thus, all such factors found 
in literature are not validated through deductive study. This research study aims to 
investigate the impacts and relationship of various dimensions on the growth of 
SWF. This is a necessary step in taking forward the body of knowledge within the 
domain of SWFs which is acknowledged by many notable researchers and they 
have explained this task as a further scope in their research (Mitchell et al, 2008; 
Truman, 2008; Bernstein et al, 2009; Clark and Monk, 2010).    
3. Previous research studies have not been empirical in their testing of various factors 
such as governance, transparency, accountability, size, structure. Previous research 
found in the literature is mainly the analysis of secondary data or literature about 
sovereign wealth funds such as historic investment deals or stock prices of the 
companies where in SWFs have invested. Therefore, this study aims to investigate 
them based on hypothetico- deductive method using both primary and secondary 
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data through interviews, questionnaire survey, reports and documents (Balding, 
2008; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009; Balin, 2010).   
4. There have been theoretical reflections about asset allocation, return on investment 
portfolio and growth of SWF (Gintschel and Scherer, 2008), but actual growth is 
rarely measures based on the constructs such as factors which can affect the growth 
of SWF. Every third article within existing literature focuses on the arguments 
about transparency and governance issues of GCC regions SWFs and their motives; 
however, the challenge is to carry out in-depth study of a few SWFs and find out 
the why and how of their investment strategies (Lam and Rossi, 2010). Thus, 
findings of this study can help potential and current SWF managers, governments 
and regulatory agencies to support the growth of SWF as an industry. 
5. The SWF phenomenon is new and recently caught the attention of researchers 
mainly after 2005 when all SWFs‘ total assets grew beyond US$ 1trillion.  Because 
of this surge of attention from financial analysts and industry, the available 
literature is more of a news analysis rather than scientific or theoretical studies. 
There has not been any framework developed in the existing literature to analyse 
the factors affecting on the management, growth and performance of SWF in more 
than 150 articles and reports reviewed between 2005 and 2011.  
6. It is still unclear after decade of research about SWF what investee countries want 
and what sponsoring countries want. Which resources apart from capital are 
required for either side of the investment deal to create successful bilateral relation 
are not known.   
7. None of the studies have linked the SWF operations and management to theories 
economics, finance, trade and management as done in this study. Hence, this 
research study attempts to clarify such inferences from the literature and come up 
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with evidence based recommendations about impacts of various factors on the 
growth of SWF.     
 
Based on the above discussed gaps found in the literature, the conceptual framework as 
a theoretical proposition is developed for this research study as shown later in the next 
section. In the proposed theoretical framework, factors which are the independent 
variables has been categorised into two groups of qualitative and quantitative. If there 
is any inherent relationship or causality between these independent variables or factors 
affecting SWF, then it would emerge during the analyses of primary data.  
 
3.3 Integrative framework of the study  
The primary method of any scientific research and investigation is the hypothetico-
deductive method. Theories based on the research processes of induction and deduction 
can help researchers to analyse, to explain and to understand the phenomena. 
Observations and preliminary information gathering like literature review has helped to 
formulate a conceptual proposition as mentioned in figure 3.1 (Saunders et al, 2009). 
The testing phase of this theoretical framework about factors affecting SWF is done by 
testing the hypotheses made in the proposed framework. Secondary data is also used to 
indentify how many of the proposed factors are addressed by Norway and Oman 
SWFs. The statistical analyses of results determine whether data supports the 
hypotheses made or not.  
 
3.3.1 Legal aspects  
Issues raised by OECD or western countries‘ governments for SWF having hidden 
political, social and strategic agenda in their recent investments can be assessed based 
on their management practices, a qualitative view.  Such as standards proposed by 
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World Bank as governance, accountability and investment practices (GAI factors). 
Mitchell et al (2008) defined these three set of fundamental principles as: Governance 
– a process by which SWF manages an objective of maximising the welfare of and 
resolves any conflict among stakeholders; accountability - a process of reporting the 
results of governance and disclosing to stakeholders; and investment practices means 
having a system in place to develop investments to balance risk and return while giving 
attention to liabilities. These GAI factors constitute ‗corporate governance‘ which can 
affect the performance and credibility of the sovereign wealth funds (Gompers et al, 
2003). Analysts and researchers have commented about lack of transparency in SWF 
deals. The transparency for SWF in this context means the disclosure of information 
like purpose, results, deals, portfolio of holdings at regular duration. But, disappointing 
responses are received from major SWFs as their priority is to maintain commercial 
interest first and disclosure second (Rose, 2008). USA style company disclosure laws if 
followed for SWFs, then it would make these financial institutions much transparent in 
their investment deals (Truman, 2007). Better corporate governance can lead to 
increased performance and valuation of the company which can be applied to SWF in 
the form of a company perspective. Also, in the countries where ministers have more 
influence than managers, the legal aspects are proven to be weakened during decision 
making against the forces of bureaucracy (Klapper and Love, 2004). Call for strong 
corporate governance and SWF management practices based on structure, governance, 
transparency, accountability and behaviour is argued by Carmichael and Palacios 
(2003) and Truman (2008). Many such research studies examining policies of 
transparency and accountability have argued that any improvement in financial 
disclosure and reporting system can enhance the performance of the organization and 
protect the investor interests.  As a main finding for this variable, ‗legal aspects‘ of 
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SWF can be divided into three major dimensions of governance, transparency and 
accountability. Their hypotheses can be defined as follows. 
H1a: The better governance increases the growth of SWF.  
H1b: More transparency provides more confidence from investment recipients 
leading to higher growth prospects.   
H1c: More accountability towards investee and sponsoring countries creates better 
system of managing SWF thus creating favourable conditions for growth of SWF.   
 
3.3.2 Investee country laws 
In addition to concerns raised over political view and transparency of the recent surge 
in SWF investment deals in US, EU and OECD countries, these recipient countries 
have formulated various laws for sovereign investments and foreign direct investment 
citing the reasons of maintaining their security of the economy and the national 
sovereignty. Control mechanisms such as voting rights, board involvement, deal size, 
investment period and announcement regulations are very popular among investee 
countries companies. Investment barriers and disclosures laws are formed as part of 
government initiatives such as: foreign investment and national security act (FINSA) 
by USA in 2007; committee on foreign investment in the USA (CFIUS) overseeing 
FINSA, foreign investment law in 1996 by France; foreign exchange and foreign trade 
control law by Japan allowing to block more than 10% investment by any SWF and 
Germany‘s foreign trade and payments act (Greene and Yeager, 2008).    
 
Such barriers until accepted by SWF sponsoring countries can have negative effects on 
SWF investments. For example, in a mixed response to such rules and concerns, few 
SWFs have started to shift their investment to MENASA region preferring higher risk 
for higher returns as these regions have commodity based growth. Unless there is a 
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common consensus over these mechanisms, barriers and laws over concerns of national 
and economic securities, there may not be a sign of positive effects on investment 
growth but it can increase the distance between investee and sponsoring countries trade 
relations.  
H2: National security concerns tend to increase investment barriers and control 
mechanisms’ negative influence over the growth of SWF. 
 
3.3.3 Environmental dimensions    
Environmental forces such as competition between many SWFs, confidence of 
investee countries and trade balances may prove bigger than laws and investment 
barriers mechanisms. Flow of capital and currency adjustments from surpluses to 
deficits have always proved to have huge impacts on world financial system and the 
global economy.  For example, countries with large deficits can have rapid reversal of 
capital flows. Same way, large foreign exchange flows into the country are not easy to 
sterilise. This can contribute to build up of foreign reserve in the large amounts but also 
the increase in the inflationary pressures (Gieve, 2008). This is just the effect of trade 
imbalance and increasing reserves. Other issues like competition between SWF can 
affect the deal terms, size, investment duration or any other terms of agreement on 
investments. Positive effects of such deals can lead to increased bilateral trade and 
even agreements. Geographical location of the country like Oman at the mouth of the 
gulf and achievement of higher global ranking in peace, stability and reduced 
corruption compared to other countries can increase confidence worldwide for the 
country and SWF as a responsible investment vehicle. Hence, major dimensions of 
environmental forces can play major role in investment practices and strategies of SWF 
management. Hypothesis regarding very important dimension of trade balance can be 
stated as:    
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H3: Increase in trade imbalances can increase currency and inflationary pressures 
leading to effects on the investments and growth of SWF.   
 
3.3.4 Policy  
Along with external forces like competition, law and trade, other factors within country 
such as policy, laws and population mindset for business, trade and economy with 
religious and cultural beliefs have greater emphasis on growth of the country. These 
factors can be categorised as internal to the country and qualitative in nature as difficult 
to measure in quantity. Governments around the world prepares fiscal budgets and 
announce improvement plans in the form of various schemes, visions and set of 
reforms which are usually implemented through planning and administration changes. 
Recent credit crisis and recession suggest that planning, evaluation and control for 
investment deals are necessary tools to control such crises further. In many countries in 
the Middle East and GCC region, governments are the largest employer and rely much 
on the foreign workforce as shortage of local talent. Also, there is lack of investments 
from private business houses to become mainstream employers. Thus, government 
policy and its direct influence on the management of SWF have severe impacts on 
growth of the SWF. This has led to the following hypothesis.   
H4: Lack of planning negatively affects the growth of SWF.   
 
3.3.5 Sponsoring country laws   
Investors and ordinary population support to the government and investments is as 
crucial as legal and investment framework in GCC countries where sultanates are 
ruling and have final decision making powers such as Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar or 
UAE. The bureaucratic or autonomy maximisation trend of political economies in 
GCC region SWFs have created a situation where these governments completely lack 
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any governance, transparency, policy and laws for their respective SWFs. Therefore, 
when  these countries responded to the demand of USA and other OECD countries for 
more transparency in SWF investments, these SWFs have provided mixed responses in 
terms of having own legal mechanisms or shifting their assets allocation to other higher 
return but high risk investment projects (Santiso, 2008). For example, China, Russia 
and UAE which are in top 10 SWFs, each of them have created its own framework 
which needs prior approval for every FDI transaction. For example, China revised its 
‗catalogue‘ in November 2007 for industry investment guidance and their 2006 act for 
merger and acquisition process; Russia has prepared 1999 federal law of foreign 
investment; and UAE has 40% limit of foreign company ownership in local companies 
(Greene and Yeager, 2008). These laws are response to developed countries‘ concerns 
over national and economic securities because of these SWFs‘ growth and political 
stability. Not only size and amount of deals worry the western governments but level 
of secrecy and accountability matter more. Analysing the top 22 SWFs, Lyons (2007) 
found that only US, Canada, Singapore, Malaysia and Norway have high level of 
transparency whereas GCC countries SWF have very low level of transparency. 
Oman‘s SWF has the lowest level of transparency with other funds such as Brunei, 
ADIA, Kuwait, Taiwan and Venezuela. Oman‘s SWF approach is also much 
conventional compared to UAE, Qatar, Singapore and China‘s strategic approach. This 
can have large impact on Oman‘s own resources allocation, protectionism and market 
dynamics within country and raises questions about the need of financial and political 
stability. The government of Oman in such a scenario shall take positive stance on 
reforms and reduce the bureaucracy and provide the right frame of investment and 
legal aspects leading to political, financial and national stability. This can directly 
affect SWF as it is much clear with presence of such mechanism that where should 
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money flow, how much and when. Thus, following hypotheses can be defined for the 
objectives of SWF sponsoring countries.        
H5: Political objectives can affect the transparency and;thus treatment of SWF by 
investee countries which can affect the growth of SWF.   
 
3.3.6 Structure  
Apart from set of qualitative factors in and out of the country, SWF itself as an entity 
have complex issues, start from the purpose of setting up SWF to the final decision 
making expertise and usage of sophisticated tools. Since, these are the factors which 
can be easily categorised and measured in numbers, they are considered quantifiable.    
As known from the detailed literature review about SWF, the structure of the SWF 
consists of its purpose of setting up, its ownership, command or hierarchy chain, 
sources of input funds and objective of utilization of funds. As Lyons (2007) said GCC 
region SWFs falls into the category of much conventional, very less strategic approach 
and very low transparency approach funds. This categorization allow one to think 
about who influences these SWFs, what is the purpose of setting up SWF. On one side, 
GCC region governments attempt to create non-oil dependent economies and on the 
other hand, the same government capitalizes maximum benefits from the oil and gas 
prices and demand as exporters. This revenue is again used to fund SWFs‘ multi-
billion investment deals.  Therefore as argued by Singh (2008) and Bernstein et al 
(2009), the key factors in the successful management practices of SWF is their 
purpose, objective and decision making ownership. Thus, basic structure of SWF sets 
the direction of remaining aspects of managing SWF.         
H6: A SWF should have a clear purpose which enables more efficient and 
transparent management, positively affecting the growth of the SWF. 
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3.3.7 Investment deal 
Deutsche bank research by Kern (2007) shows that US$ 3.1trillion assets are already 
managed by SWFs and which may grow to more than US$ 10 trillion as per IMF 
estimates. Key issues are open markets for SWF and political view of the investment 
strategies. Western governments argue about political motives (Lyons, 2007; Bahgat, 
2008; Beck and Fidora, 2008; Gieve, 2008; Santiso, 2008) but SWF sponsoring 
countries governments argues about the loss making investments in 2007 and 2008 in 
the financial services and banking industries of USA and EU. They argue about being 
less expert in making investment deals and benefits of SWF. Researchers who studied 
investment deals in detail conclude that successful running of any SWF depends on 
deal terms, deal size, asset allocation and investment strategies and decision making 
using professional expertise (Balding, 2008; Bertstein et al, 2009, Chhaochharia and 
Laeven, 2009, Megginson et al, 2009). Hence, the following components of investment 
deals are very important to the management and strategies implementation in SWF.         
H7a: Fundamental and mechanism issues in investment strategy can directly impact 
the investments’ performance and thus the success and growth of the SWF. 
H7b: To lead to the growth of the SWF, deal size should be optimized by analysing the 
targeted investment opportunity for risk and return.  
H7c: Assets allocation directly affects the growth of SWF.    
 
3.3.8 Operations 
SWF have more diverse and riskier investment portfolios compared to other traditional 
holdings in allocating the government resources and their persistent investment 
strategies favouring a segment of industries can create specific investment trends 
(Bahgat, 2008; Balin, 2010). Governance and investment practices with best practices 
approach like managing other multinational finance company, SWF can save 
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themselves from growth decline and political interference (Mitchell et al, 2008). Lack 
of knowledge, skills and investment expertise can be developed between investee and 
SWF sponsoring countries with co-operation and common legal framework worldwide 
(Greene and Yeager, 2008; Santiso, 2008). Lack of system, tools and professional 
manager‘s utilization can be major barriers in the success of SWF (Zhang and He, 
2009). Thus, any operational weakness can reduce the efficiency of investment strategy 
and the effectiveness of overall growth of SWF. Therefore, following hypothesis is 
formulated.         
H8: Use of expert knowledge systems and research in the decision making process 
prior to deal finalization will result in successful deals and increased investment 
opportunities resulting in the growth of SWF. 
 
3.3.9 Growth of SWF 
In the last decade many research studies have attempted to study the concept of 
sovereign wealth funds, however these studies have not analysed the sustainable 
growth of SWFs as a dependent variable. Two basic components for any SWF to grow 
are: first profitability or performance of portfolio or investments made and second, the 
worldwide acceptance and image of the particular SWF so that it can attract investment 
opportunities. Thus, investment performance and success rate of SWF are critical for 
an overall sustainable growth of SWF. In this research study, relationships between all 
independent variables - factors affecting and this dependent variable of growth of SWF 
are analysed. The growth of SWF is measured in two components: investment 
performance and success rate of SWF.  
 
The measures obtained from literature for investment performance are policy, fund‘s 
benchmarking with other funds, development, divergence, economic contribution of 
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fiscal issues and overall rate of return achieved. The measures obtained from literature 
for success rate of fund are qualitative in nature or non-financial as they lead to the 
overall image, acceptance and development prospects of the SWF. These measures for 
success rate include talent, population‘s integration, trade decisions, consumer markets 
availability and any increase in governance and transparency, laws and regulations 
reforms.  Both components‘ measures are backed up by research studies which 
analysed SWFs for different variables such as China SWF by Zhang and He (2009); all 
global SWFs by Lyons (2007), Truman (2008) and Anderson (2009); OECD study of 
SWFs by Santioso (2008); A case of Abu Dhabi SWF by Abdelal (2009); Norway 
SWF by Caner and Grennes (2010); A case of Singapore‘s SWF -  Temasek Holdings 
by Clark and Monk (2010) and Heany et al (2011); Big four – Kuwait, Abu-Dhabi, 
Singapore and China SWFs by Pistor and Hatton (2011). The above mentioned eight 
factors (independent variables) affecting SWFs are divided in the following framework 
based on whether they are quantifiable or not, thus categorizing them into quantitative 
or qualitative group. The dependent variable is sustainable growth of SWF. 
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Figure 3.1 Initial theoretical proposition for Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
Source: Inferences from and Gaps in the Literature  
 
Major factors are conceptualized as independent variables while defining hypotheses 
and proposing the initial theoretical framework. This hypothesized theoretical 
proposition is then operationally defined to measure these variables. Only upon 
defining their measures through indicators, one can measure the strength of 
relationship between independent and dependent variables and their statistical results 
lead one to test the developed hypotheses.      
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3.4 Hypothesized theoretical proposition 
The hypothesised model for this research study is shown below according to the 
sequence of the hypotheses. The proposed framework is divided into three sements as 
explained below for the ease of understanding. The arrows depict inter-relationships 
between these constructs; and primary data responses in the form of questionnaires will 
be analysed to test these hypothesised relationships.  
 
Figure 3.2 hypothesises direct influence of first set of qualitative factors such as 
governance, accountability, investee country laws and trade balances on the growth of 
SWF which are considered as independent variables. Research hypotheses H1 – H3 
suggest that dimensions such as legal aspects, laws and environmental forces can 
influence the decision making within the SWF. Thus, these variables will have direct 
effects on the growth of the fund.  This set of hypotheses H1 – H3 assumes that there is 
positive relationship between increase in governance, transparency, accountability and 
compliance to laws, ultimately resulting in higher growth of SWF.    
 
 
Figure 3.2 Impacts of qualitative factors on SWFs 
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SWF by government of sponsoring countries can affect the dimensions of the 
sustainable growth of SWF. This set of hypotheses H4 to H5 assumes that there is 
positive relationship between independent variables of better policies and appropriate 
planning and investments performance and success rate of the fund in terms of size and 
credibility.  
 
Figure 3.3 Impacts of qualitative factors on SWF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 hypothesises an association between the quantitative factors of structure, 
decision making and investment deals of SWF to the growth of SWF. Research 
hypotheses H6 – H8 suggest that dimensions such as quantitative factors have positive 
impacts on performance and overall success of SWF and thus on the growth of SWF.   
 
Figure 3.4 Impacts of quantitative factors on SWF 
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3.5 Operationalization of variables  
The process of operationalizing variables refers to the concept where these variables 
can be directly or indirectly measured. Concepts are the building blocks of the 
theoretical framework and research is conducted around them. Once measured, 
concepts provide the relationship and meaningful information between variables. 
Measurement in the analytical study such as this one becomes necessary in quantitative 
techniques because to delineate fine differences between the different characteristics in 
question; to provide a consistent device for analysing the distinctions between patterns 
and to create the basis for precise estimation of the degree of relationship between 
variables and concepts used (Neuman, 2006; Bryman and Bell, 2007). Indicators are 
then employed through number of questions to measure the concept directly or 
indirectly depending largely on the qualitative (perceptual nature) or quantitative 
(numbered nature) type of the concept. To measure a concept one can utilize as many 
indicators as possible to extract the exact meaning or quantity of the strength of 
variable (Neuman, 2006; Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
 
In this framework, factors are already grouped as qualitative or quantitative in nature 
which makes it easy to apply measures to them. Selection of these factors and their 
dimensional concepts are justified with supporting evidences from literature citing 
required references and hence, not replicated again here in the discussion. Table 3.2 
provide the operationalization details about indicators and scales applied in case of 
each factor and related hypothesis based on the conceptual framework in figure 3.1 and 
the questionnaire (Appendix F). 
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Table 3.2 Operationalization details of framework 
Factor affecting 
SWF 
Hypothesis 
number 
Dimension(s)  Type of Indicator(s) Scale applied  
Legal aspects 
 
H1 Governance  
Transparency  
Accountability 
Perceptual questions  Likert 
1= strongly disagree 
TO 
7 = strongly agree 
Investee country 
laws 
H2 National security 
 
Perceptual questions  Likert 
1= strongly disagree 
TO 
7 = strongly agree 
Environmental 
dimensions 
 
H3 Trade balances  
 
Perceptual questions  Likert 
1= strongly disagree 
TO 
7 = strongly agree 
Policy 
 
 
H4 Lack of planning   
 
Perceptual questions  Likert 
1= strongly disagree 
TO 
7 = strongly agree 
Sponsoring 
country laws 
H5 Political stability   
 
Perceptual questions  Likert 
1= strongly disagree 
TO 
7 = strongly agree 
Structure 
 
H6 Purpose of SWF 
 
Direct questions and  
Perceptual inquiry  
Likert 
1= strongly disagree 
TO 
7 = strongly agree 
Investment deal 
 
H7 Investment 
Strategy  
Deal Size  
Asset allocation 
Direct questions and  
Perceptual inquiry  
Likert 
1= strongly disagree 
TO 
7 = strongly agree 
Operations  
 
H8 Decision making 
 
Direct questions and  
Perceptual inquiry  
Yes / No measure 
And 
1 to7 Likert scale 
Source: Neuman, 2006; Bryman and Bell, 2007; Saunders et al, 2009 
 
3.5   Socio-economic factors 
Apart from the eight independent variables or factors affecting shown in the conceptual 
framework, there is one more category of factors that is social and economical factors 
within the sponsoring countries. Literature in social science, human resource 
management, economics and business culture has proven that such factors can affect 
the way business is carried out. Since these are proven concepts in the literature, they 
are not included as hypotheses in the framework. However, top management‘s 
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interviews may reveal the necessary information regarding these factors and their 
effects. Such factors may not seem affecting SWF directly but these factors allow SWF 
investments to be successful when made in the projects within the sponsoring country. 
Also, changes at such root level allow country to realise benefits in the long term and 
increases investee country confidence about national development and economic 
growth in attracting foreign investments. Hence, these socio-economic dimensions are 
critical to the success of in-country investment strategy of SWF and outlook of the 
development to foreign countries.  For example, culture and religious beliefs can lead 
to social cohesion and harmony which can increase confidence in business. Business 
traditions like Islamic finance give more opportunities to local population to come 
forward with innovative investment opportunities thus opening avenues for SWF. 
Hence, considering this context of factors actually critical for SWF, only eight factors 
are accounted in the framework.     
 
3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has detailed the conceptual theoretical proposition about which factors 
can affect the most critically to sustainable growth of any SWF. The developed 
hypotheses about each factor and its operationalization are explained in detail. The 
next chapter would describe the research methodology selected and applied in this 
research study. 
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Chapter 4  Research methodology 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the selection of research methods and the reasoning for adopting 
these methods. The chapter applies the focus of sovereign wealth fund, research 
questions, objectives defined in chapter one and developed hypotheses in the previous 
chapter as a basis to select the research methods. Main components of the research 
methodology selected are research philosophy, research approach, research strategy 
and research design comprising sampling, data collection and data analysis methods 
within the scope of this research study. Therefore, this section is data theory 
component of the research process model given by Philips and Pugh (1994). It has 
been has attempted to limit the effects of errors, biases and limitations and to maintain 
the research ethics protocol during the entire study. Next sections in the chapter explain 
these features in detail.  
 
4.2 Research objectives   
The previous chapter of the proposed conceptual framework mentioned the major 
factors affecting the SWF. The main aim of analysing these factors and strength of 
their relationship with dependent variables of performance and success rate of 
sovereign wealth fund is to find out the remedial measures in terms of which factors to 
be addressed first by the SWFs to improve their growth prospects. In doing so, the 
proposed initial framework has been conceptualized as variables of two categories, 
qualitative or quantitative. Thus, central theme of this research and research objectives 
enable one to choose an appropriate stance of how to carry out the research and 
applying which methods. The following sections describe details about the 
methodological approach adopted in this thesis.  
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4.3 Research philosophy and approach  
This section provides the rationale for using ‗interpretivism‘ and ‗positivism‘ research 
philosophies and a mixed research approach combining: ‗inductive‘ study through 
qualitative analysis of secondary data, interviews, and ‗deductive‘ study using 
quantitative analysis of data obtained through questionnaires (Saunders et al, 2009). 
 
Literature review has examined various factors affecting growth of sovereign wealth 
funds which revealed that little research has been carried out in terms of both 
qualitative and quantitative variables in a specific SWF context. Thus, indepth analyses 
of academic literature and industry data about SWFs led to the conceptual framework 
as proposed in the previous chapter three of this thesis. These qualitative analyses and 
formation of conceptual framework suggest that interpretation and meanings are 
applied to build the proposition. This process is closely matches the components and 
application of interpretivism philosophy and an inductive research approach (Neuman, 
2006).  
 
In addition to this, mainly research philosophy depends upon the way it is attempted to 
address the research problem such as development, refinement, extension or testing of 
theories (Easterby-Smith et al, 2009). This study is about the development and testing 
of the conceptual framework consisting growth of SWF and factors affecting it. The 
acceptable standards and views of every research make the methodology and research 
process distinct. The research philosophies in the management influence the research 
design and processes, the way research is carried out for example, it leads to a major 
question of which is first, theory or data (Neuman, 2006; Easterby-Smith et al, 2009).   
Research philosophy relies on two aspects: how much world can perceive an idea of 
research issue and up to what extent one can analyse, understand and infer the 
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meanings from the data to develop the body of knowledge (Saunders et al, 2009). 
These can be further categorised into three different philosophical viewpoints called: 
positivism, interpretivism and realism. In this study, a combination of research 
philosophies interpretivism and positivism is applied. Interpretivism application is 
justified in analysing literature and developing the conceptual framework whereas 
positivism is justified in testing the proposed framework and hypotheses generated 
based on the causal relationships in the framework.  
 
Interpretivism is defined as an alternative to the positivism orthodoxy. This philosophy 
applies the details of the situation to understand the reality or the reality working to 
create the situation as argued by Remenyi et al (1998 as cited in the Saunders et al, 
2009). Interpretative theorist attempts to find the meaningful explanation of an event or 
a fact within a research context specific to the subject. This allows information to be 
interpreted to analyse the topic. Neuman (2006) defines the interpretivism as  
―it is the systematic analysis of socially meaningful action through the direct 
detailed observation of people in natural settings in order to arrive at 
understandings and interpretations of how people create and maintain their 
social worlds‖. 
Use of a single type of philosophy may create over dependence on one type of data or 
unidirectional inferences; thus keeping in sight this reason of data and biases, it was 
decided to use both philosophies in this study (Bryman and Bell, 2007). Hence, 
reducing an over dependence on the single philosophy is one of the reason of adopting 
mixed methodologies and also, it is the requirement of subject such as SWF concept 
which requires exploration at first to develop the framework and then analysis and 
testing to refine the concept. Qualitative aspects and current status of management 
issues can be the best understood by discussion with managers and decision makers of 
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SWF. Thus, qualitative analyses of interviews and secondary data are adopted as 
compared to quantitative analyses in the form of statistical tests for questionnaire data.  
 
Positivism stands for the application of the scientific methods to study social research. 
With this type of positivism, researchers prefer working with an observable reality and 
try to make law like generalization at the end of analyses of findings (Saunders et al, 
2009). Contrary to the interpretivism, positivism usually demonstrates the causality 
which can be proved or can be tested by deduction of hypotheses. However, positivism 
requires that theoretical concepts are operationalized first before any measurement 
process takes place and; results may be generalized through statistical analyses which 
need the large number of units of analysis in the samples (Easterby-Smith et al, 2009). 
Positivism is a highly structured methodology which normally produces objective facts 
and establishes the truth like experimental research of observations, facts and numbers. 
On the other hand, interpretivism derives meanings and values without having direct 
relation between subjects and objects (Williams and May, 1996). The realism or 
positivism has an underlying assumption of considering the reality and the existence of 
what is already being known to use in the analyses with events, entities and structures 
included in the research field. It is considered to be independent of research beliefs and 
values that can be a bias to the quality of feedback from respondents (Easterby-Smith 
et al, 2009).   
 
These research philosophies of interpretivism and positivism are closely aligned to 
main research approaches inductive and deductive respectively. More clear the 
adoption of a research approach, more clarity it would bring in developing or testing 
the concept (Sekaran, 2003; Neuman, 2006). Inductive approach is defined as a process 
which takes inferences from data analyses to formulate or to develop the theory 
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whereas deductive approach is about taking this developed or proposed concept or 
theory to data for testing the proposition for impacts, causal relationships or defining 
measurements using statistical analyses such as correlations or regression of structured 
data for example questionnaire data in this study (Neuman, 2006).  
 
Both these approaches are selected in this study. Literature review and its qualitative 
analyses leading to development and proposition of the conceptual framework is the 
inductive approach of this research study. The deductive approach is applied in the 
form of testing the proposed framework from qualitative analyses of secondary and 
interviews data and statistical analyses of primary questionnaires data of Oman SWF.    
 
In addition to formation and testing of theoretical proposition, these approaches enable 
to find more perspectives regarding investment strategies and management issues as 
part of developing the proposition which leads to the methodological triangulation and 
rich information exploration (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Easterby-Smith et al, 2009). 
Development of conceptual framework proposition based on the review of academic 
literature and industry data about SWFs is result of the application of inductive 
approach in this study as shown below. 
 
The deduction approach allows one to test the proposed conceptual framework based 
on the analyses of secondary data and primary data through interviews and 
questionnaires from selected case studies of SWFs which is shown below.   
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Figure 4.1  Research approaches 
 
Inductive approach 
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Source: Adapted from Neuman (2006); Bryman and Bell (2007) 
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The research philosophy and approaches lead to the selection of an appropriate 
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affecting SWF, SWF affecting economies and industries, the other constructs such as 
religion and culture are considered as constant themes. This study first explored 
theories relating to SWF then formulated a conceptual framework of relating 
hypotheses between factors affecting SWF as independent variables; and dependent 
variable of growth of SWF. This set of activities was part of inductive approach and 
qualitative analyses of literature and data as explained in the chapter one, two and three 
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methods approach. The next step in the research process after finalizing the research 
philosophy, approach and types of analyses is to decide which strategy can be 
implemented to carry out the research. This is explained in the next section.     
 
4.4 Research strategy: The case study method  
It has been said that empirical or analytical studies are carried out to answer the 
research questions. Hence, research design is conducted in a context where it becomes 
congruent with its theoretical underpinning (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002). This 
selection of research design is preceded by an appropriate research strategy for the 
topic under investigation. Knowing the course of research study such as philosophical 
stance or research approach applied such as mixed methods allows one to finalize the 
research strategy – a plan of how to carry out the research study keeping in view the 
aim and key research questions. This study has done literature review and industry data 
analysis to formulate the initial conceptual framework proposition and collects primary 
and secondary data to test this proposition according to the deduction approach 
application. The data used to test the theory is collected from respondents attached 
directly and indirectly to Oman SWF. The purpose is to seek solutions about which 
factors affect the growth, success rate and investment performance of SWFs and once 
these factors are known then how to utilize them for the sustainable growth of any 
SWF.   
 
Primary and secondary data is sourced from Oman SWF by different data collection 
methods however it concentrates on a single unit of analysis Oman SWF. Apart from 
deduction approach using descriptive statistical tests to finalize the conceptual 
framework, Norway SWF is also analysed to compare with Oman SWF for the factors 
selected in the framework plus other organisational attributes such as size and 
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structure. The cross case comparison allows to ascertain what are the issues within 
Oman SWF and what can be done to achieve best performance for Oman SWF. This 
type of research design selection is the most suitable under the case study research 
strategy where in-depth exploration of each unit of analysis is necessary.     
 
4.4.1 The case study method 
Yin (2009, p.13) defines case studies as ―an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident‖.  
Cutler (2004) classifies case studies according to their purpose and utility such as 
teaching cases for discussion and debates; historical cases for information storage and 
retrieving; diagnosis cases used in professional practice and finally, research cases for 
investigation activities. Yin (2009) categorises case studies based on the type of 
research they are deployed into such as exploratory case studies for structured or 
deductive approach research, descriptive case studies to describe the effects or impacts 
and the explanatory cases to explain for example a company‘s business process. Case 
studies provide a holistic view of the process such as investment or decision making in 
the company like sovereign wealth funds in this study. Case studies are detailed 
investigations into a complex entity that signifies the uniqueness of case study and are 
important tool to make theoretical contribution.  
In this thesis, case studies are important because constructs and linkages are not 
developed as SWF is a new concept and its body of knowledge is not developed in 
terms of any particular SWF theory. However, in this case it is attempted to develop 
explicit hypotheses based on the conceptual framework formulated from literature and 
industry data. Thus, case studies can help to develop the research and knowledge 
further for the concept of SWF (Eisenhardt, 1989; Barr, 2004). Case study research 
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strategy enables large amount of data collection rich in description and analyses for 
specific perspectives for example performance of group of SWFs. Thus, conceptual 
and causal relationships between different constructs or variables can be understood 
such as factors affecting growth of SWFs in this study. Case studies can be utilized as a 
combination research strategies with experimental or survey research. Case study 
research can be defined as an experimental or an analytical investigation of phenomena 
in practical context where barriers between phenomenon and context are blurred and 
multiple sources are used to get data (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Neuman, 2006; Yin, 
2009). Case studies are selected over other methods when comprehensiveness of 
understanding is required more than statistical analyses and current information 
regarding a phenomenon or a theory is inadequate. Hence, it is a powerful method to 
study contextual factors like what drives country and SWF to the growth and what 
business process or investment strategy must be followed (Miles and Huberman, 
1994). 
 
In this study, the selected case units are SWFs of Oman and Norway. Both these SWFs 
have investments made on a global scale and its profitability can impact to the balance 
sheets of their respective country‘s investment portfolio. Other data from Oman and 
Norway SWFs are analysed in the next chapter of secondary data analyses.  
 
4.5 Triangulation 
As defined by Robson (2002) triangulation, a concept taken from engineering is 
applied by management researchers in the measurement of constructs to reduce any 
chance of errors because lack of methodological rigour, data sources, observations or 
theories. This concept of triangulation in management was introduced by Webb et al in 
1960s and Denzin in 1970s as mentioned in Bryman and Bell (2007). The application 
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of triangulation technique is about utilizing multiple observers, theoretical 
perspectives, data sources, methodologies, approaches and analyses to identify and to 
minimize the impact of errors in the complete research process. For example, if 
authenticity of a data source is low then better to apply data triangulation and collect 
data from multiple sources. In this way, triangulation helps researchers to increase the 
validity of the findings and thus becoming confident about the generalizations and 
recommendations made, thus increasing the contribution and usage of the research 
done (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  Since, this is not laboratory experiments research, 
one can implement four types of triangulation in this study:  
(1) Data triangulation – collecting from questionnaires, interviews and secondary data;   
(2) Methodological triangulation – using both inductive and deductive approaches;   
(3) Theoretical triangulation – proposed framework as consider maximum possible 
variables in both quantitative and qualitative categories derived from key inferences 
from the literature review, of possibly all recent perspectives on sovereign wealth 
funds research; and    
(4) Data Analyses triangulation – using multiple analyses and evidences to test 
hypotheses such as regression, descriptive statistics, interviews, secondary data of 
SWFs and literature support (Neuman, 2006; Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
 
4.6 Sampling  
Sampling is a vital function of the research process in finalizing the data collection 
plan as a major activity of research design. Researcher should take sufficient number of 
units of analysis as a representative sample drawn from population domain which 
finally provides required data for the analysis purposes in the research inquiry 
(Sekaran, 2003). Sampling enables the selection of a representative sample of the 
population because it is rarely possible that whole population is utilized as a sample. 
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Thus, sampling techniques categorised as probability and non-probability are known 
for enabling data collection process to be practical in terms reducing cost, time and 
complexities. Samples can be further classified based on different criterion applying 
different stratums, filters, clusters, randomness and proportion. Probability sampling 
refers to the method of selecting units from population in such a manner that all units 
of population will have equal probability of getting selected in the sample (Saunders et 
al, 2009). Probability sampling is selected for this study because Oman SWF has 
smaller population of employees and other stakeholders. The population of respondents 
for this case study of Oman SWF is formed by employees and management 
stakeholders attached to it directly and indirectly, such as advisors, ministers and all 
levels of organizational hierarchy. Sample size can be calculated based on number of 
variables in the framework (Pallant, 2010) or based on the margin of error (Saunders et 
al, 2009).  
Stevens (1996, p.72) recommends about 15 responses per independent variable 
whereas Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p.123) suggest minimum 50 + 8m variables 
having m = number of independent variables. In this study, there are eight independent 
variables as mentioned in the conceptual framework in previous chapter. Thus, 
according to these variables based formulae, this study requires either 15x8 = 120 or 
50+ 8 (8) = 114 responses as sufficient number to carry out statistical tests using SPSS 
software (Pallant, 2010).    
The main problem in getting 114 or 120 responses is that there are not many executives 
working within Oman SWF in middle and top management. Therefore, it would be 
advantageous to get maximum possible responses from middle management through 
questionnaires and from top management through interviews.   
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The other method to determine the sample size is based on the level of accuracy 
expected. The larger sample enables reduction in errors and increases validity for 
making generalizations as they represent larger proportion of population (Sekaran, 
2003). As mentioned in Saunders et al (2009, p.210) ―the larger the sample size lower 
the likely error in generalising the population; therefore probability sampling is a 
compromise between the accuracy of the findings and time and money invested in the 
collecting, checking and analysing data‖ 
Thus, sample size calculation is governed by level of certainty required, tolerable 
margin of error, type of analysis to be undertaken and available size of the population 
(Saunders et al, 2009) 
In this study, total available stakeholders and employees attached directly or indirectly 
to Oman SWF are not more than 400. This is not a large population and also response 
rate can be low for questionnaire survey. Therefore, maximum possible respondents 
from this population would be contacted for questionnaire survey. According to 5% 
margin of error and 400 respondents‘ population, one requires a sample size of only 
168 (Saunders et al, 2009; p.212). Hence, the minimum number of responses required 
is between 114 and 168 according to both methods of sample size calculation.  
Apart from questionnaire survey, data will be collected through interview as well from 
top management executives, advisors and ministers because they can provide first hand 
information for factors and issues affecting the successful operations of SWF. Thus for 
interviews, ministers and top executives in relevant parliamentary level departments 
are approached, in the range of 30 to 40 persons. From 40 potential interviwees 
contacted, following sample of 20 interviewees agreed to take part in the interviews.   
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Table 4.1 Final Interview Sample 
  
Interviewee 
number 
Interviewee 
Designation 
Relation or 
Responsibility to Oman SWF 
1 Al-shura council speaker  Law and policy making  for country in 
conjunction with parliament     
2 General secretary state council Law and policy drafting and 
implementation in conjunction with 
parliament  
3 Dy. CEO  Employee in Oman SWF 
 
4 General director of investment 
development 
Inevstment activities with Oman SWF 
5 General director – financial audit Auditing of Financial agencies  
 
6 General director – investment 
planning  
Investment planning for Oman  
7 Vice-chairman – Shura council Law and policy making with parliament  
 
8 Economic expert –  
Al-Shura council 
Research expert who can advise SWF 
9 Technical expert –  
Al-Shura council 
Technology expert who can advise SWF 
10 Economic researcher –  
State council 
Research expert who can advise SWF 
11 Economic researcher –  
State council 
Research expert who can advise SWF  
12 Dy. CEO IT authority Planning and IT expert 
 
13 Economic expert – State council Research expert who can advise SWF 
 
14 Economic researcher – MoF Research expert who can advise SWF 
 
15 Political researcher – Oman 
News Agency 
 
Can help for bilateral relations and trade 
with other countries 
16 Director – National Economy 
Ministry  
Can advise for planning of governance and 
Revenue mechanisms of SWF 
17 Member – Al-Shura council  
 
Planning and policy making  
18 Employee – Royal Office  Repoting to Sultan, can advise for planning  
 
19 Employee – Royal Office  Reporting to Sultan, can advise for 
administration 
 
20 Executive – Internal security Can advise on national security issues  
 
Desing and process of data collection done using questionnaire and interviews are 
explained in the next section. 
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4.7 Data collection and analysis techniques  
Data collection is a vital component of research design as it enables the researcher to 
develop or to test the theories. The usual instruments of data collection are 
questionnaires, interviews, observations, experiments, discussions, archived documents 
and historical transactions. Data can be classified as primary or secondary. Primary 
data is collected by researchers themselves whereas secondary data is data sourced 
already published or existing information. Both categories of data have issues of 
reliability and validity embedded in them due to data collection instruments, scale 
applied, authenticity of data sources, biases from respondents or researchers. 
Therefore, multiple data collection in the form of use of different data collection 
instruments or many sources of data helps the researchers to reduce errors and increase 
the validity of the results. This is called data triangulation application (Saunders et al, 
2009). It is proposed to collect both primary and secondary data from SWFs and also 
utilize two data collection instruments: questionnaires and interviews. The deduction 
process of testing the hypotheses of the conceptual framework will have evidence 
collected from three sources: secondary data from SWFs‘ websites and reports, 
primary data through interviews and questionnaires.    
 
4.7.1 Interviews  
The first issue to be resolved for data collection through interviews is how structured 
the interview should be. According to the classification based on a level of structure, in 
this study semi-structured interviews are utilized which is closely aligned with guided 
open interview style (Easterby-Smith et al, 2009). In this study, interviews are used in 
the data collection process to explore and to extract more in-depth information from 
top management and ministers about SWF.  
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The following interview protocol and set of interview questions were prepared as a 
guideline to conduct the interview process without any bias from interviewer. The 
confidentiality, academic purpose of the research and no recording of responses were 
conveyed to the interviewees in advance to minimize the interviewee bias (Sekaran, 
2003; Bryman and Bell, 2007).     
 
Semi-structured interviews with open ended questions would enable to extract 
maximum possible information about SWF and get rich description required for 
deduction of conceptual framework through multiple data sources, as compared to the 
structured interviews and close ended questions in the interviews (Bryman and Bell, 
2007). The variation or pattern emerging out of data and willingness of respondents to 
reveal detailed information are more evident in semi-structured and flexible style of 
interviewing which keeps the interviewees at ease (Sekaran, 2003; Neuman, 2006).  
Errors are attempted to be minimized in the interview data collection by applying 
various techniques such as open ended and less impactful questions, appropriate tone 
of the discussion, practicing the interviews in both languages English and Arabic, 
advance approvals and agreed meeting times, flexibility in the order of questions, 
conveyed confidentiality and academic purpose of the interviews in advance to 
interviewees. Analysis of interviews is done using categorising, coding and 
transcribing the data collected from interviews (Saunders et al, 2009). Conducting 
interview requires much ethical, morality and interviewer bias control since 
interpretation and recording of responses is done by interviewer alone and not by 
respondent as in the case of questionnaire where respondent selects the answer. Thus, 
interview process needs a protocol as mentioned below.   
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Interview Protocol 
Type of Interviews : Personally administered, face to face and semi- 
Structured 
Interview duration  : 45 minutes to 90 minutes 
Level of interviewees: Decision making in Wealth Fund and Ministry of 
Finance (For example, under-secretary, member of 
parliament, chief executive officer, general manager)  
No. of executives : total 30 to 40 executives from all relevant departments     
in sample 
Purpose and style : Information exploring and extraction by medium level     
 probing 
Place of interview : Department office or conference room  
Language  : English and Arabic as suited to the respondents  
Confidentiality : It is explicitly made clear to the respondents that                           
purpose of the research is academic.  
Morality and Ethics: Each respondent would be requested for interview in 
advance and data collection would proceed on the receipt 
of written consent from each participant.  
Recording responses: Interviewer will explain to each interviewee that the 
interview needs to be recorded for the study. In addition 
to giving consent for conducitng the interview, each 
interviewee would be asked to give a written consent for 
recording the interview.   
Information exchange: Few questions for selected topics are prepared in advance 
where as rest of the discussion may take its own course.   
Type of questions: Open ended, describing and explaining situation or 
process  
End of interview: Thanking the respondents for their time and contribution. 
Providing them interviewer‘s contact details in case they 
wish to receive brief summary of the research. Interview 
transcripts are given in Appendix E. 
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4.7.2 Questionnaires 
Management researchers usually make use of questionnaires in the survey research 
however questionnaires can be useful in the case study research strategy too. 
Questionnaires are mainly a structured form of pre-set questions with different scales 
to measure variables. For example, Likert scale of 1 to 7 designed and applied for this 
study (Neuman, 2006; Yin, 2009). Questionnaire is widely used and approved form of 
data collection when one wants to collect large data in short time from many 
respondents. Also, questionnaire‘s importance is increased over the time with more 
statistical tests and software are developed in the support of questionnaire for example 
SPSS. Recent developments include questionnaires sent by emails or filled online on 
the websites due to internet technology developments (Dillman, 2000; deVaus, 2002). 
Questionnaires are advantageous over interviews in terms of time, cost, location, 
analysis and overall ease of data collection process (Sekaran, 2003; Saunders et al, 
2009). The design of questionnaire in terms language of questions, scale applied, order 
of the questions, respondents understanding of questions can impact the quality of data 
it generates for analysis. Also, the data analysis techniques such as statistical tests and 
the use of software shall be known in advance prior to collecting data through 
questionnaires (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Saunders et al, 2009).         
 
Question types 
The Likert scale of 1 to 7 is applied instead of 1 to 5 to provide more choice of answers 
and to get exact views of respondents about SWF. The same scale is applied to all 
questions for better comparison, analysis and ease of understanding for respondents. 
Set of 10 questionnaires were launched initially as a pilot study to check how the 
respondents feel while answering the questions. This was done in the form of sending 
questionnaires to experts and managers for their comments about design and content of 
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questionnaire. Considering these comments, final questionnaire is designed as 
explained in figure 4.2. Major points to remember while designing questions are: no 
negative words, no use of acronyms and multiple meaning phrases, no abbreviations 
used, no use of emotionally loaded questions, to the point direct measurements, clear 
explanation of ethics, confidentiality and academic purpose and simple language 
(Saunders et al, 2009; Pallant, 2010). Following diagram provides the necessary 
procedure adopted for designing the final questionnaire for primary data collection.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 140 
Figure 4.2 Questionnaire Design 
 
Adapted from Neuman (2006); Bryman and Bell (2007); Saunders et al (2009) 
Such a design procedure followed for questionnaire minimizes the occurrence of errors 
and reduces any influence of biases thus, increasing validity of the data and results. 
The following diagram summarises the data collection methods and its further use in 
the analyses.  
 
Author’s experience & participation in 
Govt. administration & management  
Key inferences from 
Literature review  
Research methods of 
Questionnaire design  
Initial secondary data 
from SWF of Oman  
Launching questionnaire in UK & 
Oman for expert comments 
Design of final questionnaire 
in English and Arabic version 
Personally administering the 
questionnaire on selected sample 
for collecting data to test 
proposed hypotheses 
Formulating 
Draft Questionnaire  
Modify questionnaire based on 
feedback & responses’ comparative 
Analysis for final addition/deletion 
Translation and analysis of 
responses from UK having  
a. Experts’ comments  
 
Translation and analysis of 
responses from Oman having  
b. Managerial comments  
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Figure 4.3 Data collection methods  
 
Adapted from Bryman and Bell (2007); Saunders et al (2009)  
 
4.7.3 Data analyses  
Analysis of Interview transcripts   
Interview transcripts are analysed in three steps. First, major themes from each 
question and framework of factors are drawn to structure the flow of analysis. 
Secondly, notes made during each interview are converted into transcript or main 
message from the interviewee. Finally, this transcript is then explained and understood 
based on the content analysis using theme structure derived in step one (Saunders et al, 
2009). This sequence with detailed interviews analysis is in the sixth chapter of this 
thesis.      
Questionnaires 
1. Probing  
2. Closed ended   
3. Decisive questions  
Information  
 
SWF, Trade reports  
And data from Oman 
and Norway  
Primary Data Collection 
Data collection 
method 
Responses  
provide 
Findings 
include 
Secondary Data Collection 
Finalizing  
the factors 
affecting and  
their impacts 
on SWF 
Provide 
insights and 
emerging 
patterns 
Analyses for 
SWF 
management 
and 
investment 
strategies 
Interviews 
1.    Description 
2.  Impact words            
3.    Explanatory             
4.    Perspectives  
 
Specific answers 
Measure dimensions 
and  
Test hypotheses 
 
Facts, figures and 
trends provide 
investment patterns 
and important factors 
applied   
 
Descriptive and 
meaningful answers 
provide what is 
required in SWF as 
their feedback  
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Analysis of Questionnaire responses  
The data analysis is carried out using descriptive statistics and other parametric and 
non-parametric statistical tests. However this requires prior coding, screening and 
cleaning of the data in a structured format using the software, in this case it is SPSS 
version 18. This is needed if any inconsistencies are left in the questionnaires by 
respondents or in creating data files from the filled questionnaires. The SPSS software 
manual by Pallant (2010) is followed for carrying out various required tests on 
questionnaire data. The sequence of test include feeling the data, checking reliability 
and validity, reducing the data using principal component analysis (factor analysis) and 
analysing the data based on the correlations and multiple regression test results. These 
are explained as follows.   
Mean, mode, standard deviation, range and variance results are obtained for main 
independent and dependent variables. An inter-correlation matrix of all variables of the 
framework is obtained, irrespective of their relations to hypotheses developed. These 
descriptive statistics provide feel for the data which is a measure of central tendency to 
see their dispersion or cluster formation as a group of variables.   
 
Choosing a correct statistical analysis of data for testing hypothesis and relationship 
between variables is one of the most important tasks in the data analysis (Neuman, 
2006). Factor analysis allows one to condense a large set of variables such as eight 
major factors affecting the growth of SWF as mentioned in chapter three. These large 
set of variables can be scaled down to smaller and manageable number of dimensions 
and factors (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). This is done by expressing their correlation 
and analysing their clusters of related items. This is commonly used for developing 
scales and measures (Pallant, 2010). Discriminant function analysis can be applied in 
this case as one explores the predictive ability of a set of independent variables, on the 
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dependent measures such as success rate and performance of SWF. Canonical 
correlation may help in this case when one wants to analyse the relationship between 
two groups of factors as divided by qualitative and quantitative. Use of multiple 
regression analysis is made to measure overall predictive ability of all factors on the 
dependent variables of success rate and performance of Oman SWF. The group of 
analyses would facilitate the testing of strength, causal relationship, fitting in the 
framework and their impact on one another for all variables in the theoretical 
framework made (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007).    
 
4.7.4 Research ethics issues  
This research involves human participants in the data collection by interview and 
questionnaire responses. Therefore, it must acknowledge the conformity to the basic 
principles and rules of ethics. Four basic principles are autonomy, non-malfeasance, 
beneficence and justice. Autonomy involves respect and safeguard to persons and 
their protection against abuse and harm. Non-malfeasance is an obligation not to inflict 
harm or risk as a result of the research. Beneficence is an obligation to maximise 
benefits and minimise harm. Justice is about treating people well and having right 
morale that is equal opportunity. Adhering and maintaining these principles form 
following ethical procedure for data collection (Korac-Kakabadse et al, 2002).  
 
Ethical trade off can be generated from the code of conduct followed by organizations. 
For example, freedom of information may reduce the privacy or information sharing 
may hamper confidentiality. Hence, this project has followed a rational strategy of 
research ethics. Confidentiality is assured to respondents beyond the point of identity 
known. Secondly, anonymity is assured to all respondents in the main thesis document 
if they wish, which increases their confidence to provide best judged details of Oman 
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SWF and reduces any bias. The Brunel university ethics committee approval is also 
obtained prior to primary and secondary data collection.  
 
4.8 Reliability and validity  
The key issues for any research findings are acceptance by peer review based on its 
validity, reliability and generalizability. Validity refers to the measures applied for 
variables closely corresponding to reality; reliability refers to the same measures 
yielding the similar or same results if applied on other occasions and generalizability 
refers to what extent the findings of research completed confirm or contradict the 
existing body of knowledge. These definitions of three key issues pertain to the 
positivist stance of deductive approach adopted for testing the conceptual framework 
adopted in this study (Neuman, 2006; Easterby-Smith et al, 2009). Reliability of scale 
and measures applied can be known from results of consistency and stability tests such 
as Cronbach‘s Alpha coefficient. The value of Cronbach‘s Alpha reveals that how the 
measures applied are correlated which develops the scale. It ranges between 0 and 1; 
however 0.7 is considered minimum to confirm the reliability of the scale applied. 
Validity measures can be obtained by principal component analysis or factor analysis 
as these tests suggest how many measures really predict a variable and correspond to 
predict the particular variable (Pallant, 2010).The scale validity reveals the accuracy of 
variables‘ operationalization that dimensions applied to measure the variables are 
really measuring them. Different statistical tests are carried out to measure types of 
validity such as content validity, criterion validity and construct validity (Pallant, 
2010).    
In addition to the data and instruments, the appropriateness of the methodological 
selection in the research process plays a pivotal role in the reliability and validity of the 
findings. The selection of research methods relating to research philosophy, strategy 
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and data collection is supported by the evidence of those methods‘ applications for 
SWF research by previous research studies. The following table 4.2 shows the 
applications of case study research strategy, secondary data and questionnaires applied 
in the previous research studies in the field of SWF.  
Table 4.2 Support for research methods’ validity from literature  
Research 
method 
applied  
Previous researchers who applied 
same method  
Source of the literature  
Case study 
research strategy 
involving case of 
SWFs  
 
China SWF analysed by Thomas and 
Chen, 2011 
 
Temasek holding case by Henry et al, 
2011 
 
GIC, Singapore case by Clark and Monk, 
2010 
 
Four cases of Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, 
Singapore, China SWFs by Pistor and 
Hatton, 2011 
 
Norway‘s ethical case by Chesterman, 
2008 
 
Cases of GCC SWFs by Setser and 
Ziemba, 2009  
 
A case of SAMA by Smith Diwan, 2009  
 
 
22 SWFs analysed to study 7 factors by 
Lyons, 2007 
 
Journal of Cntemporary China 
 
 
Australian Journal of 
Management  
 
The Pacific Review  
 
 
Nellco Legal Scholarship 
Repository, Columbia Law 
School 
 
International Law Review  
 
 
Council on Foreign Relations  
 
 
Geopolitics  
 
 
Journal of Management 
Research  
Use of only 
secondary data as 
main source of 
data for analyses   
 
Problems in China SWF by Zhang and 
He, 2009 
 
Trust, legitimacy and governance 
discussion from secondary data cases by 
Monk, 2009 
 
Analyses of Petro China and Temasek, 
Singapore SWFs in nationalism context 
by Lavelle, 2008  
 
Study of investment and governance 
practices of top SWFs by Ainina and 
Mohan, 2010  
Study of 358 investments announcements 
made from 24 SWFs by Kotter and Lel, 
China World Economy  
 
 
New Political Economy  
 
 
 
Journal of International Affairs 
 
 
 
Journal of Asia-Pacific 
Business  
Journal of Financial 
Economics  
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2011 
 
Asian SWFs analyses for self regulation 
and Santiago principles by Park and 
Estrada, 2011  
 
 
Asian Journal of International 
Law  
Use of 
questionnaires / 
Interviews as 
data collection 
instruments for 
primary data  
 
Studying all funds with questionnaires to 
develop ranking by Truman, 2008  
 
Statistical analyses to determine 
governance by Aizenman and Glick, 2009  
 
Discussions about role of WTO in SWF 
by Mattoo and Subramanian, 2009 
Peterson Institute for 
International Economics  
 
The International Finance  
 
 
The World Economy  
 
4.9 Research design summary  
Research design components include planning actual study in terms of location, 
representative sample from population, doing data collection and carrying out data 
analyses. Thus, research design is one very vital component of any research study as it 
separates the research understanding and research actions taken, that is research design 
is actual implementation of all selected components of research methodology. The 
complete research methods selection is mentioned in the figure 4.4 below (Saunders et 
al, 2009). A broad area of research interest is identified based on the industry and 
academic literature observations made.    
a. Research context, problem definition, main aim and research objectives of the 
study are clearly defined.   
b. The first phase of secondary data is gathered in the form of literature review and 
industry information for sovereign wealth funds.   
c. Factors affecting success and growth of sovereign wealth funds are clearly 
identified leading to formation of the proposed theoretical framework comprising 
independent and dependent variables.   
d. Hypotheses are stated and variables are operationalized.   
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e. A scientific research design is planned in terms of data collection, analyses and 
their interpretation methods.   
f. Deduction approach enables the acceptance and rejection of hypotheses, findings 
are discussed and solutions to research questions for sovereign wealth funds and 
specifically for Oman SWF are answered.  
g. Research report is written in the form of doctoral level thesis.   
 
Previous sections in this thesis have clearly stated research context, problem, literature 
review, theoretical proposition and philosophical position; thus next step is to carry out 
data collection and data analyses as per the research design planned (Saunders et al, 
2009). The different research phases selected in this study are revealed in following 
figure 4.4 
 
Results of descriptive statistical tests, regression analysis carried out for questionnaire 
data and transcripts of selected interviews are displayed in Appendices A to E. No 
personal information of respondents is collected in this study unless voluntarily 
disclosed by respondents. Following figure shows selected research elements adapted 
based on research design explained by Saunders et al (2009).  
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Figure 4.4 Research methodology elements selected  
 
Adapted based on the research onion by Saunders et al (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Positivism & Intrepretivism Philosophy 
Deductive and Inductive Mixed Approach 
Case study  
Research Strategy 
Cross sectional  
Time Horizon 
Quantitative & Qualitative  
Analysis 
Probability Sampling 
for Questionnaire 
data collection 
Data Collection  
1. Contacting key executives  
2. Obtaining secondary data of Oman SWF  
3. Obtaining data of Norway SWF   
4. Collecting data through interviews 
5. Collecting data through questionnaires 
4.  
Data Analysis  
1. Analyses of secondary data  
2. Coding interview and questionnaire data  
3. Qualitative analyses of interview data 
4. Statistical analyses of questionnaire data  
5. Results, analyses and validation of findings   
6. Recommendations based on data analysis  
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Chapter 5  Analyzing case study evidence: Secondary data 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters explained the literature review, theoretical proposition, hypotheses 
formulation and research methodology applied in this study. This chapter presents the 
analyses of the secondary data obtained from two sovereign wealth funds: Oman and 
Norway. It has been attempted to find the answers for research problem; to achieve the 
research process objectives mentioned in the chapter one and to assess whether any 
substantiating evidence exists to support the hypotheses developed in the theoretical 
proposition. First, both cases are analysed separately and then the comparison between 
two cases is done. The case analyses offer detailed description and explanation about 
how these SWFs operate and invest. Their comparison offers insights into where these 
funds are positioned as compared to other funds, global regulations and industry 
benchmarks. The analysis of Norway SWF case also serves as part of triangulation 
applied in the data collection which ultimately increases the validity of the research 
findings.    
 
This section also pertains to data theory process as the secondary data analyses in this 
section enable to meet the research objectives set out in this thesis (Philips and Pugh, 
1994; Yin, 2009). The case of Norway SWF is utilized here as a benchmark based on 
their investment strategy, financial performance and worldwide acceptance of their 
governance and behaviour. The findings of this comparison are utilized to develop an 
action plan for restructuring Oman SWF and simultaneously the comparison provides 
evidence to further hypothesis testing. The secondary data for both funds were 
collected from their official websites, annual reports, presentations for investors and 
sustainable development reports, strategies and government records. Secondary and 
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primary data collected from both case funds are cross sectional and not longitudinal 
which further restricts the scope of generalization (Bryman and Bell, 2007).       
 
5.2 Case analysis strategy   
Selected SWFs are analyzed in a way that they can be compared for various attributes 
and each research issue. For example, organizational structure, decision making 
process, investment strategy, management control, governance, asset allocation and 
deals, investment rights and regulations, objectives and perspectives of setting up these 
funds. Both case funds will be analyzed for the factors mentioned in the theoretical 
proposition which will generate a comparison between the proposition based on the 
theory and the industry practices followed by these sovereign wealth funds. This will 
help in testing the hypotheses and developing an implementation procedure for 
recommended action plan within Oman SWF (Yin, 2009).  
 
5.2.1 Objectives of the case analyses  
The major objective of this chapter is to execute the research strategy as mentioned in 
the methodology chapter by conducting secondary data collection and interpreting the 
findings of data analyses obtained for both case funds. This part of the thesis becomes 
the integral section of the deduction process for testing the theoretical proposition as 
explained in the chapter four (Neuman, 2006). This facilitates to find answers to 
research problem and issues defined in the chapter one. These research issues are 
associated to constructs defining variables which formed the theoretical proposition. 
Hence, discussion and answers to these research issues underpin the sovereign wealth 
funds‘ overall functioning. Findings from secondary data in this chapter may generate 
different views about various components of SWF which can help review of the SWF 
as a phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009).     
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5.2.2 Structure of the case analyses  
This chapter follows the sequence of the data collection, coding and display; 
interpretation of displayed data; analyses, findings, discussion and comparison. The 
next chapter also follows the same logic for analysing primary data. This chapter ends 
with summary of findings based on the comparison between Oman and Norway SWF. 
The flow of the chapter is shown in the figure below.  
 
Figure 5.1 Structure of analysing case study evidence  
 
  
 
 
Adapted from Yin (2009) 
These case analyses would enable to support or reject hypotheses made in the proposed 
theoretical framework. However, these SWFs are analysed as a company analysis; thus 
the order of hypotheses or factors proposed in the framework is not exactly followed. 
The case are analysed in the following order and wherever necessary the hypotheses 
support or rejection is discussed and finally summarised as well.      
 
SWF case analysis attributes      Hypothesis tested   
 
Background        
Organisational structure ------------------------------ structure and purpose (H6)  
Management control and Govt. support ------------ policy (H4), decision making (H8) 
Strategic vision -----------------------------------------policy (H4), decision making (H8) 
Responsibility & Sustainability strategy ------------transparency, accountability (H1)  
Investment strategy ------------------------------------investment deal (H7)  
Asset allocation fundamentals -----------------------investment deal (H7) 
Governance standards ---------------------------------governance (H1) 
Transparency -------------------------------------------transparency (H1) 
Performance indicators -------------------------------where does it stand globally  
Priorities for SWF -------------------------------------possible solutions  
  
Secondary 
Data from 
Norway 
and Oman 
SWFs 
Case 
Analysis 
Strategy 
and 
Structure  
Analyses of SWF 1 
+ 
Analyses of SWF 2  
+ 
Comparison between 
SWFs 
Conformity with 
literature 
+ 
Recommendations 
and Summary 
(Included in the 
conclusion chapter) 
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5.2.2.1 Reasons for doing Norway SWF analysis first  
At the time of literature review and initial secondary data collection it was revealed 
that there was much less literature and official data available for Oman SWF. There 
was no data available regarding investment deals, management information or annual 
reports of Oman SWF. Thus, to compare the standard and globally accepted practices 
of SWF, it became necessary to review a data rich and SWF of Norway prior to 
analysing Oman SWF with its negligible data availability. Also, the case of Norway is 
utilized to increase the reliability and validity of the findings (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 
2009) 
 
5.3 Norway SWF: Government pension fund global (GPFG)   
The case of Norway‘s sovereign wealth fund is analysed in the order of its evolution, 
expansion, investment strategy, growth in the assets base and governance mechanism 
as follows. Current name of SWF set up by Norway is Government Pension Fund – 
Global (GPFG) which is managed by Ministry of Finance and Norges Bank Investment 
Management (NBIM). Thus, hereafter Norway SWF will be mentioned as GPFG in 
this chapter and further.   
 
5.3.1 History and Background of the GPFG 
It was just before Christmas in 1969 that news Norway had found oil in the North Sea. 
Over the years, Norway accumulated wealth from the oil proceeds and multiplication 
of investment returns in the last two decades.   
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Table 5.1 GPFG fact sheet  
 
1969: Petroleum discovered in the North Sea (Ekofisk), production started in 1971 
1990: Parliament passed the Government Petroleum Fund law 
1996: First net transfer to the Fund, Invested like Central Bank currency reserves 
1998: Investment in equities introduced in the benchmark (40% allocation) 
2000: Five emerging market countries added to the equity benchmark 
2002: Non-government bonds added to the fixed income benchmark 
2004: New ethical guidelines 
2006: Government Petroleum Fund renamed the Government Pension Fund Global 
2007: Strategic equity allocation increased to 60%, small-cap stocks included in    
the benchmark 
2008: Plan to invest up to 5% in real estate at the expense of bond allocation,     
          All emerging countries included in equity benchmark 
2009: Evaluation of the ethical guidelines 
2010: Responsible investment strategy guidelines prepared in March 
2010: Strategy council is formed and investment strategy review is prepared in     
          November  
 
Source: GPFG Factsheet, Asset Management Department, Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance, March 2010 available at www.nbim.no, 2010  
 
 
The current Norway SWF has its roots in the petroleum fund set up by Govt. of 
Norway in 1990 as a government‘s fiscal policy tool to support future oil and gas 
revenues. In 2006, that original petroleum fund was renamed to Government Pension 
Fund Global (hereafter referred as ‗GPFG‘). The fund is not currently utilized for 
pension payouts. However, Norway GPFG acts as a financial vehicle for Norway 
Finance Ministry to support the budgetary process and to build on the existing 
agencies. The underlying operating principle of the fund is that, it only invests in the 
foreign assets which results into risk mitigation through risk diversification, risk 
reduction, increased return on investments made and creating protection for non-oil 
economic developments. With growth and expansion of assets base, GPFG has 
increased the degree of transparency, information disclosure and governance standards. 
This has helped in getting Norwegian government and public support along with 
worldwide acceptance of Norway‘s SWF as a good governance entity (Norway GPFG 
Annual Report, 2009). 
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5.3.2 Current status of the GPFG 
This GPFG established in 2006 is Norway‘s Sovereign Wealth Fund responsible for 
investments in the foreign assets and is governed and controlled by Ministry of 
Finance, Government of Norway. The GPFG is for investments in the foreign assets 
whereas, in 2006 the National insurance scheme fund was renamed as ‗Government 
pension fund – Norway‘ (hereafter referred as ‗GPFN‘) which would deal with local 
investments and national issues. The monetary sources to GPFG comprise of income 
from petroleum activities and return on the fund's investments. The operational 
management of GPFG is delegated to Norges Bank which manages this SWF as per 
regulatory and governing frameworks set out by Ministry of Finance. The following 
attributes explain the current status of GPFG, its strategy and operations (Norway 
GPFG Annual Report, 2007).  
 
5.3.2.1 Organisational structure  
The government of Norway has prepared active management framework in the pension 
fund act. The formal responsibility of the fund management rests with Ministry of 
Finance (hereafter referred as MoF) wherein operations are managed by the Norwegian 
central bank (Norges Bank) through their investment arm Norges Bank Investment 
Management (NBIM). The MoF and NBIM have a written agreement for shared roles 
to manage GPFG. Investment strategy is governed by MoF issued guidelines for 
responsible investments, ethics and sustainability. The main aims of the fund are to 
ensure that oil wealth advantages reach to the future generations and wealth is 
multiplied, secured and utilized ethical ways acceptable to wider society (GPFG 
Annual Report, 2009; NBIM Annual Report, 2009). The relationship structure between 
the government of Norway, the ministerial department and Norges Bank is as shown 
below.  
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Figure 5.2    SWF Management structure between Parliament, MoF and NBIM 
 
Source: GPFG Global Annual report, 2009, p.10/91 
 
The NBIM as shown above is responsible for day to day functioning and investment 
operations of GPFG. This management again affected by the Norges bank operations 
and organisational hierarchy. At the NBIM, this management has been divided again 
into four major sections of executive board, committees, CEO, compliance and senior 
managers‘ leadership group. The executive board with seven members appointed by 
the King in council is a body responsible for Norges Bank‘s operations. The following 
figure reveals this NBIM hierarchy with their functions are mentioned for each 
respective department. All guidelines and strategies are laid down by executive board 
which may receive expert advisory from MoF, NBIM or external consultants (NBIM 
Global Annual Report, 2008).   
 
The value addition by GPFG is done through an active management framework 
wherein owners‘ long term interests are protected through applying business strategy 
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whilst minimizing the resources spent. In addition to GPFG, NBIM has other portfolios 
to manage such as central bank to banks in Norway, foreign exchange reserves of 
Norway and Government Petroleum Insurance Fund (GPIF) from Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy. NBIM has different governance model which differs as 
compared to other portfolios of Norges Bank. NBIM‘s executive director and CEO 
reporting to executive board are monitored by Governor of the board. This executive 
board and MoF together set guidelines for investment thresholds for GPFG about size 
and risk of the investment deals. Based on this policy, NBIM has implemented new 
risk management framework in 2009 about identifying, assessing and mitigating four 
different risks: credit, market, counterparty and operational risk. GPFG monitors each 
risk‘s limits on monthly, quarterly and annually basis (www.NBIM.no, 2011). NBIM 
follows performance based remuneration policy for all employees at NBIM managing 
GPFG. Norway parliament has supervisory council of 15 members to oversee Norges 
Bank operations and compliance with rules which includes GPFG management by 
Norges bank investment management (NBIM). This ensures that operations are carried 
out in accordance with applicable laws, agreements, decisions, guidelines and other 
rules. This supervisory council organises audit and approvals of Norges bank budget. 
For example, Deloitte AS and Norges Bank prepared separate audits and submit to this 
supervisory council. Then, the Office of the Auditor General audits and performs 
checks on GPFG to see their operations and management is in accordance with 
applicable legislation and instructions (NBIM global annual report, 2008).  
Therefore, above discussion reveals that organisational structure has paved way for 
governance mechanisms and transparent disclosures to work. Thus in case of Norway 
SWF, the hypothesis H6 about structure and clear purpose is supported.  
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Figure 5.3  NBIM Management structure 
 
Source: GPFG Global Annual Report, 2009, p.11/91 
 
 
5.3.2.2   Management control and government support  
As discussed in the previous section, management control of GPFG rests with the 
Government of Norway through a channel of parliamentary supervisory council to 
Ministry of Finance to Norges bank executive board to Norges bank investment 
management department. In the last decade, Norway government has taken measures 
and issued guidelines for the provisions on the management of GPFG. Following major 
amendments and additions were done based on responsible, sustainable and ethical 
investment strategy reviews and came into practice as of 1
st
 March, 2010. These 
amendments were issued to main Government Pension Fund Act, 2005 (MoF GPFG 
Management Report, 2010).  
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“Section 1 The Government Pension Fund shall support government saving to finance 
the National Insurance Scheme’s expenditure on pensions and support long-term 
considerations in the use of petroleum revenues‖ (GPF Act, 2010).  
 
“Section 2 The Government Pension Fund is managed by the Ministry of Finance. The 
Fund comprises the Government Pension Fund Global and the Government Pension 
Fund Norway. The Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) is deposited in an 
account at Norges Bank. The Government Pension Fund Norway (GPFN) is deposited 
with Folketrygdfondet. The counter value for both GPFG and GPFN is managed under 
rules laid down by the Ministry of Finance‖ (GPF Act, 2010).  
 
“Section 3 Income to the Government Pension Fund Global consists of the net cash 
flow from petroleum activities, which is transferred from the central government 
budget, the net results of financial transactions associated with petroleum activities 
and the return on the Fund’s capital‖ (GPF Act, 2010). 
 
As evident from the above discussion, Norway government has made it clear the 
decision making flow, firm management control and strict audit and supervision. The 
compliance of risk management adheres to the following organisational structure.   
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5.4 Organisational structure for risk management compliance   
 
Source: GPFG Global Annual Report, 2009, p.59/91 
 
One can see that Norway SWF management has passed act about how investments and 
other managerial decisions are made. Thus, Norway GPFG has both policy planning 
and decision making mechanisms present in their day to day operations. Therefore, 
hypotheses H4 and H8 respectively for policy and decision making factors in the 
proposed framework are supported in this case.  
 
5.3.2.3 Strategic vision and approach  
The main aim of GPFG is to provide funding for the National Insurance Scheme 
pension payments and to multiply sovereign wealth keeping in view the long-term 
investment considerations of petroleum revenues. The robust management and 
investment strategy by Norway government will ensure that Norway‘s oil wealth 
benefits reach to all current and future generations. The government of Norway has 
created decision making hierarchy to oversee the operations and management of 
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GPFG; however, it is not a separate legal entity, it does not have own management 
board or administrative staff. Thus, GPFG is still a department of Government of 
Norway. The government‘s approach is to be the best managed fund with the highest 
governance and ethical standards in the world. This leads to implement the global 
practice in all aspects of the Fund management and striving to achieve this. The size 
and available funds allow MoF to exercise the hybrid asset allocation portfolio to get 
the best risk – return ratio for the investments. The strategic approach of the fund is in 
the line with long term investment style with sustainable profits as a main aim and no 
influence of political objectives. This is evident from fund not investing in any weapon 
and ammunition manufacturing companies and divested funds from any such 
companies. More about this approach is discussed in the governance standards as a 
separate attribute (Strategy council report by Dimson et al, 2010). This discussion 
reveals that Norway GPFG top management has appropriate policies planning and 
decision making controls in place which again support hypotheses H4 and H8.       
 
5.3.2.4 Responsible and sustainability strategy  
GPFG‘s responsible and sustainable investment strategy is echoed by Minister of 
Finance; Sigbejern Johnsen in his 2010 foreword for the strategy when he confirmed 
that long term profitability of GPFG relies on how much sustainable development in 
economic, environmental and social terms GPFG can make (GPFG Strategy, 2010).   
As a first step towards being the best managed fund, ethical guidelines were formulated 
in November 2004 for GPFG. These guidelines were prepared on basis of 
recommendations from the government appointed Graver committee report in 2003.  
The committee report was instrumental in providing two basic perspectives to GPFG 
management:   
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a. The fund should achieve high return on the investments made which would 
enable Norway‘s future citizens to benefit from the country‘s oil wealth.                                                                                          
b. The fund would attempt to protect the rights of the community affected by 
companies in which GPFG makes investments.  
This investment ethics view prompted to create two investment requirements by GPFG 
to exercise as part of their deals with investee companies: exercise of ownership rights 
as an investor in the investee company and exclusion of companies or divestments 
from those deals wherein investee companies cannot follow ethical guidelines for 
example ‗no child labour‘.    
To follow such strategy, GPFG have to utilize the instruments, they have as an investor 
to contribute to such ethical and responsible business practices. However, being a 
professional advisor, the fund may not be able to uphold all the ethics commitments 
like a nation in the bilateral trade or foreign policy. In doing so, the fund can lose the 
credibility as a good investor and can brand themselves as an over-active equity owner. 
Thus, fund has to balance between promoting ethical and sustainable standards and 
seeking profitable returns. Norway GPFG has ethical guidelines in place since 2004, 
however GPFG management state in their strategy report that work is still in the early 
stage requiring rapid responses and attention by Norway and other SWFs. After 
evaluation in 2009, the committee has introduced new measures in 2010.       
 
The part of responsible investor strategy includes extending oil wealth benefits for a 
longer duration and sound return to future generations of Norway on the internal basis 
whilst being an effective and permanent investor in many major and global companies. 
GPFG has a responsibility for promoting corporate governance and safeguarding 
environmental and social concerns. If these investee companies cannot be sustainable 
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in their business profitably then GPFG may find it difficult to ensure financial returns 
for Norway. Thus, profitable and sizable financial returns over the time depends upon 
how much GPFG can influence the sustainable development economically, 
environmentally and socially in the investee companies and countries while 
maintaining the legitimacy and transparency in their deals and efficient functioning of 
other countries‘ economies, industries and capital markets (GPFG Responsible 
Investment Strategy, 2010).  
 
In this manner, the fund policies may influence the business practices of the investee 
companies and factors related to corporate governance, employee rights, environmental 
protection which in turn will increase sustainability of the firms and returns for 
Norway GPFG.  This responsible and ethical investment strategy comprises a range of 
tools such as international collaboration and research to develop the best practices, 
investment tools, active ownership and exclusion of companies due to guidelines 
issued by GPFG management. The capabilities that convert this responsibility strategy 
into the targeted outcome is through investment strategy for funds allocated to different 
asset classes and deals following this laid down responsibility, ethics guidelines and 
governance standards (NBIM Financial Stability Report, 2009). Next two sections 
discuss these aspects in detail about GPFG.  
 
Norway being one of the most ethical investing SWF, they strictly follow human 
rights, social responsibility and pollution control standards. They make the investee 
companies accountable for following the same. In the past, Norway SWF has made 
many divestments because of these issues. Hence, one can say that in case of Norway 
SWF hypothesis H1 is supported for accountability and transparency.    
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5.3.2.5 Investment strategy and asset allocation   
The income into GPFG from oil revenue is phased gradually into the Norwegian 
economy to derive the benefits of responsible investments and ethical guidelines; to see 
growth in the all parts of the economy while achieving economic stability in the short 
and long term. The capital of GPFG is placed in the foreign securities which ensures 
back up against reducing natural resources, tight national budgets, the exchange rate 
risks and inland political instability. The foreign investments assure hedging of the risk 
by asset classes spread and high financial return. It allows national government to 
protect the economy from the effects of variable national revenue. Also, money in 
GPFG accounts is neither earmarked against any particular expense accounts nor it has 
any claimant or owner of the asset except Norway as a sovereign country and its 
government. Proceeds are passed onto economy of Norway through money transferred 
to the national budget and amount is decided by following annual budget preparation 
based on the following fiscal rule (MoF on GPFG Management, 2009; Dimson et al, 
2010).    
 
―The fiscal rule is a plan for a smooth, gradual increase in the spending of oil 
revenues in line with the expected real returns on the capital in GPFG, estimated at 4 
per cent of the Fund capital. The exact percentage may vary from year to year, 
depending on the economic situation or in the event of unexpectedly large changes in 
the value of the Fund. Separating spending from income accumulation is crucial in 
order to successfully transform temporarily high petroleum incomes into a permanent 
increase in welfare‖ (Norway Annual Budget Fiscal Policy, 2010).  
 
The investment decisions taken by GPFG management are mainly according to a 
benchmark index determined by the finance ministry. This list shows how much of the 
fund should be initially invested in each individual security. Such a list is based on 
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commonly used indices. Norges Bank is allowed to deviate from this list but within the 
limits set by the Ministry of Finance. This deviation is termed by GPFG as an active 
management. The usual benchmark index consists of 60% equities and 40% fixed 
income allocation of assets. The target for real estate allocation for GPFG is to reach 
5% in gradual increments (GPFG Annual Report, 2009).   
 
The significant component of the investment strategy decision making is to have wide 
array of diversified investments which reduce risk and increase the profitability of the 
fund using different regions, industries, asset classes and companies. For GPFG, such a 
strategy has worked well since its inception to the end of 2007 in terms of average 
annual return. GPFG incurred losses in 2008 due to poor equities performance during 
global credit crisis however made strong recovery in 2009 with fund reaching to the 
highest return since its establishment. Such a large scale recovery in 2009 proved to 
GPFG management that no change in required in the estimated 4% real rate of return 
on the portfolio. Fund‘s assets are spread over thousands of equities and bonds in the 
international financial markets thus risk is hedged in the form of diversification and 
minimum return. Also, fund does not have any debt obligation which requires the sale 
of assets thus, investment strategy not only aims to control yearly fluctuations in return 
and it aims for higher yield on the portfolio. Some individual investments can make 
losses however the idea of investment strategy and asset allocation strengths is to 
ensure that total sum of investments results into higher financial gains with decreasing 
risk. Long term robustness of strategy helps passing through times of crisis such as 
global credit crisis in 2008 – 09. A short term view would have created sale of assets 
when prices were falling in 2008. The active management concept of allowing 
deviation from benchmark index is to achieve the return in excess of what could have 
been the return if investments were made exactly as per the benchmark index. This is 
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under review as active management is supposed to reduce the risk but experience of 
2008 – 09 during the crisis shows different results (GPFG Annual Report, 2009; NBIM 
Global Annual Report, 2009).  
 
The strategy council experts Dimson et al (2010) for GPFG has attempted to improve 
investment strategy after 2008 – 09 experience and four major characteristics or goals 
of new strategic direction are: firstly GPFG is responsible for wealth accumulation to 
Norway citizens; secondly MoF is responsible to manage GPFG; thirdly GPFG is long 
term investor with no liability and high capacity to bear risks and finally GPFG targets 
highest possible return. This strategy can be implemented having pre-requisites are 
fulfilled such as effective control and mitigating of operational risk, responsible 
investment, behave and seek advantage of being large and long term investor and 
implement best possible governance standards. This strategy and pre-requisite 
fundamentals have led GPFG management to:  
―accept higher risk for earning higher return, expand exposure to fixed assets, develop 
various forms of insurance selling” (Dimson et al, 2010; p.7).  
However, this strategic shift may lead GPFG to a riskier asset portfolio, more risk 
exposure and volatility as evident from the discussion of their new investment strategy 
and beliefs. This may change asset allocation fundamentals included in the current 
investment strategy as well which is discussed in the next section.     
 
5.3.2.6 Asset allocation fundamentals 
GPFG has inflow of funds from oil, gas and petroleum revenues whereas outflow is 
required to meet non-oil budget deficits. Thus, GPFG is integrated with government 
budget and any asset allocations to GPFG reflect the budget surpluses. Outflow from 
the fund is regulated through fiscal policy guidelines that non-oil budget deficit shall 
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correspond to real rate of return 4% for GPFG. Two major asset allocation categories 
of equities and fixed income for GPFG are shown in the following figure. The next 
stage of allocation is based on the regional and industry groups within the specified 
category of asset.    
 
Figure 5.5 Asset allocation fundamentals of GPFG 
 
Source: GPFG Global Annual Report, 2009, p.25/91 
With stringent standards followed in the asset allocation and robust investment strategy 
as discussed above, one can say that results of Norway GPFG growth over the last two 
decades are affected by it. Thus, hypotheses H7a, b and c about the investment deal, 
size, and strategy and asset allocation are supported in this case.   
 
5.3.2.7 Governance standards  
Norway GPFG has strict governance standards for their operations of their fund. In 
addition to this GPFG demands equal treatment of shareholders and well being of 
financial markets from investee companies. In the past GPFG management has voted 
against the irrelevant remunerations without performance of the company. Also, GPFG 
does not believe in same person being CEO and Chairman of the board in the investee 
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companies. GPFG management understand that better regulation may lead to better 
corporate governance which can increase stability in the financial markets. Thus, 
GPFG receives regular input from MoF and Norges Bank such as participation of 
GPFG in the preparation of the corporate governance standards through International 
Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), collaborations with Council of Institutional 
Investors (CII) and the Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA) (Sustainable 
strategy report, 2008; MoF GPFG Management Report, 2009).   
 
The demand of GPFG to investee companies for following corporate governance 
standards and making companies managing boards accountable for their decision 
making bring the effectiveness in the company working and also help in protecting 
shareholders‘ rights which ultimately safeguards the assets of SWFs as an investor. 
GPFG as an investor expects that companies disclose the information and be 
transparent in their deals and operations such as carbon disclosure and forest footprint. 
 
GPFG also prepares expectations documents for each company before taking 
investment decision and companies must disclose information about children‘s rights, 
climate change, water management and any other risk factors. If company cannot make 
major changes in their policies or production than as a last resort GPFG takes decision 
of excluding such companies and divest any investments already made. In the past, 
GPFG has excluded companies producing weapons or tobacco or seriously violating 
human rights since 2006. If new information about company is received than GPFG‘s 
ethics council may review the divestment decision taken on previous information. This 
is clearly shown in the following diagram of division of roles. GPFG uses number of 
instruments as a responsible investor promoting governance and transparency which 
integrate with environmental and social issues. These instruments are: collaborating 
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with global stakeholders to develop the best practices, investment programmes, climate 
research, active management framework and voting rights, collaboration between 
investors, or as a last resort exclusion of investee companies or divestment decisions 
(GPFP Responsible Investment Strategy Report, 2010).     
 
Figure 5.6 Division of roles between MoF, NBIM and Independent Council on 
Ethics 
 
 
Source: GPFG Responsible Investment Strategy Report, 2010, p.14/32 
 
 
 
5.3.2.8 Transparency  
 
These SWFs manage monies on behalf of their population in the respective countries. 
Thus, transparency and information disclosure is essential for people to have trust in 
the government officers and politicians taking decisions about the SWF management. 
The second source of transparency demand is investee companies and their countries‘ 
governments. In case of GPFG, the MoF reports to the storting on every aspect such as 
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revenue, investment deals, financial prospects, any changes in strategy, developments, 
risks, costs overall performance. MoF also publishes advice and reports received from 
Norges bank and any external consultants; quarterly and annual reports on GPFG and 
its management including list of meetings and all investment deals made. The Norges 
bank publishes the recommendations of the council on ethics. Hence, management 
board of GPFG and Norges bank have high degree of transparency in their dealings of 
investments made and disclosure of information as a SWF. The overall image of the 
fund is characterised by this level of transparency within the sponsoring and investee 
country stakeholders. This increases the confidence of investee companies and capital 
markets positive sentiment on receipt of market information associated to such SWF 
investment announcements (MoF on GPFG Management Report, 2008 and 2009).     
 
The above discussion about governance and transparency reveals that Norway SWF 
growth and performance is affected by these standards. The effects can be positive or 
negative both as Norway SWF many a times decided to divest following the standards 
after making demands to investee company boards. Thus, hypothesis H1 about 
governance, transparency and accountability is supported in this case.  
 
5.3.3 Key performance indicators 
The main purpose of setting up SWF is to utilize the earnings and FE reserves to have 
higher return on their investments. Hence, success of this fund can be measured in 
terms of its market value, net cash flow, annual inflows, annualised return and total 
return. These indicators are plotted in the following graphs. Their analyses suggest that 
GPFG made profit in the equity and fixed income markets which helped to increase 
market value of fund in 2009. The fund posted a return of 25.6% (NOK 613bn) which 
was down by -23.3% in 2008 when security markets collapsed worldwide due to 
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current credit crisis. GPFG had higher return of 4.1% as compared to 4% portfolio 
benchmark in 2009. As shown in the graph of market value, it has increased by 365bn 
kroner to 2640bn kroner. This success has been built on the return on the investments 
which is reflected in the lowest capital transfer at 169bn kroner since 2004.   
Figure 5.7 Market value at year end 1998–2009 in bn of NOK 
  
 
Source: GPFG Global Annual Report, 2009, p.18/91 
 
 
Figure 5.8 Net government cash flow from petroleum activities by source 
1971–2008 in bns of NOK at 2008 values 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate;  
GPFG Global Annual Report, 2009, p.66/91 
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Figure 5.9 Annual inflows into the fund by asset class 
Bns of NOK, current price inflows into fixed income portfolio 1996–2009 
 
 
 
Source: NBIM, GPFG Annual Report, 2009, p.67/91 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Quarterly and annualised return since inception 1998–2009 in 
percent 
 
 
 
Source: GPFG Global Annual Report, 2009, p.20 /91 
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Table 5.2 Key numbers for Norway SWF 
 
Size of GPFG in 2009 is NOK 2640bn that is equivalent to USD 457bn 
 
Since 1.1.98 10-year    5-year     3-year       2009 
  Average   Average  Average 
 
Total return in % (in FX basket)      4.66  3.47          3.79     0.15           25.62 
…of which manager excess return       0.25  0.17         -0.03    -0.41           4.10 
Net real return in %      2.70  1.38          1.54    -1.95           23.45 
 
Source: MoF GPFG Management Report, 2010 
 
The key numbers above shows the overall long term returns are low as compare to the 
benchmark portfolio, however the market value of GPFG in 2009 was NOK 2757bn 
which was more than annual GDP of Norway or corresponds to approximately NOK 
570,000 per capita. Globally GPFG has been recognised as major financial institutional 
investor and value of the fund is considered to have been 1% of the total value of the 
world‘s listed companies at the end of 2009 and 4.4% of the total value of Norwegian 
companies listed on Oslo Stock exchange. GPFG of Norway has strong competitors 
like ADIA (UAE), China, Saudi Arabia (SAMA) and Kuwait who are all above USD 
250bn. In the last decade Norway GPFG has reported 14 times negative return on 
quarterly results which reveals that GPFG still needs improve from its current status of 
financial success and low growth.  
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Figure 5.11 Net government cash flow from petroleum activities 
from 1970 to projected value till 2030 NOK per barrel and 
billions of NOK at, 2010 values 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Government of Norway National Budget, 2010  
 
Figure 5.12 GPFG projected market value in billions of NOK at current prices  
 
Source: Ministry of finance, Government of Norway National budget, 2010 
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5.4 Oman SWF: State General Reserve Fund (SGRF) 
This section provides details about Oman‘s economy, the sovereign wealth fund of 
Oman (called here after SGRF) and analysis of Oman SWF.   
 
5.4.1 Importance of SWF to Oman’s economy  
The country of Oman is located in the Gulf region having strategic importance in the 
international and regional trade from the long time and has acquired a dominant 
position in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). Large natural resources of oil and 
gas, long standing cultural heritage and good political ties with countries around the 
globe have earned an important place in the global trade, finance and economy for 
Oman. Peaceful and stable governing of the country from 1970 onwards by Sultan 
Qaboos along with development efforts and careful liberalisation approach by Oman 
has created an admiring place for Oman in the GCC and global politics. Oman is 
clearly well positioned with current development, economic transformation process 
and major breakthroughs like Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with USA implemented 
from January 2009. Oman has one of highest recognition in the region by scoring as 
25
th
 on the global peace index, 41
st
 in overall transparency index and 57
th
 in business 
climate by World bank in 2008 (The Report OMAN, 2009). 
The Government of Oman is in its seventh five year development plan, has created a 
long term strategic vision for 1995 to 2020. Implementation of a recent privatisation 
program has led to a surge of growth in local and foreign investments in industrial 
sectors such as power and water. The goals of the plan include increasing and 
accelerating economic transformation by enhanced focus on natural gas production, 
tourism industry development, non-oil exports, development of human capital, 
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expansion of information, communication and technology (ICT) sector while 
upgrading nation‘s overall infrastructure.     
The country‘s major wealth creation or income source is still from petroleum and 
natural gas resources i.e. oil and gas account for more than 90% of Oman‘s total 
exports of goods and services. To provide a safeguard against low oil prices in the 
world market, Govt. of Oman was one of the first nations in the region to establish a 
state general reserve fund (SGRF) which is also known as Oman state general 
stabilisation fund (OGSF) in 1980. This was the starting point of Oman‘s Sovereign 
Wealth Fund (SWF) in 1980 which now comprises of four different funds: state 
reserve fund, petroleum fund, national infrastructure fund and another fund started in 
2006 named as Oman Investment Fund (www.SWFinstitute.org, 2011). These four 
funds are under direct management of Ministry of Finance whereas other nine pension 
funds which have only within the country investment permission are managed by their 
respective functional ministry. For example, during high oil prices in 2008, approx. 
US$150 a barrel, Oman‘s SWF added US$2.2bn to oil reserve fund which has been 
estimated to have assets within the range of US$ 8.2bn to 13bn in September 2007. 
Since, the creation of state reserve fund, Govt. has created twelve more funds as 
explained above to protect the budget and to diversify investments for long term 
growth and to deal with any future financial implications in the country (The Report 
OMAN, 2009). Few recent moves of privatisation such as restructuring of power 
transmission, postal services and solid waste management sector are in the process. 
This shall increase competition for local companies to grow, to increase the availability 
of more cost-effective and efficient services, foreign direct investments and freeing up 
state finances for other essential and developmental projects. 5% to 6% GDP growth 
has been maintained in the last five years as reported by Central Bank of Oman. Oman 
has proven petroleum reserves of approximately 4bn barrels. This is a finite source and 
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therefore Oman government aims to transform the oil dependent economic position 
into the multi-channelled and non-oil dependent economy like other developing and 
industrialised countries around the globe. The government of Oman aims for the 
country to become a major exporter with a particular emphasis on the manufacturing 
industries.  
Hence, the strategic aim of achieving economic balance and sustainable growth 
depends on human resources development, economic diversification and private sector 
development as laid out in the vision for Oman 2020. But, current polices have 
inherent impediments to growth which is proven by slow growth of last three decades 
of Oman SWF as compared to other GCC member countries whose SWFs have grown 
more than hundreds of billions. Therefore, the major challenges for Oman and its 
government are:  
1. Increasing fiscal deficit in the general budget and declining financial reserves 
2. Over dependence of the national economy on oil and oil price is largely 
influenced by external financial market trends, economic and political forces  
3. Finite oil reserve for the next two decades  
4. Prominence of government role in other industries reducing opportunities like 
private investors and innovation through increased competition 
5. Lack of suitable monitoring and control mechanisms in financial and other 
sectors  
6. Weak integration between oil and other supporting sectors leading to low 
quality output compared to international standards and industry benchmarks  
7. Low efficiency and ineffective utilization of available resources  
8. Labour market imbalances as increased foreign labours and low local 
participation  
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9. Less significance to human capital development and few professions  
10. Incapacity of local labour force to match global demand by technological 
advances   (Vision 2020 for Oman, 2007)  
On one hand, the establishment and successful running of sovereign wealth fund seems 
to be a promising solution for Oman. On the other hand, this wealth fund draws its 
input from oil income. Hence, oil prices in global market and oil reserves with Oman 
plays a significant role in the achievement of Vision 2020 for Oman. The impact on 
SWF income from oil revenue can have magnified effects. For example, just one 
standard deviation shock in the oil prices can take revenue decrease to 6% of GDP 
when oil revenue is just 20% of GDP (Devlin and Titman 2004; Mitchell, et al 2008). 
From these statistics, one can infer the turbulence effect of oil prices to Oman and its 
SWF wherein oil revenue is more than 90% of their GDP. Countries like Chile and 
Venezuela have designed their funds to offset such price fluctuations. Sometime, 
during low oil prices, these governments may have to shut down the SWF investments 
made during high oil prices if businesses are not performing well. This is costlier than 
making wrong investments. This again becomes a major issue for decision makers in 
the government and businesses. To reduce such effects, SWF shall have appropriate 
investment strategy, profitable investments and steady inflow of the funds (Devlin and 
Titman, 2004).   
For country such as Oman, the profitable returns, growth and currency stabilization are 
crucial to the direct impacts on the economy and lives of their population (Swensen, 
2009). For example, if SWF is small compared to other countries and still a single 
largest source to balance the financial system then it has two major problems: 
managing the stability of the fund and maintaining the low profile without disclosing 
strategic information unless big funds follow the lead. This is exactly the case of 
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Oman‘s SWF. This makes one to think about operating mechanism of decision making 
and overall management within SWF. Hence, these practical challenges reveal the 
importance of SWF for Oman‘s economy. One such attempt is made in this thesis by 
analysing Oman‘s SWF in comparison with other well developed and profitable SWF. 
The next section explains case analysis of Oman SWF.  
5.4.2 The history and development of the SGRF  
The Sultanate of Oman launched this State General Reserve Fund (SGRF) in 1980 by 
Royal decree to manage the country‘s wealth from oil income, return from investments 
and foreign exchange reserves of the Sultanate of Oman. SGRF is owned by Sultanate 
of Oman and is managed by the Ministry of Finance (MoF). The monetary sources of 
SGRF are foreign exchange reserves from oil and gas exports revenue and current 
assets holding is worth approximate US$ 8.2bn to 13bn. The operational management 
of SGRF is managed by Ministry of Finance (MoF). There are no regulatory 
mechanisms applied by MoF and no such information is known to any other 
government department.   
 
The main problem in collecting secondary data was that SGRF has very low 
transparency and degree of disclosure. This has resulted in no information about Oman 
SWF in the public domain such as ‗no published reports‘ of any kind. Oman SWF 
(SGRF) is not monitored by any government department except the Ministry of 
Finance. This is known from initial discussion with Oman SWF employees.  The effort 
was made to get as much as possible information related to SGRF from reports of other 
government departments such as Central Bank of Oman (CBO). The following 
attributes explain the current status of SGRF, its strategy and operations.  
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5.4.3 Current status of the SGRF  
The SGRF is analysed below for the same attributes of structure, management style, 
governance, transparency, investment strategy, asset allocation and performance same 
as in the case of Norway SWF to compare them.  
 
5.4.3.1 Organisational structure  
The Government of Oman has not applied any management or regulatory framework in 
their wealth fund act. The formal responsibility of SGRF management rests with 
Ministry of Finance (hereafter referred as MoF) where decisions are taken by the 
discretionary powers of Minister of Finance. The funds inflow and outflow is 
administered by Central Bank of Oman (CBO). However, SGRF is not treated as a 
separate entity as in the case of Norway. SGRF has less than total 100 employees. 
These employees are working for Ministry of Finance and they are not trained for 
managing SWF, its investment deals or operations. There is no written agreement over 
the shared roles of MoF and CBO however they are jointly responsible for managing 
the SWF.  
 
The main objectives and strategy of SGRF are not clear but the aim is to utilize the 
income from the proceeds of oil, gas and petroleum products‘ revenue. Thus, it is the 
responsibility of MoF and CBO to ensure the increase and profitable returns on the 
investments made. The income from SGRF should reach to the population of Oman.  
 
The following diagram show as on date relationship structure between Government of 
Oman,   Ministerial departments and Central Bank of Oman.  
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Figure 5.13  Present organisational existence of SWF under MoF  
 
Adapted from Central Bank of Oman (CBO) Annual Report, 2010; Interview 
transcripts 
 
As evident from the organisational structure, the current form of SGRF is one 
ministerial portfolio in the Govt. of Oman.  According to the law, MoF is supposed to 
report details of SGRF to the Auditor General, Central bank of Oman, upper council 
and Shura – the parliament as shown above in the diagram; however the MoF does not 
report the details of SGRF to any of these stakeholders. Therefore in case of Oman 
SWF, organisational structure affects SWF negatively as opposite to Norway SWF. 
Thus, hypothesis H6 is supported in this context.   
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5.4.3.2 Management control and investment strategy    
The SGRF has full support of the Government of Oman and Sultan however there is no 
management control mechanism in the place. The only investment strategy component 
implemented by SGRF is the limit on the inflow of the fund from oil income which is 
currently 15%. The limit can be increased when oil prices are high which would enable 
the asset base expansion, portfolio creation and the increased return. The other 
fundamentals such as investment appraisal, asset allocation, measurement and 
benchmarking of the performance of SGRF are missing from the current policies of the 
MoF. Thus, current management and investment strategy requires the 
$transformational and strategic changes in Oman SWF (Observations made in Oman 
SWF, 2011).  
 
5.4.3.3 Governance, Transparency and accountability  
As evident from the above discussion of management style and very weak – unplanned 
investment strategy it is easy to infer that employee skills are not utilized to grow the 
fund. In addition, the MoF does not allow any other department or council to have 
input in managing SGRF. Other government departments and top management of SWF 
do not have up to date and accurate details about what is happening in Oman SWF. 
There are no reports published in the public domain as well. Thus, governance and 
transparency almost do not exist within the management of Oman SWF. No employees 
or decision makers are held accountable if Oman SWF makes a loss in the investment 
deal. Thus, profitability is a serious issue for SGRF.  
As evident from no availability of data and absence of investment strategy and 
governance, one can confirm that Oman SWF is largely affected by such attributes. 
Thus, in this context hypotheses regarding governance (H1), policy (H4), structure 
(H6), investment strategy (H7) and decision making (H8) are supported. Norway SWF 
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also supported these hypotheses however those were with the positive effects of these 
attributes as maintained by Norway SWF.     
 
5.5 Comparison between Oman and Norway SWF 
The following table shows the comparison between Oman and Norway. Norway SWF 
has scored high on each attribute and it is an ideal example from the competing 
Norway SWF for Oman SWF. The priorities in the form of recommendation for these 
SWFs based on their analyses and comparison are followed in the next sections. The 
main priority difference between these SWFs is what Norway needs is reduction of 
overdone mechanisms to grow further whereas what Oman SWF needs is to create 
basic investment strategy and governance framework to accomplish the fund‘s 
objectives further.   
Table5.3 Comparison between Oman and Norway SWFs 
Item Oman SWF Norway SWF 
Year started  1980 1990 
Current worth In US$ billions 8.2 to 13 375 to 500 
Major source of funds  Oil and gas  Oil and gas  
Managed by  Ministry of finance  Ministry of finance 
and Norges Bank  
Truman scorecard ranking for structure, 
governance, accountability, transparency 
and management behaviour  
20 / 100 92 /100 
Organizational structure  Present Present 
Management control  Absent  Present  
Government support  Yes  Yes 
Strategic vision – approach Absent  Present 
Responsibility – Sustainability strategy Absent  Implemented  
Investment strategy  Absent  Implemented  
Asset allocation fundamentals  Random  Mechanism based 
Decision making  Random  As per policy  
Governance standards  Low High 
Transparency level  Low High 
Overall performance achievement Not achieved  Partly achieved  
 
Sources: Secondary data from GPFG, Norway and SGRF, Oman; Truman (2008); 
Anderson (2009) 
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5.6    Summary  
The recommendations based on Oman and Norway SWFs analyses individually carried 
out in this chapter are mentioned in the final conclusion chapter of the thesis.  
It can be summarised that both of these SWFs support hypotheses from initial 
theoretical framework proposed in chapter three; however, Norway SWF supports 
these hypotheses as these attributes are managed and they adding value to Norway 
SWF whereas Oman SWF do not have any of these mechanisms in place and same set 
of attributes is negatively affecting the growth of Oman SWF.   
Results of hypotheses support and evidence from these analyses are utilized in the 
finalizing the framework in the next chapter of the thesis.  
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Chapter 6  Primary data analyses 
 
6.1 Introduction  
Chapter five described the detailed analyses of secondary data of Oman and Norway 
SWFs. This chapter presents the analyses of the primary data obtained from Oman 
SWF by conducting interviews and questionnaires. This chapter is divided into two 
parts. Part A is describes interviews analyses and Part B does same for the 
questionnaires.  
 
Interview template is prepared based on the pre-set interview question set which was 
used to conduct interviews. Based on this template, interview transcripts as listed in the 
appendix E are analysed. This section is also part of the data theory as it utilises 
primary data from interviews to find solution for research problem defined earlier in 
the thesis (Philips and Pugh, 1994). Data collection using interviews was done before 
collecting data through questionnaire so as to know in detail about Oman SWF and 
maintaining the same order interview data is analysed first. Twenty interviews were 
conducted and no recording was done during interviews. The transcripts are prepared 
from the notes taken during interviews. These transcripts are produced in the appendix 
E.    
 
As mentioned in the secondary data of Oman SWF, it is known that there is no separate 
recruitment section for Oman SWF and SWF does not have large number of 
employees. Oman SWF is managed as a part of Ministry of finance and has very low 
transparency. Thus to study Oman SWF in detail, it is very much necessary that if 
direct employees are not available then information is sourced from relevant 
stakeholders of the SWF such as members and employees of other government 
 185 
departments, Shura council, state council, parliament, auditor general‘s office and 
central bank of Oman. In this manner, twenty different stakeholders were interviewed 
from various departments of Government of Oman. 
 
The part B of this chapter represents quantitative and qualitative analyses of 
questionnaires responses. This discussion leads one to build findings, validation, 
recommendations and understand implications for theory and practice. Findings are 
described, evaluated and compared with the previous research in the field of sovereign 
wealth funds in general and growth of Oman sovereign wealth fund. Thus, this section 
can be said to be part of data theory in this thesis according to Philips and Pugh (1994) 
model of research process.  
 
Questionnaire responses analyses are is divided further into three steps: first step  
explains which statistical tests are carried out and their results; second step details the 
finalization of the proposed framework based on the analyses of findings from 
statistical tests results, descriptive statistics of questionnaire responses, interview data 
and secondary data and academic literature. Finally, third step is to derive the 
framework and check the validity of the findings.  
 
The hypotheses made in the framework are tested based on the analyses of 
questionnaires and interviews data analyses. The relationship between each factor 
affecting and dependent variable growth of SWF is analysed using regression analysis. 
The growth of SWF is defined as combination of two components in the proposed 
framework: investment performance and success rate of the fund. Therefore, regression 
analyses are performed for each component as detailed in the next sections of this 
chapter.       
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6.2 Links between interviews and questionnaire analyses  
Interview findings are obtained from the top management executives whose 
departments are related in one or the other form to sovereign wealth fund of Oman. 
Their views represent top priorities of policy changes required for restructuring Oman 
SWF overall whereas questionnaire respondents are from middle and operational 
management of these government departments. Hence, questionnaire responses 
represent the operational, implementation and output related issues of managing 
sovereign wealth fund of Oman. Thus, interview and questionnaire findings together 
support the assessment of variables mentioned in the proposed framework. In addition 
to this, table 6.2 shows that interview template themes are related to variables in the 
proposed framework which is tested by analysing questionnaire data. Therefore, any 
acceptance or rejection of hypotheses would be based on the questionnaire data 
analyses and interview findings as well. 
 
Part A: Analyses of interviews 
6.3 Interview analysis method 
Generally, interviews consists data of meaningful information expressed through 
words, pattern and impacts (Saunders et al, 2009). Such data requires analysis 
conducted through conceptualisation as it contains a collection of information in non-
standardised category. This would require one to categorise and unitise the data from 
interview transcripts (Miles and Huberman, 1994). This is a challenging process when 
one analyses a case study based on the interview evidence (Yin, 2009). Less structured 
data from interviews needs an active interpretive approach as a major analysis 
dimension. Adopting this approach allows one to transfer the nature of the qualitative 
information, comprehend and understand them. To carry out a rigorous analysis of 
interview transcripts, one shall identify key themes and patterns emerging from the 
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data to verify the conclusions. The general process followed for this is in the order of 
categorising, unitising, recognising and developing the conclusions (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Saunders et al, 2009). The same procedure is attempted here by 
creating a template from the following set of the interview questions. 
Table 6.1 Set of Interview Questions  
1. Would you tell something about the current situation of sovereign wealth funds 
position worldwide?  
2. Where do you think, we at Oman SWF stand in comparison to others in terms 
of credibility?  
3. As mentioned in media from last two or three years, does Oman SWF have low 
governance or transparency in its operations and investments process?  
4. Is there any need for tit-for-tat approach between investee countries (recipient of 
funds) and SWF sponsoring countries in creating barriers and new legal 
systems to prevent each other?  
5. As a separate entity from government administration, what are the improvement 
points in Oman SWF?  
6. One thing is always said in financial industry that Oman and other GCC funds 
started together but our fund has not grown more than 10bnUS$, why so?  
7. Does Oman SWF have any particular issues with investment strategy and 
policies as reasons for underperformance?  
8. How does the decision making process work in our SWF?  
9. Where do we need to improve or to implement changes? Is it policy, resources, 
people development, investment appraisal?  
10. What do you consider are key criteria for sustainable growth of Oman SWF? 
11. Where do you see Oman SWF in the medium or long term future? 
 
From the highlighted features of interview questions following discussion themes are 
extracted to get information related to them from interview transcripts and literature to 
compare them.  
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Table 6.2  Themes of interview analyses   
1. Current situation                                                       (Idea about SWF, H3) 
2. Credibility through governance or transparency         (H-1, H3) 
3. Laws and treaties                                                       (H-2, H-4, H-5) 
4. Investment strategy and growth concerns                   (H7, H8) 
5. Decision making process                                             (H8, H6, H7)  
6. Changes to implement: policy, resources,                      (Restructuring, H4)                                                   
people development, investment appraisal                                   
7. Key growth criteria                                                    (Dependent variable)  
8. Future of the fund and points to improve                   (Recommendations) 
 
As one can see these interview discussion themes are basically help to determine the 
acceptance or rejection of hypotheses H1 to H8 along with discussion of restructuring 
solution from the interview findings and potential of key growth criteria such as 
profitability, investment portfolio performance and success rate of SWF decision 
making. In the next section, above mentioned eight themes are analysed from the 
twenty interview transcripts mentioned in Appendix E.   
 
6.4 Analysis of Interview transcripts       
This section analyses Oman SWF on the following points which are pertinent to its 
future growth and success. 
6.4.1 Current situation within Oman SWF  
As evident from the voice of all twenty interviewees Oman SWF has a central decision 
making authority which rests with government department: Ministry of Finance (MoF); 
however, all major decisions are taken single handed by Minister of Finance. Other 
councils such as Shura, Audit committee, Ministries or Parliament do not have any 
control over it right now. Hence, one can say that the appropriate decision making 
structure does not exist within Oman SWF and it completely lacks professional 
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management system in their decision making process. Previous research regarding this 
suggests that having no professional management system in place or decisions made by 
political leaders have significant impacts on the returns of the investment decisions 
made by them (Bernstein et al, 2009). This approach of Oman SWF can be described 
as a political perspective. This perspective argues that politicians have personal interest 
to pursue their own goals and investment decisions taken by them on behalf of state 
owned institutes or banks and these decisions are inclined towards the inefficient but 
politically desired projects, such as maximizing employment to stay in power or 
financing favoured enterprises (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Mitchell et al, 2008). 
Political leaders or powerful elites holding control over SWFs portray their biased 
decision as country level benefits maximisation; however the main aim is to retain the 
control over the investment vehicle and money thus maximising their autonomy (Pistor 
and Hatton, 2011). This is one of the main reasons that GCC SWFs and Oman SWF 
score low on reputation and popularity scales such as Truman (2008) scorecard.          
A political perspective in all decisions during all three decades can have significant 
impacts on the return of portfolio. That may be the very reason why Oman SWF is at 
US$ 8 to 13billion, which is lagging behind other countries in the region by 50 to 100 
times. ADIA (United Arab Emirates) approximately 800bn, SAMA (Saudi Arabia) 
approximately 500bn and KIA (Kuwait) approximately 300bn have in assets and 
wealth creation. They all started SWF together almost three decades ago. Interviewee 
(18) suggested that around the globe many SWFs are managed by finance ministries 
(MoF) and central banks, hence, it is not a major issue that Oman SWF is managed by 
MoF. The problem is that how we are operating and not being serious about 
profitability of the fund. One must remember that there is no single owner of this 
money; this belongs to all citizens of Oman. The agency or stewardship of the 
monetary reserves then becomes crucial for the whole country. Hence, it is policy 
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makers role to decide how much reserves are adequate and what can be done with them 
if a balance of payment crisis comes on. The answers to such questions would help the 
Government of Oman to set up basic policies and operational framework for SWF (Das 
et al, 2009 IMF working paper). In this scenario, single handed management by Oman 
MoF raises more questions about its SWF credibility which is measured in terms of 
governance, transparency and accountability in the wealth fund industry as discussed in 
the next section.     
6.4.2 Credibility of the fund: Governance and transparency (H-1) 
Interviewee (11) mentioned that credibility is a momentary issue for Oman SWF 
because there is no organizational structure and transparency right now. Once 
restructuring is done, the fund will not have any problem of governance and credibility 
because the business and national culture of Oman has good values and high morale. 
That is how Oman has scored high in the world competitiveness, corruption and 
business confidence indices compared to other GCC region countries. However, 
Keynes (1933) stated long ago that international cash flows have political elements and 
Cohen (1986) made a similar argument that high finances and high politics are 
inseparable. In a time of exponential growth of SWFs worldwide, the claim rests with 
SWFs to prove a point that their investment decisions do not carry any politically 
biased agenda (Clark and Monk, 2010). USA Senator Schumer (2008) said that the 
bottom line of SWF investments is that investee country governments have no 
knowledge whether SWFs are investing purely on economic motives. These 
researchers and practitioners suggest that SWFs have issues of credibility of their 
actions inherent in their investment decisions. And, these SWFs target assets 
strategically through large pool of foreign exchange reserves from oil or commodity 
income. The US Govt. Accountability Office (GAO, 2008), Truman (2008) and 
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Anderson (2009) suggest that credibility or reputation of SWFs can be measured in 
terms of transparency, governance and accountability. These three components make 
up the overall reputation or credibility of these SWFs. Also, the institutional structure 
and setting up objectives adopted by the sponsoring country can reveal more about the 
credibility and purpose. Because, SWFs are likely to differentiate and evolve according 
to their national cultures and their respective places in a world of contested power and 
influence (Clark and Monk, 2010). Current unplanned operations and single handed 
management is reflected in the following comparison between two case studies SWFs 
Oman and Norway shows that Oman has a very low score on the credibility.       
 
Comparison between Oman and Norway SWFs  
Compared for   Oman SWF  Norway SWF 
 Established in   1980    1990  
 Operating as   State general   Govt. pension   
    reserve fund   fund – global  
 Main Income source  Oil and gas   Oil and gas  
 Current size in US$  8 to 13bn  375bn 
Best practice score achieved in Truman’s score card 
 Structure    50   94 
 Governance   0   100 
 Accountability &  18   100                        
Transparency    
 Behaviour    0        67 
Overall score = 20/100   92/100 
Source: Truman, 2008 
 
As confirmed from the interviewee responses, the causes for such a low credibility 
score as shown above in the comparison for Oman SWF arise from complete lack of 
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organisational structure; no reporting on investment and return; no reporting on reserve 
inflow and outflow of SWF; no planning for budget – investments or portfolio return; 
no professional assets or profit protection management. These problems come from 
two basic elements within SWFs. One is disclosure and other is new mercantilism 
(Gilson and Milhaupt, 2008). Disclosure issue is about being transparent in releasing a 
true account and information to the public domain. Many developed countries funds do 
this and they score high on Truman‘s score card; for example – Norway and Singapore. 
This is completely absent in Oman SWF as stated by Interviewee 1 that 
―Parliamentary committee for economy and finances in Oman should have received 
separate reports, plans and budgetary details from SWF management but there is 
none‖. In addition to these, issues of no control over decision making and no 
knowledge of how fund is operating were voiced by other interviewees 7, 15 and 19.  
Oman SWF has never published annual report regarding their investment transactions. 
This is evident from the following figure 6.1 where Oman SWF compares too much 
low on a transparency scale with other GCC funds whereas Norway and Singapore are 
on the positive side of the transparency scale.   
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Figure 6.1 Transparency and investment approach of Top 20 SWFs 
 
Source: Standard and Chartered Bank Research Report, 2007 
This is like a chain reaction in the investment industry. ‗No disclosure‘ leads to ‗zero 
transparency‘ which again leads to speculation about governance and reduces trust in 
the markets about the SWF. Interviewees stated that low credibility score of Oman 
SWF emerges from less transparency and no information availability to Omani citizens 
or foreign governments or companies. When company adopts such policy it reflects in 
the employee behaviour and organisational culture while no one is accountable. The 
more of this chain reaction works more it harms investors, fund and reputation of the 
sponsoring country (Monk, 2009; Clark, 2009; Anderson 2009).    
Interviewee 16 suggested that ―main function of the state council is to take part and to 
support better governance through its operating mechanism and fundamental 
principles‖ such as overseeing the governance and transparency of Oman SWF but 
there is no control over it in the present system. Thus, governance and transparency are 
at the lowest possible level for Oman SWF and employees are not accountable or 
Commodity  
 
Non-
commodity  
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responsible as they are not allowed to make any decisions as managers or custodians of 
the SWF. This takes overall credibility of Oman SWF to a very low level in the 
investment markets. Such a low credibility leads to an issue of new mercantilism which 
again reduces the credibility of Oman SWF. In the developed and democratic political 
economies, individual companies‘ profit maximisation is encouraged. Governments are 
prohibited to shift the profit maximisation from companies to state. Various rules and 
mechanisms are designed in WTO and EU for this. Contrary to this in some major 
developing (China) or monarchist countries (GCC Region) adopt the state capitalism 
that is new mercantilism (Yi-Chong, 2009). In this system, state takes the role of an 
organization whose benefits are to be maximized wherein government acts as a direct 
participant, coordinator or controlling stakeholder (Gilson and Milhaupt, 2008). 
Developed economies believe that free trade and competition amongst companies 
within industries increases their respective GDP levels. In the case of developing and 
emerging economies having SWFs, states act through SWFs holding the equity of 
operating companies and attempt to be in the industry competition. Then, these SWFs 
ensure that investments results in the maximization of economic, social and political 
benefits of the country (Gilson and Milhaupt, 2008). Hence, these SWFs compete with 
advanced companies or banks or investment banks in the investments field. In this 
way, Oman SWF has become a part of new mercantilism; however they are not able to 
maximize any benefits of state capitalism characteristic since there is no accounting 
within Oman SWF (Gilson and Milhaupt, 2008, Pistor and Hatton, 2011). Thus, it can 
be inferred from the discussion that governance and transparency are major attributes 
right now affecting the growth of Oman SWF. This supports the hypothesis H-1 in the 
framework and related factors impacting SWF. Therefore, Oman SWF has to 
restructure and to create a governing mechanism based on laws within the 
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administration and support of other countries in trade through bi-lateral treaties as 
discussed next.    
6.4.3 Laws and treaties (H-2, H-4, and H-5) 
At present there are no law or regulation within SWF or treaty with any other country. 
That means Oman SWF is not benefiting from any credit crisis investments and asset 
creation when most of the assets are undervalued which may provide huge return in the 
next decade or so. Also, the absence of legal structure allows many lapses on the part 
of SWF management with MoF and for employees within the SWF as they become 
unaccountable for their actions. As suggested by Interviewee 10, both MoF and Oman 
SWF do not have any strategic objectives laid out except Vision 2020 prepared by 
Govt. of Oman but that is in the perspective of the whole country.  Interviewee 6 adds 
that there are no ethical guidelines, no evaluations or audit of actions – decisions 
taken, no risk management tools. Government of Oman still runs finances based on old 
systems of central command chain and thumbs rules for decision making‖. Interviewee 
17 who works in parliament knows the IMF response to SWF growth and he expressed 
concern over increasing protectionism from either side: SWF sponsoring governments 
and investee countries governments mainly Europe and America. Thus, interviewee 17 
agreed with an idea of setting up an overarching global SWF regulatory body which 
can facilitate resolving any issues between both sides and also help in research and 
development. This will directly reduce the task of creating favourable mechanisms 
through laws and treaties by many governments around the world (Greene and Yeager, 
2008; Kotter and Lel, 2011). Other funds such as Norway, Singapore and Kuwait 
operate on the basis of planned investment strategies, regulations, and disclosure 
principles (Greene and Yeager, 2008; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009), whilst 
regularly reporting to their respective central banks or government committees and 
have trade treaties with other countries to attract investments (Rose, 2008). These legal 
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and trade mechanisms enable them to increase their reputation which results into 
increasing return and asset base. As confirmed by Interviewees, Oman SWF does not 
have any of these initiatives. Unless these basic and required initiatives are in place, 
any advanced steps of asset allocation principles and investment strategies preparation 
would not help Oman SWF. The first need of Oman SWF is legal and organisational 
structure to be built.  
The above discussion reveals that every investee and sponsoring country is creating 
mechanisms which ultimately work as barriers rather than growth enablers. This was 
found in the literature as well. This supports the hypotheses H-2, H-4, and H-5 which 
states that investee country laws, sponsoring country laws and policy making heavily 
impact the growth, performance and success rate of any SWF. 
6.4.4 Investment strategy and growth concerns (H-7) 
As stated by Interviewee 1 ―Oman SWF has is no fixed limit on how money will come 
to SWF from oil income or how the return of SWF investments will be reinvested. 
There is no audit, annual budget planning and investment return reconciliation 
process in managing Oman SWF‖. In addition to this, the Ministry of Finance which 
manages Oman SWF right now, neither wants to consult any other government 
departments, nor wants to utilise the services of consultants, asset managers or 
investment banks for investment strategy and growth (Interviewee 3). This is part of 
the major irregularities found in the operations of Oman SWF. The investment 
decisions are not analysed for any risk or return; however the MoF randomly decides 
the allocation of funds in the transactions purely based on either the political agenda or 
trade relations in the investee country. This affects the profitability and growth of the 
funds (Interviewee 1).  As known from the literature, the basic objective of setting up 
the sovereign wealth fund is to multiply the surplus income of accumulated foreign 
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reserves. Hence, their investment strategy should be handled in such a way that would 
enable the growth in assets and return on investments made (Gintschel and Scherer, 
2008). This would be possible when a fund has designed a governing mechanism, for 
example Norway SWF has fixed rules for inflow and outflow of money to and from 
SWF. Contrary to this, Oman SWF does not have any investment strategy. Since, 
SWFs do not disclose much their objectives whether political, strategic or financial; 
they remain unknown to the public (Summers, 2007; Gieve, 2008). This tendency of 
political influence or non-financial basis for decision making may lead to the investor 
biases for the investments being made. Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009) suggest from 
their study of 40,000 foreign equity investments by SWFs during 1997 – 2007 that 
SWFs tend to invest outside their countries where in areas with which they share 
religion and culture, but which offer different industries than those in the sponsoring 
country. Thus, SWFs seek industry diversification but have bias for the familiarity of 
the culture. This may help in gaining information advantages or give a psychological 
advantage of feeling cultural affinity. They also observed similar bias by mutual funds 
and other global institutional investors in their asset allocation; however SWFs have 
pronounced bias for the culture. The other finding in their study revealed that when 
SWFs announces such investments then share prices of the investee companies respond 
favourably in the stock markets. This rise in the share price may be the reason that 
investee market expects the SWFs to bring expertise and governance leading to the 
growth for that company. And, when SWFs do not necessarily have a reputation for 
governance such as many GCC funds, the announcements of SWFs taking a stake can 
act negatively on the stock market‘s performance. This effect has been voiced by many 
academics and analysts (Gieve, 2008; Balin, 2010). Since Oman SWF does not have 
any organisational structure or investment strategy in place,  it requires an overhaul in 
these aspects along with organisation design and development issues. These issues are 
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basically arising from Oman SWF not having decision making structure comprising 
board of directors and middle and operational level employees. For example, another 
GCC fund ADIA (UAE) has low governance score as transparency is very low due 
very limited disclosure; however, ADIA employs expert employees from more than 40 
countries and 1200 staff manages ADIA which has only 30% staff which are local 
UAE citizens (www.adia.ae, 2011).  SWF investment objectives reveal their 
overarching investment strategy and primary goals; however fundamental differences 
in asset allocations can have underlying existence even among SWFs of similar 
professionalism or political economies (Dewenter et al, 2010; Hong, 2010). For 
example, this can lead to competition between similarly structured SWFs such as 
China and Singapore; or Kuwait and Abu Dhabi (Pistor and Hatton, 2011). The recent 
global crisis and protectionist behaviour of Western governments might have changed 
SWF‘s asset allocations in ways but they may not be ideal or justified by financial 
management theories in all cases. Thus, it is imperative for SWFs to regularly monitor 
macro-economic risk assessments for countries whose SWFs is important for economic 
growth as a stabilizer in the capital markets (Kunzel et al, 2010; www.IMF.org, 2011). 
The shift of investments to Asian developing markets and MENASA region may 
increase if western government continue their attitude towards governance and 
transparency demands (Interviewee 16). What interviewees conveyed is that 
investment strategy fundamentals are missing from Oman SWF‘s strategy, if any. This 
really matters in the time when other funds within and outside GCC regions are 
competing for valuable assets to make investments. Thus, responses from interviewees 
support the hypothesis H-7 about investment strategy, deal and asset allocation. Such a 
detailed response and investment planning requires a robust decision making structure 
and process as discussed next.    
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6.4.5 Decision making process (H - 8)    
The Oman SWF is managed by the Ministry of finance and mostly all the SWFs 
around the world are overseen by either their central banks or finance ministries. 
Hence, there is nothing wrong with Oman SWF getting managed by the finance 
ministry. The problem is in the content and implementation approach which stems 
from the rest of the organisational structure. Thus, the problem for the Oman SWF 
decision making is that only one person, the Minister of Finance, is making the 
decisions. In this manner, Oman SWF is not operating and administered as an 
investment agency but as an individual decision maker‘s portfolio. The authority is 
totally centralised and there is no employee participation (Interviewee 10). Also, MoF 
does not seek any employee participation or does not invite any other government 
department to collaborate (Interviewee 20). Also, it is evident from almost all 
responses of interviewees that finance minister keeps decision making to himself and 
no one else has any control (Interviewees 1, 2, 5, 9, 18 and 20). Therefore in 
management terms, Oman SWF has a top-down traditional organisational hierarchy 
and communication structure. Other SWFs which are reviewed in the literature have an 
organisational structure and professional employees or hired consulting wealth 
managers working for SWFs; for example, ADIA, Norway, Temasek or SAMA. 
Therefore, this area of Oman SWF also requires serious restructuring. On the other 
hand, the reason why decision making structures are so complex in these SWFs might 
be the control their ruling elite wants to exert over the fund and thus control the 
community. This can be well explained by the autonomy – maximization concept in 
which authorities taking decisions for SWF want to maximize their autonomy by 
having control over SWF through reporting structure suited to them and at the same 
time exploiting financial strength of the foreign reserves around the globe. This has 
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been examined and found in the four case studies of Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, China and 
Singapore SWFs (Pistor and Hatton, 2011).  
The above discussion reveals that organisational structure and decision making 
appropriateness are crucial to the success and performance of SWF. Therefore, analysis 
supports the hypothesis H-8. Particularly, in case of Oman such a decision making 
structure serves the purpose for the finance minister. From this discussion of current 
situation in Oman SWF, it is evident that Oman SWF needs an overhaul restructuring 
in terms of each aspect of organisation design in addition to special requirements of 
creating a profitable and growing investment vehicle.  
6.4.6 Changes to implement: policy, resources, people development and 
investment appraisal (Links to restructuring solution) 
This section of the discussion does not deal with any hypothesis; however it reveals 
that Oman SWF requires overall restructuring; hence it supports the proposed solution 
of the restructuring plan as mentioned in the final conclusion chapter in this thesis.  
The first change required is to create a reporting structure for Oman SWF (Interviewee 
2, 17). This is in terms of making SWF overseen by Oman central bank/ ministry with 
reports audited by main audit council and guidelines prepared by the Shura and 
Council of ministers. In this way, the decisions made by Ministry of Finance would be 
reviewed by other departments and council thus bringing accountability in the 
operations of Oman SWF (Interviewees 10, 14).  
Once this basic framework is prepared then, next step would be to decide which 
information and when Oman SWF would like that information to go to public domain 
through online reports, official filing of annual reports and financial statements to the 
audit and revenue authorities of Government of Oman (Interviewees 4, 18). This would 
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increase the governance and transparency creating a good image of SWF among all 
stakeholders: employees, citizens and foreign governments who are more concerned 
about these issues (Interviewees 7, 12, 20).  
Third step would be to recruit the best talent who can move Oman SWF forward with 
profitability and growth while increasing the asset base (Interviewee 1, 3). This has 
been done by other GCC funds such as ADIA, SAMA and KIA who have more 
employees from around the world as an expert working for them. This will help in 
creating the competitive and international level work culture (Interviewee 18).   
This group of expert employees may help in crafting a robust investment strategy and 
optimal asset allocation for Oman SWF (Interviewee 5). Thus, a complete 
organisational restructuring of Oman SWF in terms of reporting structure, policies, 
information communication, recruitment and investment strategy would help to 
improve the intangible attributes such as governance, transparency and accountability 
while brining the tangible growth and profits.  
6.4.7 Key growth criteria   
The above discussion about Oman SWF and previous sections analyses about Norway 
and Oman from its secondary data reveals that Oman SWF needs to set up policies and 
investment mechanisms which would then make SWF capable of profitable growth. 
Hence, Oman SWF has key criteria which can lead to sustainable growth profits in 
years to come can be based on their achievement of organisation restructuring, 
governance and transparency mechanisms, human capital development and appropriate 
asset allocation based on the robust investment strategy.    
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Part B: Analyses of Questionnaires 
6.5 The field work reporting 
The data collection through questionnaires was personally administered to collect 
responses from SWF and other government department employees. More than 350 
respondents were contacted to respond and 153 questionnaires were finally received. 
The questionnaires were personally administered which enabled the accuracy and 
completeness of responses. The first phase of primary data collection was conducted 
through 20 face to face semi-structured interviews of senior management employees in 
Oman SWF and Govt. of Oman. Semi-structured interviews were conducted for in-
depth analyses of issues pertaining to governance, decision making and to know 
mainly what is happening in Oman SWF. The objective of questionnaire data was 
measurement and correlations assessments between variables whereas objective of 
interviews data was to explore and to explain.   
 
6.6 Results of Principal Components Analysis (PCA)   
A total of 153 questionnaire responses were received from 350 questionnaires 
launched. All 153 questionnaires were coded into an excel worksheet. Each 
questionnaire has four parts section A, B, C and D. Regression analysis is deployed for 
sections A, B and C whereas pie charts are produced to analyse responses of section D 
which contains multiple choice questions about decision making process of Oman 
SWF.  
The coding has been done in the following style for each question in the questionnaire. 
For example, the first question in the questionnaire is about main objectives of the 
SWF then their entries read as follows: The first five characters consists from the what 
is the measure about and then last three characters belong to the main variable they are 
measuring, in this case it is objectives so rounded off as OBJ.   
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Question in the main questionnaire 
1 Main objectives  
EXPENOBJ REVENOBJ DVLEPOBJ CHANGOBJ RETRNOBJ STABLOBJ BILTLOBJ PLTCLOBJ DEMNDOBJ 
 
All above dimensions coded as above were entered for their responses value from each 
questionnaire responses in the excel file and then transferred to statistical software 
SPSS. The total questions in each questionnaire are 155 which has in total 140 
dimensions measuring independent variables which is quite large for use in the 
multiple regression.  Therefore, principal component analysis is applied as a tool for 
reducing the data if any measures are found not required to be included in the 
regression analysis. The results of principal component analysis are given in Appendix 
B (Pallant 2010). 
PCA generates several diagnostic plots, such as the bi-plot, loading plot, score plot and 
scree plot. The useful measure from PCA results is Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test of 
sampling adequacy whether factor analysis or PCA is needed to be carry out or not. 
The required limit is 0.6; however, the researcher has used 0.4 as most of the results 
have been reported for this test range between 0.4 and 0.6 (Pallant, 2010).  The PCA 
results in Appendix B include KMO test, total variance explained, scree plot, un-
rotated component matrix, communalities and component score coefficient matrix. The 
Eigen values of more than 1, scree plot elbow shape change (change in the gradient of 
the graph showing the appropriate Eigen value), components extracted and their 
coefficient values have enabled to decide which measures to be considered in further 
analysis or to be dropped from calculation of variables values for regression.  
The PCA was run separately for each individual construct in the questionnaire (the 
questionnaire grouped the indirect measures in the form questions on scale of 1 to 7 
Likert scale, each with a defined theme. In order to preserve the integrity of each 
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construct the PCA was carried out individually for each construct with the aim of 
reducing the number of questions in each construct. A number of extracted principal 
components revealed several combinations of measures and explain how much 
variance is explained by each measure and principal component. The decision to retain 
or to drop the measures for a construct was based on variance explained value of 
correlation coefficient of measures and component structure. The threshold of 
coefficient was considered at 0.4 in this case. Two dependent variables in the 
framework are performance and growth (success rate) of Oman SWF.  
The following measures were discarded from the questionnaire responses before 
proceeding to the regression analysis based on their results from principal component 
analysis. These measures were either not reflected  
Table 6.3 Measures dropped from Regression analysis 
Question  Construct  Measured dropped from regression analysis 
1  Main objectives  REVEN OBJ 
1  Main objectives  RETRN OBJ 
2  Structure  DECIS STR 
6  Global Laws  FAIRG LAW 
6  Global Laws  WEAPN LAW 
14  Asset allocation  CAPTL ALO 
17  Investment Strategy MKTRS GLC 
17  Investment Strategy  STAFC GLC 
17  Investment Strategy  LACPL GLC 
 
Since only 9 measures are reduced, it can be seen that data is not reduced considerably. 
The single component structure is not used to retain or to drop the measures but has 
analysed all extracted factors, plots generated and their coefficient values pattern from 
the results of principal component analysis keeping in view not only statistical 
significance of the measures but the substantive importance as well (Neuman, 2006).  
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Once the measures for regression analysis were finalized, the average value of each 
construct was calculated. The 25 questions in the questionnaire represent indirect 
measures of 12 independent variables, 2 dependent variables and 3 possible intervening 
variables. Thus, many overlapping constructs according to their relevance were 
grouped together to measure single independent variable. Finally, 17 variables in the 
framework were analysed for relationship between them applying multiple regression 
test.  
Multiple regression is the most appropriate test as the research question testing the 
framework is: how much of the variance in the set of dependent variable – susntainable 
growth of SWF can be explained by the set of independent variables such as laws, 
planning, objectives. Also, the regression results in this study show that which of the 
independent variables has greater impacts on the growth of SWF as a better predictor 
of these dependent variable. Following results were obtained in each case. Multiple 
linear regression tests require conditions of normality, linearity, homoscedasticity 
and independence of residuals, which are satisfied as shown in the following plots 
and Appendix D. The results for dependent variable 1 and dependent variable 2 from 
each graph of versus order, distribution, fit and normality suggest that these regression 
conditions are met in each run of the linear regression (Pallant, 2010).    
 
6.7   Regression analysis for dependent variable 1: performance of 
SWF 
As shown in the appendices C and D, the normal probability plot is almost strainght 
line and scatter plot is rectangularly distributed with most of the scores around zero 
point which collectievly suggest that assumptions of outliers, normality, linearity, 
homoscedasticity and indepedence of residuals are satisfied from the regression results 
(Tabachnik and Fidell, 2007; Pallant, 2010). Multi-collinearity can be explained from 
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correlations table in appendix D. Coefficient table shows two important columns 
tolerance and VIF. None of the tolerance values are below 0.10 and VIF values above 
10. Hence, independent variables are not highly correlated between them. ―Tolerance 
value explains how much of the variability of the specified independent is not explained 
by other independent variables. VIF is the variance inflation factor which is the inverse 
of tolerance value‖ (Pallant, 2010, p.183).    
 
No group of independent variables are highly correlated except governance and 
transparency 0.686, purpose and investee country laws have 0.699 correlations which 
indicate a strong relationship, implying that they impact each other. Therefore, the 
condition of multi-collinearity is met. On the other hand, none of the independent 
variables are significantly correlated to the dependent variable of performance of 
Oman SWF as the highest correlation is 0.143 between decision making and 
performance. However, governance, accountability, investee country laws, lack of 
planning, investment strategy issues and deal size shows negative correlations which 
state their inversely proportionate variation with performance of SWF.     
 
In the coefficients table, two most important columns are standardized coefficients 
Beta values which indicate the contribution of each independent variable to make 
dependent variable. None of the values in the table is more than 0.4 – the usual limit 
specifying contribution strength. The significance column has ‗no value less than 0.05‘ 
which explains that none of the variable is making any significant contribution towards 
the regression equation. This may be due to overlap between independent variables in 
the model (Tabachnik and Fidell, 2007; Pallant, 2010).  
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The regression model summary as shown below for performance as a dependent 
variable shows that R square value is 0.062 which means that model is able to explain 
only 6.2% variation in this case. This is not significant. Also, ANOVA table for 
dependent variable 1 shows the significance value .678 which again does not match the 
criteria of p<0.0005. Hence, these independent variables and their measures do not 
predict any change in the performance of the SWF as a dependent variable. Therefore, 
the results of Multiple Linear Regression for dependent variable performance of SWF 
is not predicted by set of independent variables significantly and thus, do not support 
any of the hypotheses in the framework.  
 
Table 6.4 Regression analysis results for performance of SWF 
Model R R square Adjusted R 
square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .249 .062 - 0.018 0.659 
ANOVA  
Model Sum of squares Df Mean square F 
Regression 4.025 12 .335 23.773 
Residual  60.780 140 .434 Significance  
Total 64.805 152  0.678 
 
Dependent Variable: Performance of SWF 
 
6.8   Regression analysis for dependent variable 2: success rate of 
SWF 
As revealed from the straight line normal probability plot, rectangularly distributed 
scatter plot, all tolerance values above 0.1, and VIF values below 10 that assumptions 
of outliers, normality, linearity, homoscedasticity and indepedence of residuals are 
satisfied from the regression results in Appendix D2 for independent variables and 
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success rate (or growth) as a dependent variable  (Tabachnik and Fidell, 2007; Pallant, 
2010).  
 
As shown in table 6.5 of correlations results from multiple linear regression analysis, 
many of the independent variables are significantly correlated to the dependent 
variable of success rate of SWF as the highest correlation is -0.673 between lack of 
planning and success rate. However, accountability, sponsoring country laws, lack of 
planning, investment strategy issues show negative correlations which state their 
inversely proportionate variation with the success rate of SWF. 
 
In the coefficients table, other two important columns are standardized coefficients 
Beta values which indicate the contribution of each independent variable to make 
dependent variable. The usual significance limit is 0.4 or more, however in this case 
variables such as governance (0.351), transparency (0.267), purpose (0.391) and 
decision making (0.125) contributes more than other independent variables to make the 
success rate of SWF. The significance column has no value less than 0.05; however 
governance (0.068), planning (0.093) and asset allocation (0.59) can be considered 
significant to an extent as compared to significance values of other independent 
variables. Other variables not contributing much to regression equation of success rate 
can be attributed to the overlap between independent variables in the model (Tabachnik 
and Fidell, 2007; Pallant, 2010). Following table 6.5 provides correlations results 
generated as an output of multiple linear regression analysis test in SPSS. 
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Table 6.5 Pearson correlation results for Success rate of SWF 
Correlations 
Pearson 
Correlation 
SUCC
ESSR
ATE 
GOVER
NANCE 
TRAN
SPAR
ENCY 
ACCO
UNTA
BILIT
Y 
INVE
STEE
LAW
S 
TRAD
EBAL
ANCE 
PLAN
NING 
SPON
SORL
AWS 
PURP
OSE 
INV
EST
RAT
EGY 
DEA
LSIZ
E 
ASS
ETA
LLO
CAT 
DECI
SION
MAK
E 
Success Rate 1             
Governance  0.508 1            
Transparency 0.086 0.686 1           
Accountability -0.256 -0.101 -0.084 1          
Investee Laws 
 0.478 -0.048 -0.01 0.06 1         
Trade Balance  0.038 -0.312 -0.29 0.098 0.093 1        
Planning  -0.673 0.194 -0.039 0.21 0.034 -0.464 1       
Sponsor Laws -0.108 0.048 -0.013 -0.191 -0.048 -0.196 0.222 1      
Purpose  0.389 0.193 0.111 0.016 0.699 0.059 0.321 -0.133 1     
Invest Strategy -0.074 0.009 -0.019 0.125 0.067 -0.067 0.055 -0.092 0.037 1    
Deal Size 0.048 0.211 0.149 0.005 -0.019 -0.109 0.054 -0.038 0.126 0.031 1   
Asset 
Allocation 0.037 -0.027 -0.075 0.089 -0.044 0.058 0.282 -0.233 -0.011 0.101 -0.132 1  
Decision 
Making 0.074 0 0.007 0.244 -0.041 0.063 0.378 0.239 -0.054 
-
0.109 -0.072 
-
0.034 1 
 
The model summary for success rate as a dependent variable shows that R square value 
is 0.536 which means that model is able to explain 53.6%  of variation in this case 
which is again significant. Also, the following ANOVA table for success rate as a 
dependent variable 2 shows the significance value 0.0056 which does not satisfy 
condition of p<0.005, however it is can be considered significant to an extent. Hence, 
asset of selected independent variables and its measures predict any change in the 
success rate of SWF as a dependent variable. Therefore, results of multiple linear 
regression reveals that dependent variable success rate of SWF can be predicted by 
independent variables significantly supporting selected hypotheses for independent 
variables which are considerably correlated to success rate.   
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Table 6.6 Regression analysis results for dependent variable success rate of SWF 
Model R R square Adjusted R 
square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .732 .536 0.507 0.498 
 
ANOVA  
Model Sum of squares Df Mean square F 
Regression 5.034 12 .237 112.78 
Residual  31.745 140 .267 Significance  
Total 36.779 152  0.0056 
Dependent Variable: Success rate of SWF 
 
6.9  Regression analysis results’ for dependent variables and 
possible solutions, changes and impacts on progress 
In the final questionnaire, a set of three questions explored any hidden dimensions or 
relationships amongst dependent variables with issues about change, progress and 
possible solutions. These stem from secondary data and the existing status of Norway 
and Oman SWFs. These three set of questions were divided into possible solutions, 
changes required and impacts on progress. The regression analysis was carried out 
twice with each dependent variable of performance and success rate for these three 
variables.  
The following tables show that performance is not significantly impacted or cannot be 
predicted by three independent variables of solutions, changes and impacts. Table 6.8 
model summary of success rate as a dependent variable shows that 42.7% variance in 
the success rate can be explained by these three variables however significance of their 
correlations is very low having a significance value of 0.077 which is much more than 
the limit of 0.005.  
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Table 6.7 Regression analysis results of dependent variable performance and 
three predictors: solutions, changes and impacts 
Model R R square Adjusted R 
square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .220 .049 0.029 0.6433 
 
ANOVA  
Model Sum of squares Df Mean square F 
Regression 3.144 3 1.048 2.533 
Residual  61.661 149 .414 Significance  
Total 64.805 152  0.0059 
 
Table 6.8 Regression analysis results of dependent variable success rate and three 
predictors: solutions, changes and impacts  
Model R R square Adjusted R 
square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .681 .427 0.413 2.29 
 
ANOVA  
Model Sum of squares Df Mean square F 
Regression 7.970 3 2.998 67.417 
Residual  33.399 149 1.224 Significance  
Total 41.369 152  0.077 
 
Dependent variable: Success rate of SWF Predictors: Possible solutions, change 
and impacts on progress 
 
 
Based on the above mentioned results of principal component analysis and multiple 
linear regression analysis, testing of proposed hypotheses is discussed in the next 
section.  
 
6.10  Hypotheses testing 
The previous two sections have helped to reduce the data and to analyse the 
relationship between independent variables and dependent variables. The regression 
models signify the statistical substance of the proposed framework; however it does not 
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take into account the majority voice of respondents for each factor as data reduction 
does not take into account variables beyond certain Eigen value. This does not mean 
that rest of answers do not have any significance in this research study. Therefore, one 
would also utilize the descriptive statistics and interview findings for each important 
variable in the framework and plot the responses mean to understand its significance.  
 
Thus, each hypothesis is tested and discussed with the help of five types of supporting 
evidence: regression analysis results, interview findings, descriptive statistics, 
secondary data and literature. This is the evidence of triangulation application in terms 
of data collection and methodology. This increases the validity and reliability of the 
findings and recommendations further as it reduces chances of errors and biases.  For 
regression results‘ evidence, values for dependent variable 2: success rate is only 
considered as that of the significant model which can explain variance in the 
sustainable growth of SWF.  
 
H1a: Better governance increases the growth of SWF.  
H1b: More transparency provides more confidence from investment recipients 
leading to higher growth prospects.    
H1c: More accountability towards investee and sponsoring countries creates better 
system of managing SWF thus creating favourable conditions for growth of SWF.   
 
This first hypothesis is about the positive influence of governance reforms on 
developing and applying mechanisms to increase governance, transparency and 
accountability.  It states that increased governance can lead to increased transparency 
in the transactions and accountability acceptance by managers of SWF, ultimately 
resulting in the better management of the SWF. An improved corporate image will lead 
to overall worldwide acceptance in the financial markets as an institution to trust its 
investment deals. In turn, this governance and transparency may increase the internal 
employees‘ morale and performance both as their accountability for the actions taken 
on behalf of the fund would increase.  
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The correlation value of 0.508 between governance and success rate of Oman SWF in 
the above table 6.5 suggests that governance mechanisms can help SWF to grow. The 
current status of Oman SWF from the following graphs reflects the same that 
employees (questionnaire respondents) agree on the requirement of Oman SWF need 
of reforms and increased governance and transparency. Thus, respondents have 
confirmed that there are no mechanisms or regulatory frameworks in place either 
within the SWF or in any other agency for SWF.       
 
In addition to this, interviewees have agreed that there is no governance mechanism in 
place, there are no disclosures made; managerial roles are not defined; and there is no 
investment strategy in place. This reveals current status of Oman SWF having no 
monitoring from any government department as suggested in the interviews. There are 
no annual or performance reports published by Oman SWF. No deals data is disclosed 
except funding in flow and out flow maintained by Central Bank of Oman.            
4. Governance reforms 
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As a result of no data availability and less transparency, the financial analysts have 
classified Oman SWF with other well known GCC funds in the category of ‗No 
disclosure fund‘ as shown in the table below.  
 
 
The correlations values of success rate with independent variables in table 6.5 reveal 
that governance (0.508) affects the success of Oman SWF more than transparency 
(0.086) and accountability (-0.256). Transparency and accountability are not strongly 
correlated with success rate as evident from these correlation values; however a strong 
governance mechanism in place can increase the transparency and accountability in the 
SWF as an outcome of governance implementation as seen in the case of Norway SWF 
(GPFG).  Interviewees suggested that as of now in Oman SWF there are no governance 
5. Transparency 
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mechanisms, no information disclosure and no accountability hierarchy for the 
decisions made by either MoF or SWF which affect the growth and profitability of 
Oman SWF.  In addition to this, literature also supports that governance, transparency 
and accountability as vital elements of SWF management for the acceptance of the 
fund worldwide by investee companies and their governments (Truman, 2008; 
Drezner, 2008; Monk et al, 2009). Thus, hypotheses H1: a, b and c are accepted.  
 
H2: National security concerns tend to increase investment barriers and control 
mechanisms‟ negative influence over the growth of SWF.  
 
The statistical regression analysis result of investee country laws having correlation 
value of 0.478 with success rate of Oman SWF shows strong influence of investee 
country responses to decision making of SWF and ultimately their growth and success 
rate (Table 6.5). Furthermore, following graph shows that employees have responded 
that current investment decisions by MoF is done based on the selection of the investee 
countries either due to political ties or strategic alliance with common interests 
between governments of both investee and SWF sponsoring countries.  
 
 
However, the above plot reveals employees‘ strong disagreement (mean of 3.2, 2.2, 3.2 
in the plot) over ‗no importance‘ given by decision makers to the attributes of 
3. Investee countries
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investment environment, meaningful long term investments, growth and development 
prospects while selecting the country for investments. The same was evident from the 
responses of interviewees that current decision making by MoF has no investment 
strategy to appraise the deals before finalizing the investments, for example investment 
made in 2007 by Oman SWF to buy 30% stake in a bank in the Bulgaria. In addition to 
these interviewees 11 and 12 clearly stated that developed countries should not worry 
about myths of national security for two reasons. First, in the business world, the trade 
needs of each country is so large that no one can afford to lose investments or markets  
Second, Oman requires large amounts of investments within the country to develop 
non-oil economy to benefit existing and future populations. Thus, for example there is 
no surplus capital to buy strategic island in Pacific. This hypothesis is about the 
formation of laws within the funds recipient (investee) countries. For example, in case 
UAE‘s investment vehicle buying more than 10% in a company which owned strategic 
ports of USA. The case had drawn much attention and US govt. intervention in the 
matter finally led to divestment citing the security concerns (Drezner, 2008). In a 
response to this, many funds have diverted their investments into riskier investments in 
Middle East, North Africa and South Asia (MENASA) region. Thus, such control 
mechanisms can influence the investment decisions and deal amounts ultimately 
affecting growth of SWF. For this very reason, investee countries shall analyse the 
issues in the form of S + W + F analogy given by Kirshner (2009) which explains 
investee country governments about what is their problem of power of politics, wealth 
or fund policies. Also, there should be asset allocation strategy such as Norway‘s SWF 
to restrict investments to particular region or in a specific currency to a limit. Thus, 
with support of primary and secondary data, the hypothesis H2 is accepted.                         
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H3: Increase in trade imbalances can increase currency and inflationary 
pressures leading to effects on the investments and growth of SWF. 
 
The regression result shows very low correlation between trade balances and success 
rate to a level of 0.038 which conveys the low level relationship of this predictor 
variable to growth of SWF. Thus, statistical analysis does not support this hypothesis.  
However as shown in the following plot, employees are not able to decide. The reason 
might be their personal profile characteristics or the question being related to the core 
knowledge of economics and trade theories. One of the objectives of asking the 
employees about the trade balances was to confirm their understanding of sovereign 
wealth fund roots and fundamentals for Oman SWF.             
 
 
The responses of interviewees suggest their feedback about trade balances is positive 
as they were concerned with the lack of mechanisms for monitoring the foreign 
exchange reserve spent by Oman SWF. The interviewees were from top management 
who are involved in the policy making so they have concerns regarding the economy, 
currency rate and inflation situation in Oman. However, none of the interviewees was 
critical about the trade balance effects in SWF directly. On the other hand, trade 
balance is the difference in the earnings in capital and current accounts of the country 
through exports and imports. The increased trade balance allows the country to reserve 
the earned foreign exchange which in turn is available to utilize as funding to the 
sovereign wealth fund (Gieve, 2008). Hence, volume of the trade between two 
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countries and their respective exchange rates of currencies can affect the trade balance 
(Alerbola and Serena, 2008). The increased trade balance through higher trade volume 
increases the production demands for export goods within the sponsoring country, thus 
increasing GDP in case of exporters attempting to meet the demand. As a known fact, 
literature of economics and trade theories supports this hypothesis as well. From the 
secondary data comparing Oman with Norway SWF reveals that Norway has fixed 
spending or funds inflow limits from foreign exchange reserves accumulated through 
trade balances at Norges Bank. Therefore, if any SWF wants to grow and become 
profitable then they shall control the income and investment of the funds professionally 
like Norway. Thus, interviewees‘ feedback, secondary data and literature allow 
accepting the hypothesis H3.         
 
H4: Lack of planning negatively affects the growth of SWF.   
The regression results for lack of planning and absence of a specific plan supports the 
hypothesis with -0.673 correlation value between lack of planning as a predictor 
variable of success rate of growth of Oman SWF. However, the negative sign of 
correlation clearly suggest the inversely proportionate variation between lack of 
planning and success rate as anticipated. Any increase in lack of planning would 
decrease the success rate not only for Oman SWF but for any other profit making 
organisation which is evident from existing management theories. However, the overall 
contribution of lack of planning towards success rate of SWF is low with standardized 
beta coefficient of – 0.092.  In addition to regression results, the following plots of 
mean for each answer suggest the respondents‘ agreement about existing lack of 
strategic and investment planning situation in Oman SWF. The same has been echoed 
by interviewees that current decision making system is managed single handedly by 
Minister of Finance and appraisal of the decisions is not merit based. The 
administration of Oman SWF is totally un-organized to a level where Deputy Chief 
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executive of SWF does not have annual or performance reports of the investment 
portfolio (Interviewee 3).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The support of this hypothesis from primary data is equally supported by secondary 
data of Norway SWF and literature of investment strategy and planning that with a set 
of appropriate appraisal tools for investments in financial assets can improve the 
returns on the investments (Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009). Hence, one can accept 
hypothesis H4 in the current context.    
 
H5: Political objectives can affect the transparency and thus the treatment of 
SWF by investee countries which can affect the growth of SWF.   
 
The regression result of 0.102 for sponsoring country laws do not support this 
hypothesis based in the correlations results mentioned for the dependent variables 1 
and 2. However, following plot 6 of responses about global laws mean results show the 
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agreement of employees that right now Oman SWF does not determine whether these 
companies in which they are investing follow basic global laws in significant areas of 
concern. These areas include human rights, equal employment opportunities, and 
pollution control; as well, they do not check for such violations as the use of child 
labour and the use of money laundering. The plot 12 of sponsoring country shows that 
employees agree that laws in SWF sponsoring country for investments require 
updating; however there are no direct effects found.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, many a times Oman SWF rejects the foreign investment because of 
lack of sufficient information on global markets, absence of external help such as 
investment banks or issues of bi-lateral trade with the particular investment recipient 
country. The rejections of foreign investments do not happen because of priorities to 
industries within the country, wars, unrest of political instability; since, Oman‘s 
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economy and politics both were unaffected by global financial crisis and strong 
visionary leadership of current Sultan Qaboos from 1970s. Thus, employees agree for 
reasons mentioned for this hypothesis.     
 
 
The interviewees agreed for lack of clear objectives and planning along with main 
reason of single handed management for Oman SWF not adhering to global laws of 
following strict ethical standards. For example, Norway SWF does not invest in the 
companies who supply or manufacture weapons of any kind or create biological 
pollution or global warming. Oman SWF does not have any governance or such social 
responsibility policies outlined. Thus, with support of primary and secondary data, one 
can accept hypothesis H5.  
 
H6: A SWF should have a clear purpose which enables more efficient and 
transparent management, positively affecting the growth of the SWF. 
  
The regression results are not very high but considerable positive correlation value of 
0.389 is found for a relationship between the objectives and structure of funds as 
predictor variables of growth of the fund as a dependent variable (Table 6.5). The 
following plots of mean of answers to question 1 and 2 of the questionnaire suggest 
that employees strongly agree that objectives and management structure of the fund 
clearly impact the growth. Interviewees also supported the same perspective stating 
that currently objectives of the fund are not directed by investment or profitability 
goals, instead of that objectives are targeted by political motives from MoF or 
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ministries satisfying strategic demands of funds from governments of developed 
countries. Literature supports the same view such as Mitchell et al (2008), Berstein et 
al (2009) and Chhchhoria et al (2009) that management and further growth of the SWF 
in general are rooted to their objectives of setting up and organisational structure 
including decision making and investment strategy.     
 
 
 
 
Thus, based on the overall support of all types of evidences from primary and 
secondary data one can accept the hypothesis H6.  
H7a: Investment strategy fundamental and mechanism issues can directly impact the 
investments‟ performance and thus success and growth of SWF.  
 
The hypothesis is not supported by regression results as stated in the previous sections 
of regression analysis as investment strategy has negative and negligible correlation of  
– 0.074 with dependent variable of success rate. However shown in the following plot, 
employees have strongly disagreed that current decisions are made in the favour of 
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growth and profitability of the fund such as considering risk, returns, guaranteed 
income, technology transfer or long term investment. By their strong disagreement, 
employees have confirmed that currently Oman SWF does not have any investment 
strategy, does not make use of capital project appraisal methods. The same has been 
echoed by interviewees that present management of Oman SWF requires overall 
restructuring. One can see from the cases of Norway, Singapore, China, ADIA, Kuwait 
that these funds have primarily concentrated on returns on their investments through 
robust investment strategy, asset allocation, help from global experts such as 
investment banks and wealth managers. Literature also supports the strong presence of 
investment strategy, international level human capital to maintain the sustainability and 
profitability of the SWF (Aizenman and Glick, 2009; Setser and Ziemba, 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the basis of overall evidences from questionnaires, interviews and secondary data 
the hypothesis H7a is accepted.   
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H7b: Deal size shall be optimized by analysing the targeted investment opportunity 
for risk and return leading to the growth of SWF.  
 
The regression results do not support this hypothesis in terms of low correlation 
(0.048), contribution coefficient (0.067) and significance at level (0.147) that 
investment deal size and decision process can not contribute to predict success rate of 
Oman SWF. Size of the deal can affect the liquidity of the fund on investment and if 
returns are low then portfolio risk is increased (Madura, 2003). Thus, it can affect the 
risk and return balance of the investment and indirectly results into having impacts on 
growth of Oman SWF. The following graph of answers to question 18 on the 
investment deal shows that employees have disagreed again on the investment deal 
scenario that any appropriate procedures are followed to decide the deal size and 
decision on the deal. For example, respondents‘ disagreement means that Oman SWF 
does not follow any scenario analysis, does not take any help from specialized bank or 
financial methods involving deal size, risk and return to increase, to diversify or to 
divest the investments made.  
 
 
The SWF theory literature suggests that investment deal size and asset allocation are 
two important investment strategy fundamentals (Bernstein et al, 2009; Balin, 2010). 
Norway SWF does not restrict the amount of the deal but they have set 10% limit on 
how much ownership of the company they would go for. The deal size and its risk – 
return analysis becomes more important in case where equity ownership is limited by 
laws. For example, this can be restricted by the laws of investee country government 
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such as not more than 10% stake allowed by the foreign companies in strategic assets 
of the country such as in pharmaceutical, aviation or petroleum industry. Thus, on 
overall support and broad base of evidences, the hypothesis H7b is also accepted.   
 
H7c: Assets allocation directly affects the growth of SWF.  
 
This hypothesis is supported by regression results plus acceptance of previous two 
hypotheses H7a and H7b since investment strategy and deal size calculation take into 
consideration asset allocation as an integral component. The regression results show 
low correlation of 0.237 but higher contribution of 0.290 and significance of 
contribution of 0.059 (Table 6.5 and Appendix D).The following graph shows that 
employees disagree that Oman SWF applies or utilizes any of the asset allocation 
fundamentals such as capital utilization or integration with world markets. Therefore, 
they agree that asset allocation is necessary component for Oman SWF to increase its 
profits. How SWFs allocate their assets to maximise their profits is a well researched 
subject in the SWF literature. As discussed in chapter five, Norway SWF has robust 
asset allocation mechanism which fuels the return on their investments. Norway SWF 
management still wants to improve their investment strategy. These facts and 
evidences collectively support this hypothesis. Hence, one can accept the hypothesis 
H7c and with that all three components of H7 hypothesis are accepted.    
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H8: Improve the decision making by use of expert knowledge systems and 
research prior to deal finalization, more will be the successful deals and increased 
investment opportunities resulting in the growth of SWF. 
 
The regression results do not support this hypothesis with results of low correlation 
value at 0.074 and low contribution coefficient at 0.125 (this should be more than 
minimum 0.30) and low significance at 0.117 (this value should be less than 0.005) 
between decision making by SWF management and success rate of the fund. However, 
global practice of large and successful SWFs such as Norway, ADIA, SAMA, Kuwait 
suggest the vice –versa and advocate the better decision making can help increasing the 
opportunities. The graph for question 10 confirms employees‘ agreement that Oman 
SWF does not integrate their investment with other GCC funds because past 
experience is not good for investment co-operation and the rest of the reasons are 
attributed to political, cultural and administrative fundamentals. This was also 
confirmed by interviewee 3 (Dy. Chief executive of Oman SWF) that pervious co-
operation with other GCC funds have not turned out well.      
 
 
In the following plot of question 19, employees agree that operational efficiency of the 
SWF depends upon the reliable decision making based on the research and systematic 
process prior to an investment deal finalization.  
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The respondents‘ disagreement in the following graph signifies that currently Oman 
SWF does not make investments based on the risk management, financial returns 
guarantee, deal size, asset class or security of the funds invested in the country. This 
means currently Oman SWF do not make use of any fundamental of financial 
management and investment strategy in the investment decisions.  
 
 
 
Based on the three components discussed above - integrating investments, operational 
efficiency and investment decisions, one can accept the hypothesis H8. However this 
decision making hypothesis was discussed in detail and there was separate section 
included in the questionnaire with another set of question as section D of the 
questionnaire. The major aim of this thesis is to find the factors affecting SWF growth; 
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however an additional objective is to improve the growth, investment performance and 
success rate of Oman SWF. As evident from the secondary data, interviews and 
questionnaire findings, it can be confirmed that Oman SWF requires complete 
restructuring. This restructuring would be transformational for Oman SWF which 
further requires detailed understanding of how decisions are made within Oman SWF 
currently. Thus, next section analyses the decision making process of Oman SWF 
based on the responses received in the section D of the main questionnaire which 
would supplement the detailed discussion of the hypothesis H-8.  
 
It analyses how decision making process works in Oman SWF. Each question is 
associated with various stages of decision making within the SWF. Responses to each 
question are presented in the form of pie charts to easily interpret feedback of the 
employees and stakeholders of SWF.   
 
The following pie chart suggests that recipient countries (investee countries) do not 
approach first to the SWF but they contact first Government ministry which is 
supported by the second chart about large amount deal      
 
Recipient countries approach first to SWF
Yes in most 
cases , 15%
No, very rare , 
81%
Depends on 
case, 4%
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Once in contact with Ministry or SWF, clients are required to submit documents so that 
investment decision can be made before finalizing deal in a meeting with the recipient 
country government or company directly. The following chart shows mainly four 
documents however, Oman SWF should seek documents such as quality, 
manufacturing or organisational performance or policies report. These documents are 
more for internal stakeholders and thus not very much forward looking but provides 
true context of the company and how is it doing. Also, it is better to compare new 
company with the similar industry investment already in the existing portfolio, if 
available any in the same industry sector.  
 
Whom does client contact first in large amount deals?
Top 
management , 
5%
Departmental 
heads , 3%
Clients 
representative 
to SWF , 3%
Govt. Ministry , 
89%
SWF requires which documents from clients for 
investment decision 
Project report , 
15%
Company 
report , 23%
Annual report , 
33%
Investor 
presentations, 
29%
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From the previous discussions, we know that there is no investment strategy followed 
by Oman SWF right now. This is reflected in the following charts showing randomly 
taken decisions by MoF for short term profit goals. Thus, there is no stable income or 
no strategic asset is created from the SWF investments made. This is an additional 
evidence which proves Oman SWF requires robust investment strategy.    
 
 
More evidence of random selection of investments can be found in the following chart 
as employees confirm the biggest factor affecting the investment decisions is political 
motive. As one can see financial return has the lowest priority in Oman SWF as 
confirmed by employees.  
SWF aims investment opportunities for 
Continuous 
stable income 
6%
Short term 
liquidity plus 
profit 
87%
Currecy 
stabilization 
5%
Strategic 
assets
2%
 231 
 
 
The present decision making structure is investee country client contacts MoF and then 
MoF passes on the instructions to SWF; and then SWF deals with client. In this 
scenario, SWF just acts as administrative agency and not as a professional investment 
vehicle. Thus, Oman SWF requires overall restructuring of the organizational, 
reporting and monitoring structure.   
 
The post deal management responsibility of the clients and asset management and 
returns monitoring is with Government ministry and not with SWF. The chart also 
shows no professional services were used.  
Factors affecting the investment appraisal 
Avantage over 
other SWF, 4%
Financial return 
, 5%
Bilateral trade 
w ith country, 
14%
Political motive , 
77%
Current organizational hierarchy 
1%
95%
2%
2%
Client to SWF - MoF - SWF - Client 
Cilent to MoF - SWF - Client 
SWF to MoF - Client - SWF 
SWF to Client - MoF - SWF
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The decision making as known from the previous discussion and following chart is 
done single handedly by Minister of Finance. Managers and SWF team merely act as 
administrative agents in the whole decision making process. There is nothing biased in 
MoF having decision making, many countries SWFs are managed by either MoF or 
their central banks. The issue of concern is randomness and no robustness in the 
decision making without any specified investment strategy.   
 
Post-deal management repsonsibilty 
Govt. Ministry , 
98%
SWF managers 
, 2%
Professaional 
consultant , 0%
Decision maker for investment deals 
Minister , 95%
Professional 
manager , 2%
Speacial team, 
2%
Financial 
institution , 1%
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The reporting hierarchy conveys previously discussed organisational structure that 
MoF instructs the decisions to SWF.  
 
 
The following chart again shows a drawback in the investment planning of Oman SWF 
as 60% earning goes back to the treasury instead of larger share going for re-
investment. This might be the major reason why Oman SWF is lagging behind at US$ 
8 to 13bn where as other GCC funds have gone to be of size more than US$ 200bn to 
US$ 850bn.     
 
 
The reporting hirarchy / divestment process 
Ministry decision 
to SWF , 98%
SWF request to 
Ministry , 2%
Any other 
structure , 0%
Uitlization of profit form SWF 
Re-inevstment 
into SWF, 7%
Transfer to 
Govt. A/c , 60%
Dirrect to 
Projects , 33%
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The reasons for Oman SWF divesting their investments are quite different from 
Norway or other larger SWFs. In case of Oman SWF, the main reason for divestments 
is political relations with the governments of other countries.  
 
Thus, these decision making process charts as discussed above re-affirm the discussion 
of previous sections about restructuring requirements of Oman SWF in addition to 
decision making being crucial for any SWF. Thus, hypothesis H-8 can also be accepted 
with this form of evidence from section D of the questionnaire.  
The separate supporting literature is not included as a chart or table however it is 
embedded in the hypotheses testing as one category of evidence. Also, very few studies 
are empirical and mostly they are literature analyses or secondary data analyses. This is 
the reason why statistical results of this study have not been easily compared with other 
research studies in the field of SWFs.       
 
6.11  Progress, possible solutions and changes in Oman SWF 
In the questionnaire with independent and dependent variables for the framework, a 
different set of three independent variables was embedded which measured the future 
scope of the growth of Oman SWF based on what employees think that can be impacts, 
possible solutions, changes required and tools to improve the growth of Oman SWF. 
Reasons of SWF divestment 
Trade relations 
, 20%
Political 
relations , 40%
Decreasing 
asset value , 
30%
Depreciating 
currency , 10%
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The regression analysis for these three independent variables was done separately for 
two dependent variables of performance and success rate and their results are tabulated 
previosuly in section 6.9, appendices D3 and D4.  
 
The regression results of these variables are positive with dependent variable 2: success 
rate with correlations of 0.464 for possible solutions, 0.364 for changes and 0.264 for 
impacts on the progress. Their standardized beta coefficients explain strong 
contribution from these factors with values of 0.41 (solutions), 0.31 (changes) and 0.25 
(impacts) with low significance for solutions and changes but high significance of the 
contribution for impacts at level of 0.003 < 0.005 (Tables in Appendix D4).  
 
The first graph in this section is about the factors impacting progress of Oman SWF. 
From the following graph 24, it is evident that employees agree about bureaucratic 
decision making hierarchy such as SWF management by MoF, absence of regulatory 
frameworks, lack of strategic planning and non-utilization of any research skills 
negatively impact the growth of Oman SWF. This is why Oman SWF has not achieved 
the progress same as other SWFs of Norway, ADIA or Singapore.   
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The possible solution to this problem can be seen from strong agreement of 153 
respondents in the following graph 22. The possible solutions according to the voice of 
employees can be: finalizing investment objectives, specifying growth and return 
targets, developing legal and governance mechanism, developing the international 
level human capital, increased use of research and world markets information and 
heavy punishment for frauds and transgressions. This will allow SWF and employees 
to grow together and increase the governance, transparency and accountability.    
 
 
The following changes are also strongly agreed upon by employees for fund‘s financial 
management such as increase the fund inflow available for overseas investments, 
increase local and emerging markets investments. This might be because of many 
SWFs in GCC region lost billions due to credit crisis in the developed countries during 
2007 - 2009.  
 
22. Possible solutions 
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A number of possible solutions and changes would lead to improvement for the Oman 
SWF.   The necessity of making these changes was strongly acknowledged by the 
employees, as illustrated in graph 25 of dependent variables.  Included among the 
changes are:  development of Oman‘s work force, stronger cultural and religious 
integration of the population, enlargement of consumer markets based on various 
demographic characteristics, enhancement of transparency, and greater professionalism 
in work ethics. 
 
These possible solutions and changes are also strongly supported by top management 
which is evident from interviews data. For example, Interviewee 1 suggested the 
changes across the board in Oman SWF and implementation of professional 
management and investment practices. Interviewees 2, 6, 9, 10 and 15 stressed the 
need of appropriate reporting, appraisal and information disclosure systems. Dy. CEO 
of Oman SWF (Interviewee 3) recommends overall changes in terms of policy, 
strategy, decision making and reporting structure. Interviewees 5, 9 and 10 strongly 
supported that Oman SWF should make use of professional talent and take actions to 
develop the local talent to the global level of expertise. Changes in leadership, 
investment strategy, asset allocation and reduction in portfolio risk by increasing 
23. Changes 
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geographical spread of investments are recommended by interviewees 8, 11, 12 and 13. 
Changes in the fund inflow, asset allocation, budgeting, approvals, governance 
structures, policy and planning are voiced by interviewees 6, 8, 15, 16 and 17. 
Therefore, it is proved from the regression of results of impacts, changes and possible 
solutions with success rate of SWF and interviewees data that proposed restructuring 
plan for Oman SWF in terms of long term economic policy, new investment strategy, 
performance benchmarking and development of human capital advantage is agreed and 
accepted by top management (from interviewees), employees and other stakeholders 
(from questionnaires) of Oman SWF. The restructuring plan for Oman SWF is 
explained in the next chapter of conclusion.      
 
6.12       Final theoretical framework 
The following table shows the overall presentation of hypotheses results and confirms 
that all hypotheses are accepted on the basis of regression results, descriptive statistics 
and the collective support and multiple evidences from interview results, secondary 
data, literature and current SWF managerial practices. The table includes only primary 
data results about hypotheses in addition to the column of final acceptance or rejection 
of the hypothesis. All hypotheses are accepted based on the support from either of the 
previously mentioned bases. An exception to this is hypothesis 3 about environmental 
dimension of trade balances. This hypothesis is accepted based on the secondary data 
and literature considering the substantive significance of positive current account trade 
balances in increasing the foreign reserves which would enable any country to launch 
SWF.      
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Table 6.9 Summary of the hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis  Regression 
Results  
Descriptive 
Statistics  
Interview 
Results  
Final 
Acceptance or 
Rejection 
H1: Legal aspects 
Governance  
Transparency  
Accountability 
Supported for 
Governance 
only  
Supported  Supported  Accepted 
H2: Investee country laws 
National security 
Supported  Supported  Supported  Accepted 
H3: Environmental 
dimensions  
Trade balances  
Not supported  Neutral   Neutral  Accepted 
H4: Policy  
Lack of planning  
Supported  Supported  Supported  Accepted 
H5: Sponsoring country laws 
Political stability  
Not supported  Supported  Supported  Accepted 
H6: Structure 
Purpose / Objective  
Supported  Supported  Supported  Accepted 
H7: Investment deal  
Investment Strategy  
Deal Size  
Asset allocation 
Supported for 
Asset 
allocation only  
Supported  Supported  Accepted 
H8: Operations 
Decision making 
Not supported  Supported  Supported  Accepted 
 
 
As one can see from the hypotheses testing that regression analysis are carried out for 
each dimension of growth of SWF: investment performance and success rate of SWF. 
The regression model of performance is rejected based on the low degree of correlation 
and variance; however there is enough substantive significance of investment 
performance dimension revealing its necessary contribution for growth of SWF from 
other evidences of interviews and secondary data (Seth et al, 2009). Hence, all 
hypotheses are accepted based on the regression analysis results of success rate as 
dependent variable and investment performance is still included in the final framework 
as shown in the next section.  
 
Since all the hypotheses are accepted, there is no change between an initially proposed 
theoretical framework and the finally derived framework. Therefore, the following 
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framework is the final theoretical framework derived based on the hypothetico-
deductive method. The utilization of this finalized framework brings implications, 
contributions and further avenues for the research which is discussed in the concluding 
chapter.  
Figure 6.2 Final Derived Theoretical Framework 
 
 
The above mentioned framework has been derived based on the analyses of multiple 
regression results and descriptive statistics first and then weighing them with the other 
forms of compelling evidences such as interview findings, industry data and literature. 
The validity of the acceptance of all hypotheses is increased by comparing the research 
findings with the previous studies as done in the coming section of this chapter. 
 
Strategic 
Restructuring Plan 
Required 
 Long Term 
Economic policy 
 New investment 
policy & 
regulations 
 Performance 
Benchmarking for  
     Wealth Funds 
 Creation of human 
capital advantage 
Sustainable 
Growth of SWF 
in terms of 
Investment 
Performance 
and Success rate 
of the fund  
QUALITATIVE 
Legal aspects  (H1) 
 Governance  
 Transparency  
 Accountability  
Investee country laws  (H2) 
 National Security 
Environmental dimensions (H3) 
 Trade Balances  
Policy    (H4) 
 Lack of Planning   
Sponsoring country laws  (H5) 
 Political Objectives   
 
QUANTITATIVE 
Structure  (H6) 
 Purpose  
Investment deal  (H7) 
 Investment strategy 
 Deal size  
 Asset Allocation  
Operations  (H8) 
 Decision Making 
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The statistical techniques such as principal component analysis and multiple regression 
analysis have enabled to evaluate various components of relationship between factors 
affecting growth, success rate and performance of SWF. Not all results of regression 
analyses have supported each hypotheses; however this type of hypotheses are found to 
be supported by other forms of evidences as stated in their analyses and table 6.9 as 
above. Table 6.9 presents the finalization of framework mentioned in the above figure 
6.3. The method of analysing each hypothesis with multiple forms of evidence has 
given valuable insights about relationships among these variables and how they 
influence management and operations of any SWF. This is detailed in the findings of 
this research study in the following section.  
 
6.13 Findings of this research study 
This section summarises the findings of this research study.  These findings refer to the 
final framework and align the research aim and objectives with the findings.   
 
The qualitative factors such as governance, transparency, accountability, sponsoring 
and investee country laws, planning and policies and trade environment affect the 
sovereign wealth fund decision making to make foreign investments which can directly 
impact overall growth of SWF.  
 
Governance was found to be a high impact factor which can ultimately enable the 
transparency and accountability in the SWF. Thus, it is necessary to have governance 
mechanisms in place such as Norway SWF which has scored high in all such attributes 
and same is demanded by Oman SWF stakeholders.  
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Policy making and planning affect range of issues within SWF wherein national 
security concerns may be a myth created by political leaders or a debate in media since 
SWF investments can have positive impacts on the industry which needs long term 
funds in the investee countries. Also, there is no such evidence found in the literature 
or primary data that SWFs have negative impacts on the capital markets of investee 
countries however their persistent inclination for specific industrial segments can 
imbalance the money supply. For example, considering profitability as only investment 
criteria would lead SWFs to riskier investments which would create liquidity shortage 
for safe but low yield businesses. 
 
On the other hand, when asset allocation is not appropriate, there are examples of 
SWFs losing the value of the investments for example GCC SWFs losing approax. US 
$ 40bn in the banking industry during 2007 – 09 credit crisis. SWFs are vital to the 
economies of sponsoring countries and investee countries depending on their 
contribution to the trade balance of the country. Therefore, utilization of SWFs for 
increasing trade and economic benefits is possible if both sponsoring and investee 
countries create common mechanisms in terms of laws and treaties instead of creating 
barriers and protectionism to the bi-lateral trade. This shifts one from qualitative 
factors to quantitative factors of investment strategy and decision making components.  
 
The quantitative factors such as purpose, structure, deal size, asset allocation, trade 
balances and decision making are equally important as qualitative factors to the SWF 
growth. Both of these findings about qualitative and quantitative factors affecting 
growth of SWF are supported by multiple forms of evidences.  
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Decision making by political leaders or decisions based on political objectives rather 
than financial motives can impact the profitability of the SWFs. This is evident from 
interviews data, questionnaire data and equally supported by the literature. This 
decision making should allow other attributes to be workable or advantageous for SWF 
such as investment strategy and organisational structure as these two are vital for 
setting up objectives and appraisal of the investments which can ultimately reflected in 
the assets yield and growth of the SWF. Deal size is one of the main components to be 
utilized by the SWFs for analysing investment opportunities as governance 
mechanisms of sponsoring countries may restrict deal size or equity shareholding and 
same can be protected by investee countries‘ governments and companies. For 
example, Norway SWF has 10% limit to buy equity of the any company, or UK 
competition commission asked Kuwait SWF to divest anything over 10% holding in 
British Petroleum. Thus, deal size in terms of percentage and amount is critical 
component affecting growth of SWF.     
 
A detailed literature review revealed that existing finance and management theories 
can help in resolving conflicting issues within the SWFs, between SWFs or with their 
stakeholders as discussed in detail in the next section.   
 
From Oman SWF data, it is found that there is lot of resentment within SWF 
employees and other government departments because of heavy influence and single 
handed decision making by Ministry of Finance. Top executives and employees of 
SWF and other government departments have clearly suggested that Oman SWF 
requires complete restructuring or transformation in terms of policy, planning, 
governance mechanisms, decision making and investment strategy. The restructuring 
plan for Oman SWF is explained in the final conclusion chapter of the thesis.  
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According to the primary data analyses and current situation of Oman SWF, the future 
of sovereign wealth fund of Oman relies heavily on how restructuring plan will be 
managed by the Government of Oman. The current set of issues of concern mainly 
arises from lack or complete absence of many vital attributes such as planning, 
policies, structure, audit and budgetary control, professional investment strategy and 
research based decision making. The current investment decisions by Minister of 
Finance are random, without any risk – return appraisal and preferably containing 
political biases. On the other hand, because of this non-professional management style 
adopted by Oman SWF, the fund is losing out to competitors and quite large SWFs 
namely, UAE, Saudi Arabia, China, Norway, Singapore and Kuwait funds in the 
recession period when assets are undervalued and cheaply available to buy. Missing 
this investment period would create again a larger gap between Oman SWF and these 
global SWFs. Therefore, for a future of successful assets growth and consistent 
profitable returns on the investment portfolio, Oman SWF has to act now to bring in 
professional management and develop the organisation.  
 
6.14 Support of existing theories in resolving issues of concern in 
SWF  
In the literarure review section, the exsiting theories of trade, finance, management and 
economics are discussed as being the basis of SWF and to understand the concept of 
SWF in detail. These theories can support and help resolving issues within SWF 
management. To understsnd the utilization of theories for SWF, the example of Oman 
SWF is analysed based on the primary data from interviews and questionnaires.  
It can be observed from responses of executives from SWF, councils, central bank of 
Oman, government committees and ministries for questionnaires and interviews that 
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there is strong resentment about how Oman SWF is getting managed. These 
respondents are government employees and at the end of the day they are citizens of 
Oman as well. Also, the conflict is evident from recent protests against the government 
reported in the media and the government‘s immediate response in terms of re-
allocation of ministerial portfolios. Thus, there are two types of conflicts within 
sponsoring country: between actual owners‘ population and MoF; and between MoF 
and employees of SWF. The fundamental reasons can be issues of trust, integrity, 
legitimacy or intent which basically stems from lack of governance. These issues 
match with Agency theory explained in the literature review. Agency theory deals with 
principal – agent conflicts which can help to analyse and to resolve such issues based 
on analyses.  
 
The second issue is that Oman SWF is one of the least transparent SWFs worldwide 
and having ‗no governance mechanism‘. The issue of governance can be tackled by 
applying tools of stakeholders management and decision making decentralization 
theories which empower employees to take on more responsibilities and be 
accountable for their actions. Hence, application of stakeholder management and 
decision making theories for top management would help to resolve the governance 
issue.  
 
The third issue is complete lack of investment strategy, asset allocation planning and 
use of investment appraisal tools and risk management methods. Therefore, Oman 
SWF must implement financial management theories to prepare a robust investment 
strategy which can ultimately help to increase the return on the investment deals made.  
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The fourth issue is the credibility of the Oman SWF which is very low as compared to 
Norway and Singapore SWFs. The internal issues for credibility can be governance 
and transparency; however investee country trade relations and legal mechanisms of 
protecting domestic economy and industry can also affect the bilateral relations with 
other countries. Oman has no issue of bilateral trade relations; however improvement 
in governance and transparency may increase the credibility of Oman SWF.  
 
Therefore, one can see that issues such as of Oman SWF can be resolved for any global 
SWF utilizing the agency theory, stakeholder management theory, decision making 
theory and financial management theories and help to improve its structure, 
governance, transparency, credibility or profitability ultimately leading to growth of 
SWF.  
 
6.15 Reliability and validity of the findings  
The reliability of the findings is a measure of consistency in the longitudinal time 
horizon, accuracy of measurement, replicability of findings for same constructs under 
different research setting. Thus, stability and similarity of the findings on a consistent 
scale can be defined as the reliability for the research carried out (Neuman, 2006; 
Pallant, 2010). The statistical measure of the reliability of the sample is usually 
calculated by Cronbach‘s alpha which is 0.638 (normal value) and 0.692 (based on 
standardized items). The scale and sample is reliable when Cronbach‘s alpha is 
between 0.7 and 0.9.  Hence in this case it can be said that reliability is achieved.  
 
The validity of the findings refer to the dimensions applied fitting, predicting and 
correlating and contributing to the construct or dependent variable they are measuring 
collectively. In terms of statistics, this can be explained from factors or principal 
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component analysis and regression results. Some of the independent variables are not 
correlating or contributing to measure performance or success rate of SWF. However, 
their further verification is done by data analyses from other sources such as interview 
transcripts and already published literature.  
 
The important feature of the validity checks are: Does a novel argument in the findings 
or proposition have any evidence, does refuting the existing argument of the literature 
by the researcher have any evidence or how much is the similarity or differentiation 
between existing and new findings. The following table of findings of this case study 
and their support from the literature by similar findings confirm the validity of this 
research study‘s recommendations and conclusion.  
 
Table 6.10 Validity of the findings of this study   
Variable  Findings in this study Existing research 
supporting this study  
Governance  
Transparency  
Accountability  
Governance is the dominating predictor of the growth 
of SWF. Transparency and accountability is affected 
by governance mechanism and do not affect directly 
the growth of SWF. 
 
Lyons,2007; Drezner, 
2008; Fotak et al, 2008;; 
Portman, 2008; Truman, 
2008; Dixon and Monk, 
2009; Monk, 2010;; Clark 
and Knight, 2010; De 
Bellis, 2010; Kotter and 
Lel, 2011 
 
Investee 
country laws 
National security concerns tend to increase investment 
barriers and control mechanisms‘ negative influence 
over the growth of SWF. SWFs are not a threat to 
developed economies. 
 
Bahgat, 2008; Greene and 
Yeager, 2008; Hayward, 
2008; Kirshner, 2009   
Trade 
balances  
Trade balances do not directly impact the performance 
and growth of SWF; however accumulation of FE 
reserves over the time shifts balance of power to 
developing and emerging economies SWFs.  
 
Gieve, 2008; Alerbola and 
Serena, 2008  
Lack of 
planning and 
policies 
This varies inversely with success rate and growth of 
SWF  
 
Chhaochharia and Laeven, 
2009; Ang, 2010; 
Sonarajah, 2011 
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Sponsoring 
country laws 
and political 
objectives  
Political objectives hamper the governance. Increase in 
sponsoring country laws in response to protectionism 
by developed investee countries would again reduce 
growth of SWF. Sponsoring countries needs simple 
governance mechanism and legal framework which 
increase the ease of business and robustness of 
performance, success and growth of SWF.  
 
Drezner, 2008; Fotak et al, 
2008; Portman, 2008; Park 
and Estrada, 2011; Pistor 
and Hatton 2011; 
Structure and 
purpose 
Governance and investment strategy mechanisms 
would infuse the organisation of activities in the 
SWFs. However, politically motivated investments or 
objective to launch SWFs are barriers to long term 
growth of SWFs.  
 
Mitchell et al, 2008; 
Bernstein et al, 2009; 
Chhaochharia et al, 2009; 
Pistor and Hatton, 2011 
Investment 
strategy: deal 
and asset 
allocation 
Asset allocation, deal size and announcements can 
affect the profitability of SWF and investee company 
both. Oman SWF requires complete restructuring of 
investment strategy and asset allocation fundamental 
which strongly influence the growth of SWF.  
Kern, 2007; Balding, 2008; 
Santiso, 2008; Aizeman 
and Glick, 2009; Balin, 
2010; Paulson, 2009;Setser 
and Ziemba, 2009; 
Dewenter et al, 2010  
 
Decision 
making  
Current decision making is influenced by MoF or 
political elites want to maintain the control over wealth 
and power. Better the decision making by use of expert 
knowledge systems and research prior to deal 
finalization, more will be the successful deals and 
increased investment opportunities.  
Drezner, 2008; Mitchell et 
al, 2008; Anderson, 2009;  
Pistor and Hatton, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
6.16   Summary 
This chapter provided insights into what mangers and top executives related to SWF 
think that is necessary to improve any global SWF in addition to Oman SWF for its 
growth, credibility, strategy and decision making. The evidence to this was obtained in 
the form of analyses of secondary and primary data. These multiple evidences also 
enabled the testing of initially proposed theoretical framework.   
 
This chapter has documented the results and data analyses of interview and 
questionnaire data. Thus, analyses carried out based on the five different types of 
evidences have enabled to finalize the proposed framework. The final framework can 
be utilized by any SWF in the context such as objective to increase growth, or having 
issues of concern for any factor mentioned in the framework. The results of this study 
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are compared to a possible extent with recent literature during finalizing the proposed 
framework as there is no such empirical study carried out for analyzing the factors 
affecting growth sovereign wealth funds. The use of statistical tests such as principal 
component analyses and multiple regression analyses have increased the reliability and 
validity of the conclusions and recommendations made.  
 
The next and final chapter of this thesis provides concluding remarks and 
recommendations in the form of research summary, limitations, implications for 
academia and industry managers of SWF with further scope of extending this type of 
research for sovereign wealth funds.   
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Chapter 7  Conclusion 
 
7.1 Research summary  
This chapter summarises the research and explain the contribution, implication and 
further research scope arising from this thesis whilst considering its limitations. Based 
on the findings of this study, recommendations are made for global SWFs and in 
particular a restructuring plan for Oman SWF. According to Philips and Pugh (1994), 
this chapter contains the utilization of theory which is strongly correlated to the 
background, focal and data theories.    
 
The research design combined data collection and analyses units, such as multiple data 
sources, multiple analysis techniques deployed and multiple evidences utilized 
enabling to test hypotheses. Secondary data was obtained from two SWFs Norway and 
Oman whereas primary data was obtained only from Oman SWF in the form of 20 
semi-structured interviews of top management and 153 questionnaire responses of 
middle and operational level employees.         
 
A surge in SWF investments has prompted the interests of various stakeholders in the 
concept, deals and debate surrounding SWFs around the globe. Since, natural resources 
are finite, becoming depleted overtime. In particular, GCC region economies are 
interested in developing non-oil income based industries and markets in which SWF 
would be a main catalyst. With unprecedented growth from US$ 500billion to 
3.5trillion has brought many managerial issues of concerns to the domain of SWFs. 
The major constituents to these problems are growth, governance, transparency, laws 
and protectionism, polices and planning, trade balance, investment strategy and 
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decision making.  This research study focussed on such factors affecting the 
performance and success rate as two components of sustainable growth of SWFs.  
 
The major challenges for SWFs and governments of sponsoring and investee countries 
are: how to make these SWFs sustainable, how to utilize their financial leverage 
appropriately to have lasting benefits for economies and how to manage them as an 
industry while minimizing the conflicts between stakeholders on the either side of 
investment deals. Thus, the research findings of this thesis about crucial factors for 
growth would help SWF managers and governments to address such challenges.  
 
A specific solution such as a restructuring plan for Oman SWF is an additional output 
this research study. The analysis of findings about factors affecting growth of SWFs 
and case analyses of Oman and Norway have enabled to prepare such a roadmap for 
restructuring Oman SWF.  This restructuring plan would bring a permanent solution to 
Oman SWF because in the current scenario, no executive knows what is going in the 
Oman SWF as there are no governance mechanisms or regulations in place, and no one 
is accountable for loss of foreign exchange reserves in the investments.  
 
7.2 Implications for theory and practice 
The research findings arising from this study have many theoretical and practical 
implications for academia and SWF business practitioners‘ communities respectively.  
The study provides a set of important implications for global SWF managers and 
government of Oman. It is important to know the wider implications of making SWF 
investments – divestment decisions, making laws and barriers decisions, creating 
governance and increasing transparency and utilizing the findings of this study. These 
implications can either be positive or negative for SWFs, investee companies, 
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governments of sponsoring and investee countries, economies and markets of these 
countries, SWF managers, researchers and theoretical body of knowledge of SWFs.  
 
SWF investments announcements can bring positive outlook for stock prices of the 
investee companies but depending on the deal size and reputation of SWF attached to 
it, the market can have negative effects. Secondly, if the investments of high risk – 
high return is followed by SWFs then money supply can be imbalanced between low 
return stable firms and high return riskier businesses. Large numbers of SWF 
divestment decisions can also negatively impact the markets and industries in the 
investee countries. Continuous large overseas investments can also hamper the growth 
of sponsoring country economies as cash available for local projects is reduced. Hence, 
investments and divestments both can have positive or negative implications. 
  
To reduce such negative impacts, investee and sponsoring countries create laws and 
barriers which result in protectionism, reducing the trust and trade between investee 
and sponsoring countries. This reduction in trust and trade has negative impacts on the 
growth of a SWF. To create growing and profitable SWF, one may argue to create 
governance mechanisms which would bring transparency and accountability within 
SWF decision making and operation; however overdoing this may hamper the actual 
tasks of creating profits and valuable asset base such as the case of Norway. Norway 
SWF‘s conventional and overdone mechanisms along with divestment policies have 
resulted in loss making deals in many quarters during the last decade. On the other end, 
increased transparency and accountability would increase investors‘ confidence about 
the governance in Oman business which may attract more foreign direct investmemts 
(FDI) to Oman. This would again help SWF growth as government will have two 
options: either invest profitably in FDI supported projects or invest in foreign equities 
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as liquidity demand would decrease domestically as FDI inflow increases. Therefore, 
increased transparency and goevrnace has macro-economic benefit suhc as FDI increse 
as well which ultimately can support SWF growth.            
 
The findings of this study are based on the multiple data, analyses and evidences 
found; and hence, it would have positive implications if one makes use of these factors 
and findings in SWF management practice. For academic researchers, positive 
implications are further research streams, development of SWF as a theory and 
availability of validated framework which can be applied or utilized in different 
research contexts. Also, the existing theories can be correlated as foundations of SWF 
concept which again widens the scope of research.  
 
The another implication arises from the possible generalizations of the findings of this 
study for all SWFs worldwide which would enable the governments and regulators to 
reach in creating an overarching institute for managing and monitoring all SWFs 
together as a separate industry.  
 
7.3 Contributions of the research  
This thesis makes theoretical contribution to the body of knowledge in terms of 
literature analyses, conceptual framework, research findings, methodologies applied 
and further scope of the research.   
 
The literature analysis suggests a strong relationship between streams of economics, 
finance, trade and legal foundations and a concept of sovereign wealth fund. In 
addition to this, a systematic review of literature of the last decade of SWF conceptual 
development and their management also forwards the body of knowledge.   
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The conceptual framework is developed based on the extensive literature review and 
industry data whose findings are validated based on the multiple sources of evidence; 
hence the conceptual framework derived from hypotheses testing is one of the major 
contribution and novelty from this thesis.  
 
 
The major findings about governance mechanism, laws and protectionism, trade 
balances, investment strategy, deal size and asset allocation backed up by evidences 
from literature, industry data and primary data are contributing to the theoretical 
refinement of SWF as a phenomenon (Partington, 2002).  
 
There are not many empirical studies found in the literature which have applied 
combined philosophies and mixed method approaches within the analytical frame of 
study. Hence, application of such a methodology with support of triangulation in itself 
become is another contribution to research domain of SWF concept.   
 
The conceptual framework, applied methodology and research findings create a set of 
opportunities for the future researchers and thus set a direction of research streams 
entailing SWF as a theory. Since SWF is a complex subject requiring in-depth 
understanding of existing theories, the outcome of this research study would be utilized 
over the long term.  This is because nature and context of any research are two major 
attributes affecting the level of complexity of the research studies (Neuman, 2006).  
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The practical contribution is made in terms of findings about the factors affecting SWF 
and the recommendations to global SWFs and Oman SWFs. Furthermore, Oman SWF 
is presented with a restructuring plan as it was one of the objectives in this research.  
 
The recommendations for global and Oman SWFs are made as a foundation to long 
term incremental changes which make them feasible and easy to implement. 
Recommendations for global SWFs are sourced from findings of this research study 
and conceptual framework developed for growth of SWF. Thus, implementing these 
recommendations would bring the improvement in the success rate and investment 
performance of the SWF which would make a huge contribution towards uplifting the 
SWFs in the global financial markets.  
 
Oman SWF analyses for its secondary and primary data have enabled to prepare the 
recommendations and its further restructuring plan. The implementation of these 
recommendations and restructuring plan would bring the required changes in Oman 
SWF in terms of organizational structure, investment strategy, planning, governance, 
transparency and development of human capital. This would definitely be welcomed 
by the interviewees and employees who voiced their resentment in their responses for 
what is the current situation of Oman SWF. Thus, it would be one of biggest practical 
contribution of this thesis.      
  
This thesis makes an additional practical contribution by proposing SWF to be 
considered as a separate industry such as having an overarching body to monitor and 
regulate the SWF issues. The current portfolio and long term growth forecast for SWFs 
is in the range of US$ 7 to 10 trillion in next 5 years from its existing asset 
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accumulation of approximately US$ 3.5 trillion which supports its industry status 
proposition.   
 
7.4 Limitations 
The research limitations of this study can be categorised as research design and 
theoretical limitations. The design limitations include low availability of secondary 
data about Oman SWF; low response rate of questionnaires and limited number of 
SWF cases. However these design limitations are taken care of by applying data and 
methodological triangulations which make the impacts of these limitations negligible 
on the research findings and their reliability and validity. The issue of limited number 
of cases was nullified by a systematic review of literature which has many articles 
reviewed containing various cases of large and global SWFs such as SAMA, ADIA, 
CIC, Temasek, Norway and KIA.  Hence, there was no need to increase number of 
cases in the secondary data analyses.  
 
Low significance of statistical results is removed by support of multiple evidences in 
testing hypotheses. The methodological rigour and precision such as an application of 
triangulation in the research work reduces such limitations and limitations fade away 
over the time with the increasing use of findings of this study. Therefore, 
generalization of findings is possible and these findings can be applied to any SWF 
who has similar contextual issues.  
 
7.5 Recommendations for global SWFs  
A number of possible solutions and changes would bring Oman SWF having good 
management style, investment strategy and governance in place. However, it would 
need following decisions to be made for the long term success rate of Oman SWF. 
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 First, the existing theories of economics, finance, international trade and business 
management can be applied to understand the concept of SWF and to resolve any 
conflicts arising in the SWF operations. Thus, it is recommended to utilize the 
closely established link between theories and practical SWF activities for 
strengthening the SWF.  
 Second, it is a myth that SWFs can affect global capital markets, since their total 
asset base is only US$ 3.5 to 4 trillion which is almost negligible when compared 
to hedge funds, insurance funds or pension funds. Therefore, second 
recommendation is not to be afraid of SWFs, as they were much helpful during 
the global credit crisis.  
The empirical testing of the proposed framework found that qualitative and 
quantitative factors are equally important and complementary to each other for the 
growth of SWF. Therefore, SWF managers should concentrate on developing and 
maintaining the culture of high level of professionalism, transparency and 
accountability along with primary focus on the profitability and return on the 
investments (ROI).  
 
The example of Norway‘s negative quarterly returns on multiple occasions in the last 
decade and the changes made in asset allocation policies raises questions over SWF‘s 
traditional investment style, overdone governance mechanisms and strict divestments 
policies which ultimately reduced the resilience of Norway SWF to market turbulence 
and potential basic risks. Thus, global SWFs managers shall be able to identify, manage 
and communicate different risks which affect the rate of return.  
 
The losses made by GCC region funds, Norway and Temasek during financial crisis 
revealed that the risks factors within the fund management of the fixed income portfolio 
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had not been appropriately identified and communicated. Few of these funds have strong 
management control and governance mechanisms having a solid foundation. These 
losses lay the foundations for improvement in such mechanisms or restructuring of the 
funds. Hence, new mechanisms should direct the investment strategy based on weighing 
expected returns against expected risk and usefulness of active management in 
exploiting the characteristics of SWF.   
 
We have seen the huge amount of rules, regulations and frameworks in the case of 
Norway. If all SWFs and their sponsoring countries start developing these many rules 
and in response to that there would be more of the same action by investee countries, 
then the growth, performance and ease of operations are affected for all SWFs. 
Therefore, it is proposed to develop a new global regulatory agency which can resolve 
such conflicts between SWFs and investee companies or between the two 
governments.  
 
Further testing of this research study may be done using more data and different 
research designs. Positive confirmations to such further research studies regarding the 
same set of variables may increase the validity of this research. Hence, it is 
recommended to researchers that findings and factors of this study are to be tested and 
to compare the results.  
 
7.6 Recommendations for Oman SWF 
This section details the specific recommendations for Oman SWFs from based on their 
secondary and primary data analyses. The restructuring plan for Oman SWF is given 
separately in the next sections of this chapter.  
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The comparison between Norway and Oman SWFs suggests that first priority for 
Oman SWF (SGRF) is to improve its organisational structure, by putting a robust 
investment strategy and governance mechanism in place as part of reporting system, 
monitoring and management control. This would further require sourcing and utilizing 
the local and international talent in the process. This is the first step of restructuring the 
organisation.  
 
The next important step for SGRF is to start investing in the profitable deals. This is 
possible by infusing culture of quality and developing the wealth management skills of 
global level expertise. The large and successful funds in and outside the GCC have 
made use of wealth managers such as investment banks, banks, advisors or research 
analysts. This would help in returning to the profitability and accumulation of required 
human capital over the years. Thus, SGRF requires actions to be taken for these 
priorities first.  
 
The two recommendations above are possible to implement by turning the Oman SWF 
into a separate organisational entity rather than keeping it in its current form as a 
department within the finance ministry. Also, it would start to have its own 
organisational capabilities and resources developments when given the autonomy to 
function professionally rather than under strict political influence. Many SWFs around 
the world have become successful in this manner for example, Temasek and ADIA.   
 
One can conclude that Oman SWF needs huge amount of hard work to grow, get 
earning and expand. This is possible by collective efforts of government and 
employees of SWF. The restructuring and investment strategy are keys to the further 
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success; however it is the governance, transparency and accountability as the major 
traits of the organisational culture would add the sustainability to Oman SWF. 
On implementation of recommendations appropriately, governance and transparency 
standards may improve which would also increase investors‘ confidence worldwide. 
This can ultimately results into increase in the foreign direct investments (FDI) inflow 
to Oman. Increased FDI would eventually support the goals of Oman SWF about 
bringing economical improvements.   
 
7.7 The restructuring plan for Oman SWF  
The findings from the analyses of primary and secondary data suggest that Oman SWF 
requires overall restructuring of the organisation design mainly: planning, staffing, 
controlling and monitoring. The planning function would bring changes in the 
investment planning, strategic planning and internal business processes. The staffing 
function would bring changes in the human capital attraction, training, development 
and retaining the right talent. The monitoring function would enable the induction of 
regulatory, reporting and control mechanisms in place which are currently absent now. 
This would ultimately bring governance, transparency and accountability to the 
organisation and make the decision making focussed and un-biased. The major aim of 
this restructuring plan is to make the organisation‘s image more transparent, introduce 
professionalism in the working culture of the SWF and increase the profitability of the 
SWF. Therefore, one would suggest three levels of changes need to be introduced: 
strategic, transformational and incremental. Transformational level changes would 
bring the changes at the top level including leadership. The strategic changes would 
include the policies and strategies of the SWF and incremental changes would be 
brought to the core operations. The incremental changes would be implemented in a 
phased manner and not a big bang introduction because phased manner of 
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implementing changes would reduce the organisational inertia in the form of 
employee‘s resistance against the change.  
 
The following self-explanatory diagram 8.1 reveals the complete restructuring plan. 
The restructuring plan includes focus on profitability, organizational development, 
leadership and monitoring and control. The profitability and leadership focus are part 
of planning function as mentioned above which would provide new strategies and 
policies to Oman SWF for example, development of new investment strategy, asset 
allocation mechanism or deploying sustainability standards. The organizational 
learning focus is part of the staffing function improvement which would see 
development and accumulation of global level expertise through in-house development 
and outsourcing. The monitoring and control would be done through developing 
standards, code of conducts, effective decision making structure and benchmarking the 
performance of Oman SWF with leading international SWFs. 
 
Figure 7.1 Restructuring plan for Oman SWF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted based on the analyses of findings  
Profitability Focus 
 New Investment strategy and 
policies  
 Asset allocations and ROI 
targets  
 Market research and global 
intelligence  
Leadership Focus 
 Corporate strategy  
 Policy issues with other funds 
and regulators  
 Corporate social responsibility  
Organizational Learning Focus 
 Human capital development  
 Training and assessment  
 Zero tolerance for transgressors  
 Outsourcing global expertise  
 
Monitoring and Control Focus 
 Mechanisms for governance and 
accountability  
 Transparency and information 
disclosure  
 Decision making and reporting  
 Performance measurement  
Sustainable 
Growth of 
SWF 
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The implementation of this restructuring plan would be done by Government of Oman 
which is not in the scope of this research study.   
 
7.8 Future scope of research 
Based on the findings of this research study, new research avenues emerging from the 
debates of the proposed concept and research design context can be detailed as a scope 
of further research streams in subject domain of sovereign wealth funds.  
 
Future research can examine whether other SWFs and different demographic profiles 
of respondents can influence the structure and composition of the dimensions 
measuring growth, success and performance of the SWF.  
 
This newly established research stream can focus on the sampling of the survey and 
interviews which can be higher, or arranging other methods of data collection such as 
focus groups comprising managers from each different SWF and wealth management 
experts from central banks and investment banks. This will be beneficial for academic 
researchers and SWF managers to know the differences between various investment 
strategies under which their decision making is affected and why.  
 
SWF management was found to be affecting the growth based on the decision making 
strategies and employees‘ skills availability. Future researchers may increase their 
attention to these aspects to identify any changes in the other factors affecting the 
growth of their funds.   
 
The another research avenue can arise from the time line of the data as this study 
collected cross-sectional data where as next step can be to adopt a grounded theory 
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research strategy and study in depth causal relationships based on the longitudinal 
research design.  
 
Further research applying qualitative and longitudinal methods or more case studies 
would be useful to test the findings of this study. Also, one can involve samples from 
other countries which will see the comparison between SWFs based on the differences 
across cultures, business dynamics and national settings.  
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APPNEDIX A - Scale Reliability Test Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 151 98.7 
Excluded
a
 2 1.3 
Total 153 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in 
the  
b.  
c. procedure. 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based on 
Standardized 
Items N of Items 
.638 .692 158 
Summary Item Statistics 
 
Mean Minimum Maximum Range 
Maximum / 
Minimum Variance N of Items 
Item Means 4.437 -.004 6.947 6.951 -1622.258 3.216 158 
Item Variances .789 .007 2.852 2.845 430.600 .350 158 
Inter-Item Covariances .009 -.670 1.532 2.202 -2.285 .010 158 
Inter-Item Correlations .014 -.902 1.000 1.902 -1.108 .016 158 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
701.0798321 340.994 18.46601266 158 
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APPENDIX – B PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
RESULTS 
 
QUESTION 1 MAIN OBJECTIVES  H6  
 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .526 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 674.231 
Df 36 
Sig. .000 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadings
a
 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 2.395 26.611 26.611 2.395 26.611 26.611 2.277 
2 2.167 24.074 50.685 2.167 24.074 50.685 2.025 
3 1.477 16.409 67.094 1.477 16.409 67.094 1.770 
4 .984 10.938 78.032     
5 .950 10.552 88.584     
6 .590 6.551 95.134     
7 .196 2.174 97.309     
8 .165 1.828 99.137     
9 .078 .863 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Un rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 
DVLEPOBJ .708 -.563  
EXPENOBJ .675 -.541  
STABLOBJ .653 .602 .332 
BILTLOBJ .641 .506 .512 
DEMNDOBJ -.551 .436  
RETRNOBJ    
CHANGOBJ .451 .718 -.478 
PLTCLOBJ  -.407 .882 
REVENOBJ    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 3 components extracted. 
 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
EXPENOBJ 1.000 .773 
REVENOBJ 1.000 .048 
DVLEPOBJ 1.000 .839 
CHANGOBJ 1.000 .947 
RETRNOBJ 1.000 .149 
STABLOBJ 1.000 .899 
BILTLOBJ 1.000 .929 
PLTCLOBJ 1.000 .949 
DEMNDOBJ 1.000 .505 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
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Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 3 
EXPENOBJ .389 -.014 -.013 
REVENOBJ -.008 .114 .070 
DVLEPOBJ .404 -.005 -.002 
CHANGOBJ -.005 .102 -.491 
RETRNOBJ -.172 .019 .007 
STABLOBJ -.005 .446 -.058 
BILTLOBJ -.003 .490 .063 
PLTCLOBJ -.011 .231 .578 
DEMNDOBJ -.313 .000 -.001 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.  
 Component Scores. 
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QUESTION  2 STRUCTURE OF THE FUND H6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulati
ve % Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 2.014 28.771 28.771 2.014 28.771 28.771 1.770 25.288 25.288 
2 1.423 20.323 49.094 1.423 20.323 49.094 1.508 21.546 46.834 
3 1.169 16.707 65.800 1.169 16.707 65.800 1.328 18.967 65.800 
4 .983 14.037 79.838       
5 .683 9.758 89.595       
6 .501 7.158 96.753       
7 .227 3.247 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .465 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 202.744 
Df 21 
Sig. .000 
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Un-rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 
OBJCTSTR .811  .334 
STYLESTR .796 .357  
CNFLTSTR .559  -.453 
SOURCSTR -.400 .753  
PURPSSTR -.401 .746  
DECISSTR    
OWNERSTR   .861 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 3 components extracted. 
 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
PURPSSTR 1.000 .731 
OBJCTSTR 1.000 .825 
OWNERSTR 1.000 .837 
SOURCSTR 1.000 .742 
STYLESTR 1.000 .814 
DECISSTR 1.000 .073 
CNFLTSTR 1.000 .584 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 3 
PURPSSTR .013 .569 .029 
OBJCTSTR .278 .032 .439 
OWNERSTR -.217 -.025 .721 
SOURCSTR .013 .574 .036 
STYLESTR .506 .047 .005 
DECISSTR -.022 -.134 -.155 
CNFLTSTR .460 .002 -.220 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
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QUESTION  3 INVESTEE COUNTRIES SELECTION H2 
 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .672 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 722.955 
Df 21 
Sig. .000 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums 
of Squared 
Loadings
a
 
Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 3.277 46.809 46.809 3.277 46.809 46.809 2.703 
2 1.593 22.757 69.566 1.593 22.757 69.566 2.408 
3 .874 12.480 82.046     
4 .719 10.273 92.319     
5 .379 5.418 97.737     
6 .084 1.204 98.941     
7 .074 1.059 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 
REASNINV .831 -.344 
ALLNINV .821 -.413 
INVESINV .781 .502 
GROTHINV .754 .522 
LNGRTINV .725 -.402 
AVAILINV .380 .642 
SECURINV  .455 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted. 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
REASNINV 1.000 .809 
SECURINV 1.000 .269 
INVESINV 1.000 .863 
AVAILINV 1.000 .556 
ALLNINV 1.000 .845 
LNGRTINV 1.000 .687 
GROTHINV 1.000 .841 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
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QUESTION  4 GOVERNANCE REFORM  H1 
 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .654 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 273.999 
Df 10 
Sig. .000 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums 
of Squared 
Loadings
a
 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 2.619 52.377 52.377 2.619 52.377 52.377 2.611 
2 1.081 21.630 74.007 1.081 21.630 74.007 1.099 
3 .695 13.902 87.909     
4 .403 8.056 95.966     
5 .202 4.034 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
 
 
 
 
 
Un – rotated Component Matrix
a
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Component 
1 2 
OVERARFM .852  
ROLESRFM .844  
DISCLRFM .802  
DECISRFM .722 -.395 
GOVERRFM  .925 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted. 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
GOVERRFM 1.000 .874 
DISCLRFM 1.000 .654 
DECISRFM 1.000 .677 
ROLESRFM 1.000 .768 
OVERARFM 1.000 .728 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
 
 
 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 
GOVERRFM -.009 .856 
DISCLRFM .312 -.065 
DECISRFM .301 -.334 
ROLESRFM .306 .253 
OVERARFM .321 .083 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
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QUESTION  5 TRANSPARENCY  H1 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 3.206 53.440 53.440 3.206 53.440 53.440 
2 1.296 21.607 75.047 1.296 21.607 75.047 
3 .855 14.242 89.289    
4 .417 6.946 96.235    
5 .226 3.765 100.000    
6 .000 .000 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rotation could not be converged within 25 rotations for Q5 of transparency.  
 
 
 
Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 
REGULTRN .844 .463 
EVALUTRN .844 .463 
RETRNTRN .835  
RTNGSTRN .759 -.335 
BNCMRTRN .710 -.541 
ANOUNTRN  .668 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted. 
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QUESTION 6 GLOBALLY ACCEPTED LAWS H1 & H5 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums 
of Squared 
Loadings
a
 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 3.994 57.060 57.060 3.994 57.060 57.060 3.930 
2 1.280 18.290 75.351 1.280 18.290 75.351 1.555 
3 .999 14.269 89.620     
4 .548 7.824 97.444     
5 .179 2.556 100.000     
6 .000 .000 100.000     
7 .000 .000 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
HMRGTLAW 1.000 .684 
CHLDLLAW 1.000 .978 
EQULTLAW 1.000 .822 
FAIRGLAW 1.000 .481 
POLUTLAW 1.000 .978 
WEAPNLAW 1.000 .354 
MLAUNLAW 1.000 .978 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 
POLUTLAW .984  
CHLDLLAW .984  
MLAUNLAW .984  
EQULTLAW .864  
FAIRGLAW  .649 
HMRGTLAW .529 .636 
WEAPNLAW  -.592 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted. 
 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 
HMRGTLAW .054 .513 
CHLDLLAW .255 .006 
EQULTLAW .247 -.134 
FAIRGLAW -.018 .500 
POLUTLAW .255 .006 
WEAPNLAW .058 -.443 
MLAUNLAW .255 .006 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
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QUESTION  7 INVESTMENT RIGHTS  H4 & H2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .499 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 5.633 
Df 6 
Sig. .466 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums 
of Squared 
Loadings
a
 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 1.191 29.777 29.777 1.191 29.777 29.777 1.191 
2 1.019 25.475 55.252 1.019 25.475 55.252 1.019 
3 .981 24.529 79.781     
4 .809 20.219 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 
VINVERGT .772  
NOMINRGT .767  
INFRMRGT  .715 
TRADERGT  -.711 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted. 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
VINVERGT 1.000 .596 
NOMINRGT 1.000 .590 
TRADERGT 1.000 .512 
INFRMRGT 1.000 .511 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 
VINVERGT .648 -.023 
NOMINRGT .645 .024 
TRADERGT .045 -.700 
INFRMRGT .045 .700 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
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QUESTION  8 TRADE BALANCES   H3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .539 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 8.543 
Df 3 
Sig. .036 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
1 1.269 42.287 42.287 1.269 42.287 42.287 
2 .935 31.156 73.443    
3 .797 26.557 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 
BILATBAL .729 
CURNCBAL .690 
TRADEBAL -.511 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
 
a. Only one componen  was extracted. The 
solution cannot b  rotated. 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 
BILATBAL .574 
CURNCBAL .544 
TRADEBAL -.403 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
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QUESTION 9 INVESTMENT PLANNING  H4, H7, H8 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Compo
nent 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums 
of Squared 
Loadings
a
 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 3.102 38.779 38.779 3.102 38.779 38.779 2.793 
2 1.713 21.407 60.186 1.713 21.407 60.186 1.704 
3 1.390 17.378 77.564 1.390 17.378 77.564 2.220 
4 .668 8.354 85.918     
5 .584 7.303 93.220     
6 .323 4.040 97.260     
7 .219 2.740 100.000     
8 .000 .000 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
 
 
 
Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 
APRSLPLN .871   
ADMINPLN .858  -.474 
SKILLPLN .858  -.474 
TRAINPLN .582  .559 
BIASSPLN .541  .499 
ABSNCPLN  .915  
SHORTPLN  .901  
DPENDPLN .489  .563 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 3 components extracted. 
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Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
SHORTPLN 1.000 .858 
BIASSPLN 1.000 .565 
APRSLPLN 1.000 .764 
ABSNCPLN 1.000 .848 
DPENDPLN 1.000 .573 
ADMINPLN 1.000 .969 
SKILLPLN 1.000 .969 
TRAINPLN 1.000 .659 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 3 
SHORTPLN .018 .545 -.029 
BIASSPLN .001 .021 .388 
APRSLPLN .277 -.001 .156 
ABSNCPLN -.017 .539 .031 
DPENDPLN -.033 .002 .406 
ADMINPLN .397 .000 -.056 
SKILLPLN .397 .000 -.056 
TRAINPLN -.003 -.022 .421 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
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QUESTION  10 INTEGRATE INVESTMENTS  H5, H8 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .649 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 235.201 
Df 15 
Sig. .000 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums 
of Squared 
Loadings
a
 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 2.597 43.285 43.285 2.597 43.285 43.285 2.090 
2 1.011 16.853 60.138 1.011 16.853 60.138 1.934 
3 .954 15.899 76.037     
4 .655 10.921 86.958     
5 .556 9.270 96.228     
6 .226 3.772 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 
HELPLINT .815 .402 
REASNINT .756  
SULTNINT .689  
DIFRNINT .676 -.389 
SIZESINT .551 -.575 
NGHBRINT .354 .546 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
REASNINT 1.000 .619 
DIFRNINT 1.000 .609 
SULTNINT 1.000 .498 
NGHBRINT 1.000 .423 
HELPLINT 1.000 .825 
SIZESINT 1.000 .634 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 
REASNINT .119 .361 
DIFRNINT .432 -.050 
SULTNINT .303 .106 
NGHBRINT -.193 .453 
HELPLINT .034 .496 
SIZESINT .497 -.206 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
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QUESTION  11 SPECIFIC PLAN ABSENCE  H4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .570 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 195.576 
Df 10 
Sig. .000 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums 
of Squared 
Loadings
a
 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 2.104 42.088 42.088 2.104 42.088 42.088 1.942 
2 1.137 22.740 64.828 1.137 22.740 64.828 1.373 
3 .951 19.022 83.850     
4 .614 12.281 96.131     
5 .193 3.869 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
 
 
 298 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 
PLANSSPL .883  
AGNDASPL .843 .381 
DEPTSSPL .606 -.459 
RISKSSPL .497 -.623 
LQUDTSPL  .551 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted. 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
DEPTSSPL 1.000 .577 
PLANSSPL 1.000 .869 
RISKSSPL 1.000 .635 
LQUDTSPL 1.000 .303 
AGNDASPL 1.000 .857 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 
DEPTSSPL .098 -.493 
PLANSSPL .490 .022 
RISKSSPL -.009 -.593 
LQUDTSPL .199 .420 
AGNDASPL .503 .094 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
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QUESTION 12  SPONSORING COUNTRY LAWS  H5 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .509 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 285.836 
Df 10 
Sig. .000 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums 
of Squared 
Loadings
a
 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 1.968 39.368 39.368 1.968 39.368 39.368 1.958 
2 1.272 25.437 64.806 1.272 25.437 64.806 1.289 
3 .972 19.436 84.242     
4 .701 14.026 98.268     
5 .087 1.732 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 
CURNLSCL .968  
FAVORSCL .961  
UPDATSCL  .743 
OBJCTSCL  -.660 
OLDLSCL  .510 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted. 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
UPDATSCL 1.000 .632 
OLDLSCL 1.000 .278 
CURNLSCL 1.000 .946 
FAVORSCL 1.000 .937 
OBJCTSCL 1.000 .448 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 
UPDATSCL .070 .600 
OLDLSCL .018 .407 
CURNLSCL .497 .001 
FAVORSCL .496 -.013 
OBJCTSCL .118 -.504 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
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QUESTION  13 LAWS AND REGULATIONS  
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .632 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 486.498 
Df 10 
Sig. .000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums 
of Squared 
Loadings
a
 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 2.641 52.826 52.826 2.641 52.826 52.826 2.639 
2 1.029 20.587 73.412 1.029 20.587 73.412 1.058 
3 .950 18.996 92.408     
4 .335 6.699 99.107     
5 .045 .893 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
 
Component Matrix
a
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Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
DIVRSLRG 1.000 .888 
COMMNLRG 1.000 .935 
MEANSLRG 1.000 .763 
PENLTLRG 1.000 .647 
CONDCLRG 1.000 .437 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Component 
1 2 
DIVRSLRG .936  
COMMNLRG .967  
MEANSLRG .873  
PENLTLRG  .802 
CONDCLRG  .611 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted. 
 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 
DIVRSLRG .358 -.059 
COMMNLRG .366 .036 
MEANSLRG .330 .054 
PENLTLRG -.055 .769 
CONDCLRG .071 .601 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
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QUESTION  14 ALLOCATION H7 
 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .531 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 35.315 
Df 6 
Sig. .000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 1.514 37.846 37.846 1.514 37.846 37.846 
2 .978 24.456 62.302    
3 .941 23.525 85.827    
4 .567 14.173 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 
CAPTLALO  
INCMEALO .773 
STATSALO .434 
MRKTSALO .813 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
CAPTLALO 1.000 .067 
INCMEALO 1.000 .598 
STATSALO 1.000 .188 
MRKTSALO 1.000 .661 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
Component Score 
Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 
CAPTLALO -.171 
INCMEALO .511 
STATSALO .287 
MRKTSALO .537 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin 
with Kaiser Normalization. 
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QUESTION 15 FOREIGN INVESTMENTS REJECTION H5 
 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .721 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 276.867 
Df 28 
Sig. .000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums 
of Squared 
Loadings
a
 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 2.691 33.635 33.635 2.691 33.635 33.635 2.657 
2 1.080 13.499 47.135 1.080 13.499 47.135 1.164 
3 1.070 13.375 60.510 1.070 13.375 60.510 1.144 
4 1.021 12.768 73.278 1.021 12.768 73.278 1.047 
5 .815 10.188 83.465     
6 .721 9.007 92.473     
7 .388 4.851 97.323     
8 .214 2.677 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
LWTRNRJF -.044 .076 -.829 .010 
PRIORRJF .005 -.017 .016 .913 
CLOBJRJF .321 -.048 -.133 .054 
SINFORJF .315 .202 .033 -.009 
ABAGNRJF .344 -.039 .034 .069 
CNSFIRJF .225 -.181 .218 -.344 
WARSSRJF -.093 .379 .398 .008 
BILATRJF .038 .820 -.056 .003 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
LWTRNRJF  .321 -.731 .406 
PRIORRJF   .606 .724 
CLOBJRJF .887    
SINFORJF .762    
ABAGNRJF .891    
CNSFIRJF .548   -.352 
WARSSRJF -.452  .356 -.321 
BILATRJF  .859   
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 4 components extracted. 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
LWTRNRJF 1.000 .821 
PRIORRJF 1.000 .921 
CLOBJRJF 1.000 .797 
SINFORJF 1.000 .681 
ABAGNRJF 1.000 .821 
CNSFIRJF 1.000 .503 
WARSSRJF 1.000 .497 
BILATRJF 1.000 .821 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
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QUESTION 16 FOREIGN INVESTMENTS FAVOURED H7 
 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .567 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 135.485 
Df 21 
Sig. .000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadings
a
 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Varianc
e 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 2.035 29.077 29.077 2.035 29.077 29.077 1.907 
2 1.436 20.510 49.587 1.436 20.510 49.587 1.420 
3 1.029 14.703 64.291 1.029 14.703 64.291 1.292 
4 .835 11.929 76.219     
5 .702 10.036 86.255     
6 .539 7.700 93.955     
7 .423 6.045 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total 
variance. 
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Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 
LRISKFIF -.582  -.485 
SUBSTFIF  .777  
GRNTDFIF  .809  
DURABFIF .605   
GDMNDFIF .754   
COMPTFIF .757   
TCTRNFIF -.396  .808 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 3 components extracted. 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
LRISKFIF 1.000 .592 
SUBSTFIF 1.000 .620 
GRNTDFIF 1.000 .718 
DURABFIF 1.000 .455 
GDMNDFIF 1.000 .647 
COMPTFIF 1.000 .621 
TCTRNFIF 1.000 .848 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 3 
LRISKFIF -.422 .189 -.242 
SUBSTFIF .104 .533 .046 
GRNTDFIF -.075 .595 -.051 
DURABFIF .359 .110 .040 
GDMNDFIF .258 -.083 -.388 
COMPTFIF .388 .117 -.095 
TCTRNFIF .106 -.018 .787 
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QUESTION 17 GLOBALLY SPECIALIZED Cos. APPROACHED 
 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .405 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 125.473 
Df 15 
Sig. .000 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums 
of Squared 
Loadings
a
 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 1.808 30.140 30.140 1.808 30.140 30.140 1.675 
2 1.215 20.253 50.393 1.215 20.253 50.393 1.362 
3 .982 16.368 66.761     
4 .934 15.571 82.332     
5 .789 13.150 95.482     
6 .271 4.518 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 
MKTRSGLC -.394  
NAVILGLC .803 .455 
INCRTGLC  .471 
STAFCGLC .831  
ABTEMGLC  -.800 
LACPLGLC -.466  
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted. 
 
 
 
 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 
MKTRSGLC -.291 .074 
NAVILGLC .213 .546 
INCRTGLC -.085 .392 
STAFCGLC .420 .201 
ABTEMGLC .432 -.503 
LACPLGLC -.337 .074 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
MKTRSGLC 1.000 .220 
NAVILGLC 1.000 .852 
INCRTGLC 1.000 .263 
STAFCGLC 1.000 .692 
ABTEMGLC 1.000 .700 
LACPLGLC 1.000 .297 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis 
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QUESTION  18 INVESTMENT DEAL PROCESS  H7 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .477 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 234.140 
Df 10 
Sig. .000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadings
a
 
Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 1.894 37.881 37.881 1.894 37.881 37.881 1.885 
2 1.172 23.448 61.329 1.172 23.448 61.329 1.178 
3 1.115 22.295 83.624 1.115 22.295 83.624 1.135 
4 .698 13.959 97.582     
5 .121 2.418 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
INCRFDEL 1.000 .936 
DIVRSDEL 1.000 .940 
ICINVDEL 1.000 .776 
REDUCDEL 1.000 .726 
CNSULDEL 1.000 .804 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 3 
INCRFDEL .514 -.004 -.024 
DIVRSDEL .516 -.010 .032 
ICINVDEL -.015 .720 .250 
REDUCDEL .029 .572 -.444 
CNSULDEL .006 .094 .789 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 
INCRFDEL .962   
DIVRSDEL .959   
ICINVDEL  .586 .652 
REDUCDEL  .821  
CNSULDEL  -.355 .823 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 3 components extracted. 
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QUESTION  19 OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY  H8 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .607 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 350.600 
Df 3 
Sig. .000 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.306 76.861 76.861 2.306 76.861 76.861 
2 .627 20.907 97.768    
3 .067 2.232 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 
SYSTEEFN .716 
RELABEFN .953 
RSRCHEFN .941 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
SYSTEEFN 1.000 .513 
RELABEFN 1.000 .908 
RSRCHEFN 1.000 .885 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
Component Score 
Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 
SYSTEEFN .311 
RELABEFN .413 
RSRCHEFN .408 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with 
Kaiser Normalization. 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 
a. Only one component was extracted. The solution 
cannot be rotated. 
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QUESTION  20 INVESTMENT DECISION  H8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .480 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 97.530 
Df 21 
Sig. .000 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums 
of Squared 
Loadings
a
 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 1.712 24.459 24.459 1.712 24.459 24.459 1.635 
2 1.270 18.139 42.598 1.270 18.139 42.598 1.322 
3 1.033 14.758 57.357 1.033 14.758 57.357 1.040 
4 1.004 14.336 71.693 1.004 14.336 71.693 1.068 
5 .972 13.887 85.580     
6 .638 9.111 94.691     
7 .372 5.309 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
VOLUMIND    -.731 
RISKMIND  .328 -.355 .539 
GURNTIND .343 .669   
SECURIND .325 .720 -.322  
ROINVIND   .861 .316 
SIZEOIND .837    
ASSETIND .827    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 4 components extracted. 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
VOLUMIND 1.000 .620 
RISKMIND 1.000 .587 
GURNTIND 1.000 .601 
SECURIND 1.000 .731 
ROINVIND 1.000 .896 
SIZEOIND 1.000 .809 
ASSETIND 1.000 .775 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
VOLUMIND -.098 .180 -.077 -.715 
RISKMIND -.109 .209 -.094 .660 
GURNTIND .034 .528 .271 -.073 
SECURIND -.022 .639 -.203 .048 
ROINVIND .001 .002 .908 .011 
SIZEOIND .552 -.034 -.064 -.018 
ASSETIND .544 .027 .079 .039 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
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QUESTION  21 SWF PERFORMANCE DEPENDENT 1 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .667 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 853.009 
Df 28 
Sig. .000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Compone
nt 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadings
a
 
Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 3.007 37.586 37.586 3.007 37.586 37.586 2.710 
2 1.997 24.964 62.550 1.997 24.964 62.550 2.428 
3 1.138 14.228 76.779 1.138 14.228 76.779 1.147 
4 .948 11.855 88.634     
5 .518 6.479 95.113     
6 .244 3.052 98.165     
7 .112 1.399 99.564     
8 .035 .436 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 
POLICCNF .846 -.454  
GCSWFCNF   .688 
RETRNCNF .705 .642  
CMPARCNF .714 .624  
DEVLPCNF   .722 
DVRGECNF .769 -.519  
CNTRBCNF .351 .677  
RATERCNF .751 -.485  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 3 components extracted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
POLICCNF 1.000 .922 
GCSWFCNF 1.000 .502 
RETRNCNF 1.000 .930 
CMPARCNF 1.000 .918 
DEVLPCNF 1.000 .525 
DVRGECNF 1.000 .864 
CNTRBCNF 1.000 .645 
RATERCNF 1.000 .836 
 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 3 
POLICCNF .360 .012 -.028 
GCSWFCNF -.010 .064 .609 
RETRNCNF .020 .398 -.097 
CMPARCNF .028 .393 -.092 
DEVLPCNF .013 -.036 .629 
DVRGECNF .355 -.029 -.080 
CNTRBCNF -.081 .330 .253 
RATERCNF .345 -.023 .139 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
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QUESTION  22 POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .426 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 322.868 
Df 36 
Sig. .000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums 
of Squared 
Loadings
a
 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 2.023 22.473 22.473 2.023 22.473 22.473 1.953 
2 1.910 21.224 43.697 1.910 21.224 43.697 1.889 
3 1.193 13.260 56.956 1.193 13.260 56.956 1.238 
4 1.077 11.969 68.926 1.077 11.969 68.926 1.170 
5 .887 9.851 78.777     
6 .769 8.540 87.317     
7 .624 6.938 94.255     
8 .374 4.154 98.409     
9 .143 1.591 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
 
Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
INCRIPSS  .682  -.459 
PLANGPSS  .569   
NLAWPSS .414  -.357 .383 
COOPPSS .699 .365 -.311  
OUTSRPSS .911    
DVLEPPSS .573  .676  
RSRCHPSS  .767   
ASESSPSS -.324 .531 .427 .451 
SANCTPSS   -.449 .651 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 4 components extracted.  
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Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
INCRIPSS 1.000 .735 
PLANGPSS 1.000 .351 
NLAWPSS 1.000 .450 
COOPPSS 1.000 .731 
OUTSRPSS 1.000 .880 
DVLEPPSS 1.000 .832 
RSRCHPSS 1.000 .740 
ASESSPSS 1.000 .773 
SANCTPSS 1.000 .711 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
INCRIPSS .176 .413 -.311 -.148 
PLANGPSS .002 .285 .016 .166 
NLAWPSS .214 -.099 -.024 .449 
COOPPSS .438 .096 -.148 .094 
OUTSRPSS .422 -.030 .203 -.054 
DVLEPPSS .116 -.069 .635 -.125 
RSRCHPSS -.062 .450 .110 -.117 
ASESSPSS -.241 .235 .502 .241 
SANCTPSS -.027 .026 -.016 .724 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
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QUESTION  23 CHANGES   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .455 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 22.134 
Df 10 
Sig. .014 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums 
of Squared 
Loadings
a
 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 1.331 26.623 26.623 1.331 26.623 26.623 1.195 
2 1.139 22.771 49.394 1.139 22.771 49.394 1.206 
3 1.017 20.345 69.738 1.017 20.345 69.738 1.097 
4 .875 17.505 87.244     
5 .638 12.756 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 
AMONTCHN .595 .436 .491 
INCOVCHN -.766   
INCEMCHN .470 -.574 -.324 
INCLCCHN  .711  
TRANSCHN -.351  .736 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
3 components extracted. 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
AMONTCHN 1.000 .786 
INCOVCHN 1.000 .716 
INCEMCHN 1.000 .656 
INCLCCHN 1.000 .627 
TRANSCHN 1.000 .703 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 3 
AMONTCHN .750 .129 -.027 
INCOVCHN -.447 .476 -.111 
INCEMCHN -.132 -.676 -.057 
INCLCCHN .204 .282 -.621 
TRANSCHN .168 .237 .719 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
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QUESTION 24 IMPACTS ON PROGRESS  
 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .485 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 36.898 
Df 36 
Sig. .427 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 1.398 15.535 15.535 1.398 15.535 15.535 
2 1.218 13.530 29.065 1.218 13.530 29.065 
3 1.147 12.749 41.814 1.147 12.749 41.814 
4 1.114 12.379 54.193 1.114 12.379 54.193 
5 1.055 11.721 65.914 1.055 11.721 65.914 
6 .860 9.561 75.475    
7 .797 8.858 84.333    
8 .751 8.340 92.673    
9 .659 7.327 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
 Component Matrixa 
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Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
BUREAIMP .619 .115 -.079 .000 -.189 
RSKAVIMP .595 -.041 .083 .021 .175 
ABSPSIMP .115 -.189 -.056 .685 .162 
LACSPIMP .006 -.045 .653 -.280 .204 
SKILLIMP .005 -.038 -.004 -.059 -.754 
DECISIMP -.074 -.594 .064 .099 .123 
LOCALIMP .218 -.352 -.127 -.503 .175 
SPENDIMP .003 .519 .046 -.008 .310 
MNAGEIMP .011 .035 .615 .275 -.217 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
BUREAIMP .460 .388 -.492   
RSKAVIMP .590    .435 
ABSPSIMP    .811  
LACSPIMP .329  .688 -.300  
SKILLIMP  .444  -.356 -.590 
DECISIMP .436 -.485    
LOCALIMP .364 -.545  -.401  
SPENDIMP -.450    .535 
MNAGEIMP .349 .535 .527   
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 5 components extracted. 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
BUREAIMP 1.000 .670 
RSKAVIMP 1.000 .600 
ABSPSIMP 1.000 .723 
LACSPIMP 1.000 .746 
SKILLIMP 1.000 .729 
DECISIMP 1.000 .591 
LOCALIMP 1.000 .631 
SPENDIMP 1.000 .535 
MNAGEIMP 1.000 .707 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
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QUESTION  25 SUCCESS RATE  DEPENDENT 2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .606 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 60.539 
Df 21 
Sig. .000 
 
   
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadings
a
 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 1.719 24.552 24.552 1.719 24.552 24.552 1.708 
2 1.303 18.614 43.166 1.303 18.614 43.166 1.313 
3 .990 14.139 57.305     
4 .861 12.304 69.609     
5 .827 11.815 81.424     
6 .682 9.736 91.160     
7 .619 8.840 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 
DEVTLISR .474 -.405 
CRINTISR .709  
GCCRISR -.316 -.531 
NLAWSISR .714  
SORCEISR  .661 
INCCMISR  .578 
INGVTISR .592  
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted. 
 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
DEVTLISR 1.000 .389 
CRINTISR 1.000 .525 
GCCRISR 1.000 .382 
NLAWSISR 1.000 .568 
SORCEISR 1.000 .451 
INCCMISR 1.000 .350 
INGVTISR 1.000 .357 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 
DEVTLISR .323 -.263 
CRINTISR .426 -.048 
GCCRISR -.114 -.432 
NLAWSISR .380 .249 
SORCEISR -.014 .512 
INCCMISR -.146 .426 
INGVTISR .350 -.005 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
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APPENDIX C–DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS for all variables 
 
 
Data set Normality Tests Results  
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
PERFORMACE 153 100.0% 0 .0% 153 100.0% 
SUCCESSRATE 153 100.0% 0 .0% 153 100.0% 
 
 
      
       
 
 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
GOVERNANCE 153 1.00 3.60 1.5477 .41408 1.257 .196 2.924 .390 
TRANSPARENCY 153 1.00 2.83 1.4129 .34310 1.079 .196 .828 .390 
ACCOUNTABILITY 153 1.00 4.00 3.6797 .56909 -3.246 .196 10.583 .390 
INVESTEELAWS 153 2.88 4.80 3.9637 .28462 -1.042 .196 5.206 .390 
TRADEBALANCE 153 4.00 5.00 4.1753 .20903 .961 .196 .721 .390 
PLANNING 153 4.23 5.73 5.2886 .24292 -1.658 .196 3.713 .390 
SPONSORLAWS 153 3.89 5.95 5.1876 .35126 -.727 .196 .648 .390 
PURPOSE 153 3.92 6.00 5.3405 .39783 -2.209 .196 4.691 .390 
INVESTRATEGY 153 2.62 3.93 3.4006 .23521 -.205 .196 .994 .390 
DEALSIZE 153 1.00 4.00 2.6301 .46383 .254 .196 .807 .390 
ASSETALLOCAT 153 1.00 4.00 1.5987 .43744 2.343 .196 9.241 .390 
DECISIONMAKE 153 4.11 5.60 5.1329 .22686 -1.170 .196 3.473 .390 
PERFORMACE 153 3.25 6.63 5.4859 .65296 -.888 .196 .695 .390 
SUCCESSRATE 153 4.43 6.71 5.7800 .48915 -.431 .196 -.442 .390 
POSSIBLESOLU 153 4.00 6.67 5.7645 .51182 -.734 .196 .640 .390 
CHANGES 153 4.20 6.80 5.7699 .47227 -.468 .196 .118 .390 
IMPACTS 153 4.22 6.33 5.3073 .45258 -.184 .196 -.450 .390 
Valid N (listwise) 153         
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The data set is normal with no missing values, no extreme outliers and normally 
distributed data from histograms.  
 
 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic Df Sig. 
PERFORMACE .136 153 .000 .944 153 .000 
SUCCESSRATE .114 153 .000 .969 153 .002 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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APPENDIX D  MULTILE REGRESSION RESULTS 
D 1: Between Independent variables and performance as a dependent variable  
 
 
Correlations as above  
 
 
 
PERFO
RMAC
E 
GOVE
RNAN
CE 
TRANS
PAREN
CY 
ACCO
UNTAB
ILITY 
INVES
TEELA
WS 
TRADEB
ALANCE 
PLANN
ING 
SPONS
ORLA
WS 
PURP
OSE 
INVES
TRATE
GY 
DEA
LSIZ
E 
ASSET
ALLOC
AT 
DECISI
ONMA
KE 
Pea
rson 
Corr
elati
on 
PERFORM
ACE 
1.000 -.053 .042 -.070 -.015 .101 -.007 .029 .017 -.040 -.087 .005 .143 
GOVERNA
NCE 
-.053 1.000 .686 -.101 -.048 -.312 .094 .048 .002 .009 .211 -.027 .000 
TRANSPA
RENCY 
.042 .686 1.000 -.084 -.010 -.290 -.039 -.013 .111 -.019 .149 -.075 .007 
ACCOUNT
ABILITY 
-.070 -.101 -.084 1.000 .060 .098 .210 -.191 .016 .125 .005 .089 .244 
INVESTEE
LAWS 
-.015 -.048 -.010 .060 1.000 .093 .034 -.048 .699 .067 -.019 -.044 -.041 
TRADEBA
LANCE 
.101 -.312 -.290 .098 .093 1.000 -.464 -.196 .059 -.067 -.109 .058 .063 
PLANNIN
G 
-.007 .094 -.039 .210 .034 -.464 1.000 .222 .321 .055 .054 .282 .378 
SPONSOR
LAWS 
.029 .048 -.013 -.191 -.048 -.196 .222 1.000 -.133 -.092 -.038 -.233 .239 
PURPOSE .017 .002 .111 .016 .699 .059 .321 -.133 1.000 .037 .126 -.011 -.054 
INVESTRA
TEGY 
-.040 .009 -.019 .125 .067 -.067 .055 -.092 .037 1.000 .031 .101 -.109 
DEALSIZE -.087 .211 .149 .005 -.019 -.109 .054 -.038 .126 .031 1.000 -.132 -.072 
ASSETAL
LOCAT 
.005 -.027 -.075 .089 -.044 .058 .282 -.233 -.011 .101 -.132 1.000 -.034 
DECISION
MAKE 
.143 .000 .007 .244 -.041 .063 .378 .239 -.054 -.109 -.072 -.034 1.000 
Sig. 
(1-
taile
d) 
PERFORM
ACE 
. .259 .304 .193 .428 .107 .467 .363 .419 .314 .141 .477 .039 
GOVERNA
NCE 
.259 . .000 .108 .277 .000 .125 .278 .491 .456 .004 .371 .499 
TRANSPA
RENCY 
.304 .000 . .152 .453 .000 .315 .435 .085 .409 .033 .177 .466 
ACCOUNT
ABILITY 
.193 .108 .152 . .230 .115 .005 .009 .424 .062 .476 .138 .001 
INVESTEE
LAWS 
.428 .277 .453 .230 . .126 .338 .278 .000 .205 .405 .296 .309 
TRADEBA
LANCE 
.107 .000 .000 .115 .126 . .217 .008 .236 .207 .089 .238 .221 
PLANNIN
G 
.467 .125 .315 .005 .338 .217 . .003 .400 .248 .253 .000 .000 
SPONSOR
LAWS 
.363 .278 .435 .009 .278 .008 .003 . .051 .129 .319 .002 .001 
PURPOSE .419 .491 .085 .424 .000 .236 .400 .051 . .324 .060 .448 .254 
INVESTRA
TEGY 
.314 .456 .409 .062 .205 .207 .248 .129 .324 . .351 .107 .090 
DEALSIZE .141 .004 .033 .476 .405 .089 .253 .319 .060 .351 . .052 .187 
ASSETAL
LOCAT 
.477 .371 .177 .138 .296 .238 .000 .002 .448 .107 .052 . .340 
DECISION
MAKE 
 
.039 .499 .466 .001 .309 .221 .000 .001 .254 .090 .187 .340 . 
 330 
Coefficients as shown below 
 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients   
Standardized 
Coefficients     
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
B     Correlations   
Collinearity 
Statistics   
Model 1  B 
Std. 
Error Beta T Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Zero-
order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 2.501 2.371   1.055 0.293 -2.186 7.187           
GOVERNANCE -0.189 0.186 -0.12 
-
1.016 0.312 -0.556 0.179 
-
0.053 -0.086 
-
0.08 0.48 2.08 
TRANSPARENCY 0.279 0.223 0.147 1.25 0.213 -0.162 0.72 0.042 0.105 0.1 0.49 2.05 
ACCOUNTABILITY -0.132 0.104 -0.115 
-
1.265 0.208 -0.337 0.074 -0.07 -0.106 -0.1 0.82 1.23 
INVESTEELAWS -0.111 0.271 -0.049 
-
0.411 0.682 -0.647 0.424 
-
0.015 -0.035 
-
0.03 0.48 2.08 
TRADEBALANCE 0.314 0.281 0.101 1.118 0.265 -0.242 0.87 0.101 0.094 0.09 0.83 1.21 
PLANNING -0.074 0.271 -0.027 
-
0.271 0.786 -0.609 0.462 
-
0.007 -0.023 
-
0.02 0.66 1.52 
SPONSORLAWS 0.013 0.179 0.007 0.073 0.942 -0.341 0.367 0.029 0.006 0.01 0.72 1.39 
PURPOSE 0.08 0.197 0.049 0.406 0.685 -0.31 0.47 0.017 0.034 0.03 0.46 2.16 
INVESTRATEGY 0.02 0.234 0.007 0.085 0.932 -0.443 0.483 -0.04 0.007 0.01 0.94 1.06 
DEALSIZE -0.089 0.123 -0.063 
-
0.721 0.472 -0.332 0.155 
-
0.087 -0.061 
-
0.06 0.88 1.14 
ASSETALLOCAT 0.032 0.139 0.021 0.229 0.82 -0.242 0.306 0.005 0.019 0.02 0.78 1.29 
DECISIONMAKE 0.488 0.275 0.169 1.774 0.078 -0.056 1.031 0.143 0.148 0.15 0.73 1.36 
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The normal probability plot above is almost strainght line and scatter plot is 
rectangularly distributed with most of the scores around zero point which collectievly 
suggest that assumptions of outliers, normality, linearity, homoscedasticity and 
indepedence of residuals are satisfied from the regression results (Tabachnik and 
Fidell, 2007; Pallant, 2010).   
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D 2: Between Independent variables and success rate or growth as a dependent 
variable 
 
Correlations 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
SUCCE
SSRAT
E 
GOVE
RNAN
CE 
TRANS
PAREN
CY 
ACCOU
NTABIL
ITY 
INVEST
EELAW
S 
TRADE
BALAN
CE 
PLANNI
NG 
SPONS
ORLA
WS 
PUR
POSE 
INVEST
RATEG
Y 
DEAL
SIZE 
ASSE
TALL
OCAT 
DECISI
ONM
AKE 
SUCCESSRA
TE 1 0.508 0.086 -0256 0.478 0.038 -0.673 -0.108 
0.38
9 -0.074 
0.04
8 0.237 0.074 
GOVERNAN
CE 0.508 1 0.686 -0.101 -0.048 -0.312 0.194 0.048 
0.19
3 0.009 
0.21
1 
-
0.027 0 
TRANSPARE
NCY 0.086 0.686 1 -0.084 -0.01 -0.29 -0.039 -0.13 
0.11
1 -0.019 
0.14
9 
-
0.075 0.007 
ACCOUNTA
BILITY -0.256 
-
0.101 -0.084 1 0.06 0.098 0.289 -0.191 
0.01
6 0.125 
0.00
5 0.089 0.244 
INVESTEEL
AWS 0.478 
-
0.048 -0.01 0.06 1 0.093 0.034 -0.048 
0.69
9 0.067 
-
0.01
9 
-
0.044 -0.041 
TRADEBALA
NCE 0.038 
-
0.312 -0.29 0.098 0.093 1 -0.464 -0.196 
0.05
9 -0.067 
-
0.10
9 0.058 0.063 
PLANNING -0.673 0.194 -0.039 0.289 0.034 -0.464 1 0.222 
0.32
1 0.055 
0.05
4 0.282 0.378 
SPONSORL
AWS -0.108 0.048 -0.13 -0.191 -0.048 -0.196 0.222 1 
-
0.13
3 -0.092 
-
0.03
8 
-
0.233 0.239 
PURPOSE 0.389 0.193 0.111 0.016 0.699 0.059 0.321 -0.133 1 0.037 
0.12
6 
-
0.011 -0.054 
INVESTRAT
EGY -0.074 0.009 -0.019 0.125 0.067 -0.067 0.055 -0.092 
0.03
7 1 
0.03
1 0.101 -0.109 
DEALSIZE 0.048 0.211 0.149 0.005 -0.019 -0.109 0.054 -0.038 
0.12
6 0.031 1 
-
0.132 -0.072 
ASSETALLO
CAT 0.237 
-
0.027 -0.075 0.089 -0.044 0.058 0.282 -0.233 
-
0.01
1 0.101 
-
0.13
2 1 -0.034 
DECISIONM
AKE 0.074 0 0.007 0.244 -0.041 0.063 0.378 0.239 
-
0.05
4 -0.109 
-
0.07
2 
-
0.034 1 
Sig. (1-
tailed)                           
SUCCESSRA
TE . 0.092 0.145 0.246 0.412 0.329 0.56 0.459 0.48 0.181 
0.27
6 0.325 0.381 
GOVERNAN
CE 0.092 . 0 0.108 0.277 0 0.125 0.278 
0.49
1 0.456 
0.00
4 0.371 0.499 
TRANSPARE
NCY 0.145 0 . 0.152 0.453 0 0.315 0.435 
0.08
5 0.409 
0.03
3 0.177 0.466 
ACCOUNTA
BILITY 0.246 0.108 0.152 . 0.23 0.115 0.005 0.009 
0.42
4 0.062 
0.47
6 0.138 0.001 
INVESTEEL
AWS 0.412 0.277 0.453 0.23 . 0.126 0.338 0.278 0 0.205 
0.40
5 0.296 0.309 
TRADEBALA
NCE 0.329 0 0 0.115 0.126 . 0.217 0.008 
0.23
6 0.207 
0.08
9 0.238 0.221 
PLANNING 0.56 0.125 0.315 0.005 0.338 0.217 . 0.003 0.4 0.248 
0.25
3 0 0 
SPONSORL
AWS 0.459 0.278 0.435 0.009 0.278 0.008 0.003 . 
0.05
1 0.129 
0.31
9 0.002 0.001 
PURPOSE 0.48 0.491 0.085 0.424 0 0.236 0.4 0.051 . 0.324 0.06 0.448 0.254 
INVESTRAT
EGY 0.181 0.456 0.409 0.062 0.205 0.207 0.248 0.129 
0.32
4 . 
0.35
1 0.107 0.09 
DEALSIZE 0.276 0.004 0.033 0.476 0.405 0.089 0.253 0.319 0.06 0.351 . 0.052 0.187 
ASSETALLO
CAT 0.325 0.371 0.177 0.138 0.296 0.238 0 0.002 
0.44
8 0.107 
0.05
2 . 0.34 
DECISIONM
AKE 0.381 0.499 0.466 0.001 0.309 0.221 0 0.001 
0.25
4 0.09 
0.18
7 0.34 . 
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Coefficients(a) 
 
Model 
Unstan
dardize
d 
Coeffici
ents   
Standa
rdized 
Coeffici
ents     
95.0% 
Confid
ence 
Interva
l for B     
Correla
tions   
Colline
arity 
Statisti
cs   
1 B 
Std. 
Error Beta T Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Zero-
order Partial Part 
Tolera
nce VIF 
(Constant) 4.722 1.792   2.635 0.009 1.179 8.266           
GOVERNANCE 0.391 0.141 0.351 0.884 0.068 0.154 0.402 0.108 0.074 0.07 0.482 2.075 
TRANSPARENCY 0.258 0.169 0.267 0.222 0.240 -0.296 0.371 0.086 0.019 0.02 0.487 2.054 
ACCOUNTABILITY -0.058 0.079 -0.067 -0.736 0.463 -0.213 0.098 -0.06 -0.062 -0.06 0.815 1.226 
INVESTEELAWS 0.148 0.205 0.086 0.723 0.471 -0.257 0.553 0.018 0.061 0.06 0.481 2.081 
TRADEBALANCE 0.149 0.213 0.064 0.701 0.185 -0.271 0.569 0.038 0.059 0.06 0.827 1.21 
PLANNING -0.186 0.205 -0.092 -0.909 0.093 -0.591 0.219 -0.03 -0.077 -0.08 0.659 1.516 
SPONSORLAWS -0.013 0.135 -0.009 -0.098 0.822 -0.281 0.254 -0.01 -0.008 -0.01 0.722 1.385 
PURPOSE 0.378 0.149 0.391 -0.562 0.375 0.379 0.211 0 0.047 0.05 0.464 2.157 
INVESTRATEGY -0.122 0.177 -0.059 -0.687 0.493 -0.472 0.228 -0.07 -0.058 -0.06 0.941 1.062 
DEALSIZE 0.071 0.093 0.067 0.762 0.147 -0.113 0.255 0.048 0.064 0.06 0.876 1.141 
ASSETALLOCAT 0.31 0.105 0.29 0.96 0.059 -0.107 0.308 0.037 0.081 0.08 0.776 1.288 
DECISIONMAKE 0.269 0.208 0.125 1.296 0.117 0.142 0.68 0.074 0.109 0.11 0.734 1.362 
a. Dependent 
Variable: 
SUCCESSRATE             
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The above plots of normality and scatter ploy explain that regressions results have met 
conditions of normality, no outliers, linearity, homoscedasticity and indepedence of 
residuals are satisfied from the regression results (Tabachnik and Fidell, 2007; 
Pallant, 2010).   
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D 3: Between three possible intervening variables and performance as a  
 
 
 
 
 
Casewise Diagnostics 
 
Case Number Std. Residual PERFORMACE Predicted Value Residual 
72 -3.908 3.25 5.7639 -2.51393 
Dependent variable: performance  
 
 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnostics 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) 
POSSIBLESOL
U CHANGES IMPACTS 
1 1 3.985 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2 .007 23.470 .00 .67 .04 .31 
3 .006 26.765 .00 .06 .70 .43 
4 .002 42.589 1.00 .27 .26 .26 
a. Dependent Variable: PERFORMACE 
 
Correlations 
 
PERFORMAC
E 
POSSIBLESO
LU CHANGES IMPACTS 
Pearson Correlation PERFORMACE 1.000 .214 .060 -.017 
POSSIBLESOLU .214 1.000 .109 .048 
CHANGES .060 .109 1.000 .178 
IMPACTS -.017 .048 .178 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) PERFORMACE . .004 .229 .417 
POSSIBLESOLU .004 . .090 .279 
CHANGES .229 .090 . .014 
IMPACTS .417 .279 .014 . 
N PERFORMACE 153 153 153 153 
POSSIBLESOLU 153 153 153 153 
CHANGES 153 153 153 153 
IMPACTS 153 153 153 153 
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Coefficients(a) 
 
Model 
Unstan
dardize
d 
Coeffici
ents   
Stan
dardi
zed 
Coeff
icien
ts     
95.0% 
Confid
ence 
Interva
l for B     
Correla
tions   
Colline
arity 
Statisti
cs   
  B 
Std. 
Error Beta T Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Uppe
r 
Boun
d 
Zero-
order Partial Part 
Tolera
nce VIF 
(Constan
t) 3.852 0.961   4.011 0 1.954 5.751           
POSSIBL
ESOLU 0.27 0.103 0.21 2.627 0.01 0.067 0.472 0.214 0.21 0.21 0.987 1.013 
CHANGE
S 0.06 0.113 0.04 0.533 0.595 -0.163 0.283 0.06 0.044 0.043 0.958 1.044 
IMPACTS -0.05 0.117 -0.04 -0.43 0.668 -0.282 0.181 -0.02 -0.035 -0.034 0.968 1.033 
a. Dependent Variable: PERFORMACE 
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D 4:  Between three possible intervening variables and success rate or growth as 
a dependent variable 
 
 
 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnostics 
 
Model 
Dimen
sion Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant
) 
POSSIBLE
SOLU CHANGES IMPACTS 
1 1 3.985 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2 .007 23.470 .00 .67 .04 .31 
3 .006 26.765 .00 .06 .70 .43 
4 .002 42.589 1.00 .27 .26 .26 
a. Dependent Variable:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlations 
 
 
SUCCESSRAT
E 
POSSIBLESOL
U CHANGES IMPACTS 
Pearson Correlation SUCCESSRATE 1.000 .464 .346 .264 
POSSIBLESOLU .464 1.000 .109 .048 
CHANGES .346 .109 1.000 .178 
IMPACTS .264 .048 .178 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) SUCCESSRATE . .215 .036 .000 
POSSIBLESOLU .215 . .090 .279 
CHANGES .036 .090 . .014 
IMPACTS .000 .279 .014 . 
N SUCCESSRATE 153 153 153 153 
POSSIBLESOLU 153 153 153 153 
CHANGES 153 153 153 153 
IMPACTS 153 153 153 153 
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Coefficients(a) 
 
Model 
Unstan
dardize
d 
Coeffici
ents   
Stan
dardi
zed 
Coeff
icien
ts     
95.0% 
Confid
ence 
Interval 
for B     
Corr
elati
ons   
Colli
neari
ty 
Stati
stics   
  B 
Std. 
Error Beta T Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Zero-
orde
r 
Parti
al 
Pa
rt 
Toler
ance VIF 
(Constant
) 3.561 0.707   5.036 0 2.164 4.958           
POSSIBLE
SOLU 0.46 0.076 0.41 0.531 
0.09
6 -0.109 0.189 
0.06
4 
0.04
3 
0.0
42 
0.98
7 1.013 
CHANGES 0.43 0.083 0.31 1.217 
0.12
6 -0.063 0.265 
0.14
6 
0.09
9 
0.0
96 
0.95
8 1.044 
IMPACTS 0.265 0.086 0.25 3.07 
0.00
3 0.094 0.435 
0.26
4 
0.24
4 
0.2
41 
0.96
8 1.033 
a. Dependent Variable: SUCCESSRATE 
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Appendix E - Interview transcripts 
 
Interview 1 
 
Date: 20.12.2010 
Time: 9:30 am to 10:45 am 
Interviewee: Al - Shura Council Speaker (Parliament) 
 
This interviewee is president of parliament of Government of Oman. It was more of a 
conversation regarding sovereign wealth fund of Oman and its current position rather 
than structured interview about fund. The interview was not recorded so below are the 
major points jotted down during this conversation.  
 
The major tone of his answers was to say that Oman SWF completely lack proper 
decision making and management system. The improvement changes are needed 
across the board and there is a greater need right now to introduce professional 
management and investment practices in Oman SWF. This is because, if one looks at 
the other sovereign funds in the gulf co-operation council, Oman SWF has not 
progressed even 10% of what other funds have done to grow a level of US$ 300 to 
800bns in the assets. This is because Oman SWF is has only one person for decision 
making. Oman SWF is also governed by Ministry of finance and not as a professional 
separate entity. There is no fixed limit on how money will come to SWF from oil 
income or how the return of SWF investments will be reinvested. There is no audit; 
annual budget planning and investment return reconciliation process in managing 
Oman SWF. Parliamentary committee for economy and finances in Oman should have 
received separate reports, plans and budgetary details from SWF management but there 
is none. There are so much irregularities in operations of Oman SWF as investment 
appraisals are not properly done but investment money are disbursed based on political 
agenda and trade relations decided by ministry of finance with other countries. So, 
entire objective of profitability disappears from decision making for SWF.  
 
What the president of parliament wants for Oman SWF is to have new organisation 
design, and management reporting regularly to members of parliament where 
representative of public will be able to decide benefits for their country. Right now, all 
reporting is done to ministry of finance. There is nothing like a SWF as an organisation 
but it is managed like a department within ministerial portfolio. The biggest mistake 
has been done for Oman SWF is removal of economic ministry as it was able to exert 
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some regulatory pressure for SWF management being a separate committee from 
formed by parliaments and its members. President of the parliament stated that a 
detailed research study of this kind on sovereign wealth fund and its recommended 
action plan will be crucial for restructuring and developing Oman SWF as a separate 
investment agency of the Government of Oman.     
 
 
Interview 2 
 
Date: 1.11.2010   
Time: 9:00 am to 10.40 am  
Interviewee: General Secretary of the State Council   
 
This interviewee is a general secretary of the state‘s council which one part of the 
overall government structure. The state‘s general council is a separate body of 
society‘s well known members like an upper house of parliament in democratic 
government. The main function of the state council is to take part and to support better 
governance through its operating mechanism and fundamental principles. Right now, 
this state council has no control over SWF management because there is no change in 
the decision by ministry of finance for improving SWF after this state council and 
other parliament members made repeated requests and suggestions to government. 
There is no answer from government or finance ministry with regard to any of these 
suggestions.  
 
General Secretary stated that council members want the fund to become a separate 
government agency with complete autonomy and professional management without 
any political and ministerial influence except laid down code of ethics and governance 
conduct. On the other hand, they do not want fund to become the reserve bank of the 
country. However, they wish that restructured SWF will report to government of Oman 
parliament will be overseen by central bank and auditor general for investment strategy 
and governance issues respectively. As of now, audit department of Oman government 
does not receive any report from SWF. State council general secretary would like 
Oman SWF to develop professional management structure, to have the international 
level team of managers and compete with other GCC funds for growth in assets and 
profits.              
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Interview 3 
 
Date: 15.12.2010   
Time: 9:00 am to 10:30 am  
Interviewee: Deputy Chief Executive, State General Reserve Fund 
 
This interviewee is a professional in economics and holds an authoritative position of 
Dy. CEO in Oman SWF. However, in his own words, ―does not have any authority or 
control over events, investments and decision making in the management of Oman 
SWF.‖ He feels that organisation operates on totally centralized authority where there 
is no employee participation. Thus in his opinion, Oman SWF has top –down 
traditional approach in organisational hierarchy and communication. This is 
complementing to lack of professional management in Oman SWF. At the same time, 
ministry of finance does not want to avail any services from global consultants, asset 
managers or investment banks for investment strategy and growth. Being a deputy 
CEO of the state general reserve fund, the interviewee in general should have all data 
and reports at his disposal including down the line employees. As confirmed by him, 
Deputy CEO does not have any information regarding how much asset is owned by 
Oman SWF and any reasons for investment decisions taken by Ministry of Finance. 
This is the current status of Oman SWF as known to its deputy CEO that is the highest 
senior most employee of the SWF  
 
According to him, the future of Oman SWF is not clear without an appropriate 
restructuring plan. The investment decisions are currently made randomly without any 
appraisal techniques and without considering any market opportunities. This is what 
makes a big difference between Oman SWF and other GCC funds which avail 
professional services from global banks and asset managers. Also, in other project 
Oman SWF have tried to be a partner or a strategic alliance in the investment bids in 
the past but due to bilateral relations between the countries and other management 
differences, it did not turn out well. Thus, Oman SWF cannot have that option of 
alliance with other GCC funds.      
 
The interviewee ended the interview with a suggestion that Oman SWF needs an 
overhaul in the organisation in terms of its design, policy, organisational hierarchy, 
communication, reporting, decision making and investment strategy.  
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Interview 4 
 
Date: 5.1.2011   
Time: 9:30 am to 11:30 am  
Interviewee: General Director of Investment Development   
 
This interviewee manages the investment development department in the SWF. He is a 
professional to look after the investment development operations and complete end to 
end procedures at SWF. According to his opinion, the complete system of SWF needs 
an overhaul in terms of organisational structure and investment process. The most 
important aspect which needs immediate change are short and long term investment 
planning in addition to professional and international human capital development for 
Oman SWF.  
 
In his opinion, if Oman SWF can manage to create the pool of trustworthy and 
knowledgeable employees who are competent enough to manage the current assets 
worth approx.US$ 8bns then Oman SWF can look forward to grow profitably in the 
future.  
 
Another major change, he suggests is about reporting structure of Oman SWF. 
Currently, all decisions are taken by finance minister and no where any profit – loss, 
budget, assets are reported. No financial statements are prepared. This makes it 
difficult to report about SWF to parliament or to disclose it to common public.  
 
A major challenge for Oman SWF is to restructure within short time frame so when 
assets are cheaper in the credit crisis time, it can make use of the opportunities 
worldwide to invest. Because, this is such a long cycle of recession that growth cycle 
after this might be quite long enough to earn profits from the assets purchased during 
this credit crisis time. Thus, Oman board and two councils of ministers together with 
auditor general should form a committee to take over the operations from 
overburdened Ministry of Finance.     
 
This interviewee also ends the discussion with praising the efforts of such a detailed 
study on Oman SWF and says this is commendable project if results and 
recommendations can help Oman SWF to start growing and developing professionally.   
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Interview 5 
 
Date: 2.11.2010   
Time: 9:30 am to 11:00 am  
Interviewee: General director of Superintendence of Companies – A financial 
audit  
 
This interviewee works at a position where information has to be kept secure and 
confidential for all the companies unless it is necessary to bring to parliament or other 
government agencies‘ notice. He thinks that it is high time that Oman SWF is 
restructured to international competition level. This restructuring is necessary because 
as of now, there are no reports or information received by government audit 
department. On the other hand, Audit department is not allowed to take initiative for 
auditing Oman SWF. Unless parliament or Oman board takes a decision to re-organise 
the reporting and auditing of Oman SWF, audit department cannot change or ask for 
details.   
 
Interviewee suggested that Oman SWF should avail the help of professional wealth and 
asset managers from banks, investment banks or expert consulting companies to draft 
an investment strategy and start using appraisal techniques for investment decisions. 
This will allow Oman SWF to grow the asset base and profitability of the fund at the 
same time. Interviewee does not have more details about Oman SWF so he can not 
suggest more intricate changes required in Oman SWF.  
 
Interview 6 
 
Date: 15.12.2010   
Time: 11:30 am to 12:45 pm  
Interviewee: General Director of Investment Planning  
 
This interviewee does not work for Oman SWF but he is part of the Ministry of finance 
on senior position. He wants to know more in detail about Oman SWF as he has been 
getting all these news about governance and transparency of Oman SWF from press 
and working within ministry. He thinks how government can plan a budget without 
having the information about how much money flows into SWF or investments and 
how much is earned back from the SWF. There is no accounting for resource or 
financial reserve allocation even in the finance ministry. All decisions are based on 
minister‘s intuition. There is no planning or decision making process in the entire 
system for oil income except national budget and allocation of money to various public 
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projects. Contracts are awarded many times without consultation or any technical or 
commercial analysis and negotiations.   
 
Both MoF and SWF do not have any strategic objectives laid out except vision 2020 
planned by government. There are no ethical guidelines, no evaluations or audit of 
actions – decisions taken, no risk management tools. Government of Oman still runs 
finances based on old systems of central command chain and thumbs rules for decision 
making whereas other GCC funds have turned themselves into professional investment 
houses for example, Kuwait (approx.US$ 250bns assets) and UAE (approx.US$ 
850bns assets). Other funds have investment strategy, laws, regulations, disclosure 
principles, annual reports and treaties with other countries to adhere to. These all make 
them perform and score high on governance, transparency and accountability 
measures. Oman SWF does not have any of these initiatives.  
 
Finally, interviewee suggest that Oman SWF has a lot to change and to improve before 
competing with other funds as within the country needs of resource allocation are 
mounting every day. At the same time, oil reserves are not infinite to government must 
develop other industries which can bring revenue for development or can attract 
foreign investments to the country. This will create long term growth not only for 
Oman SWF but for Oman as a sovereign country.  
 
Interviewee wishes to see the results or recommendations of the project on the 
completion and will be ready to extend any help required in future for this research 
study.      
 
Interview 7 
Date: 20.12.2010   
Time: 12:15 pm to 13:30 pm  
Interviewee: Vice-chairman of the Shura Council  
 
This interviewee is a member of Shura council which is parliament of elected 
representatives of citizens of Oman. Being a public representative and having national 
interests in Oman SWF, his Excellency stressed that two major issues for Oman SWF 
to address immediately are information disclosure and decision making hierarchy.  
Because of the low level of transparency and inadequate information disclosure, Oman 
SWF is losing confidence of its own population and also the reputation in international 
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financial world. This practice must be stopped and Oman SWF as an investment 
agency should start declaring information such as other global funds. Decision making 
is completely managed by Ministry of Finance which has created less use of talent 
available in the financial sector. This has led to the situation where Oman SWF 
decision making has become weaker and having no control over any of its internal 
functions. This is why we are 50 or 100 times behind other GCC region SWFs. Other 
government departments have no information regarding how our SWF is operated.      
 
The official disclosure of actual investment position, profits and return on portfolio 
shall be known to other government departments such as auditor general, trade 
ministry, central bank of Oman. This can help in such a way that these departments can 
make suggestions to improve the growth of Oman SWF. The growth of Oman SWF 
can become the growth engine of the country as the income or profit of the SWF can 
be utilized to improve the economy of Oman state.   
 
This interviewee has envisioned that researcher‘s recommendations would be really 
helpful step in this regard to improve the Oman SWF performance. The adoption of 
appropriate governance mechanisms and transparency by Oman‘s SWF will improve 
its image, resulting in improvements in not only the profitability of Oman SWF, but 
the whole country‘s economic status.   
 
 
Interview 8 
Date: 11.01.2011   
Time: 11:30 am to 12:30 pm   
Interviewee: Economic expert, Al Shura council     
 
This interviewee is an active member of Shura council - the parliament of elected 
representatives of citizens of Oman. He is also one of the few economic experts in the 
council. He explained the advantages of SWF success rate and also explained the 
downside of losing the capital through investments when world markets are in jittery 
because of global recession and credit crunch.  
 
He gave the examples that Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Kuwait had lost money in banking 
sectors of USA in 2007–09 so any suggestion to SWF for the foreign equities 
investment is a tricky issue. Also, he advised to adopt ‗wait and watch‘ approach 
before recommending increase in the oil income allocation to SWF funds inflow for 
 347 
making more investments. Such a decision making is crucial in two terms. The fund 
allocated to SWF for foreign investments can alternatively be utilized for domestic 
investments which can help for industrial and economic growth along with currency 
stabilization within the country. And, foreign investments can be less profitable during 
ongoing global recession which may prolong for another two or three years.   
 
Therefore, the main message conveyed by this interviewee is about having appropriate 
funds inflow to SWF, robust investment strategy and control over asset allocation in 
decisions about foreign investments. Also, he voiced resentment about MoF being not 
engaged in the appraisal of projects before making investment decisions. The 
interviewee suggested that SWF can become major economic growth vehicle for 
Oman.    
 
 
Interview 9 
 
Date: 11.01.2011   
Time: 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm  
Interviewee: Technical expert, Al Shura council     
 
This interviewee is also an elected member of parliament and a technical expert. 
Having been worked in the departments which are not directly related to sovereign 
wealth fund of Oman, the interviewee has less information about SWF. However, 
Dr.Al-Saidi was interested in conveying that how SWF can overcome the conflicting 
interests between Oman SWF, MoF and other government departments and agencies 
from his own experience as a departmental head.  
 
Furthermore, Dr.Al–Saidi stressed for Oman SWF to make use of developing local 
talent whilst currently deploying international experts or wealth managers for creating 
robust investment strategy. In this manner, growth and creating human capital can be 
managed by Oman SWF simultaneously.  
 
Apart from this, Dr.Al-Saidi knew that there are no published reports and MoF 
maintains total secrecy about transactions. Dr.Al-Saidi agrees that it is ok not to release 
all strategic and vital information but to an extent like other companies prepare their 
annual reports, Oman SWF must increase the transparency to that level where Omani 
citizens and foreign investors can maintain their trust for Oman SWF.          
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Interview 10 
 
Date: 04.01.2011   
Time: 9:30 am to 11:00 am  
Interviewee: Economic researcher, State council    
 
This interviewee is an economic researcher who in the upper house of the parliament in 
Oman. The upper house members are selected for a fixed term by His majesty Sultan 
Qaboos with a consideration given to the council members‘ recommendations.  
This interviewee is engaged in the research and administration so he stressed that MoF 
and Oman SWF both do not have any specific planning and the policies of MoF 
actually lacks the strategic vision and objectives. However, government of Oman has 
prepared Vision 2020 for the whole country with contribution from other ministries, 
budget committee and central bank of Oman. MoF could not provide any data in the 
Vision 2020 for SWF.   
 
This interviewee has found out by engaging herself previously with MoF that there are 
no initiatives taken by MoF to improve the governance or profitability of Oman SWF. 
Interviewee suggested that Oman SWF requires initiatives to develop mechanisms for 
governance, transparency and investment strategy just like other large SWFs of 
Norway, UAE or Singapore. The asset allocation and any strategic planning are 
completely ignored by MoF.  
 
When Oman SWF is in a situation which requires complete restructuring in terms of 
laws, policies, decision making and governance frameworks and organisation re-
design. This interviewee agreed with the idea of incremental re-design of Oman SWF 
as all aspects of SWF cannot be improved at the same time. The interviewee suggested 
that developing employability of local talent is not crucial for SWF but for the whole 
economy of Oman.  
 
Interview 11 
 
Date: 04.01.2011   
Time: 11:40 am to 1:30 pm  
Interviewee: Economic researcher, State council     
 
This interviewee again is a member of state council which is upper house of the 
parliament. Interviewee told the researcher that everyone is worried about Oman SWF 
governance and transparency damaging the credibility of the SWF and country in the 
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financial world. However, the issue is not permanent as it is because right now there 
are no mechanisms to monitor governance and transparency standards; and there is no 
organisational structure or hierarchy except Minister of Finance to oversee decision 
making or investments. Also, the developed countries worrying about security threat 
due to strategic investments is not true because in the business world there are 
components where countries and markets can not afford to lose each other.   
 
This interviewee is confident that Oman SWF can be re-designed to develop as a world 
class SWF with no issues of governance and credibility because the business and 
national  culture of Oman have good business ethics and high moral standards. This 
can be seen from high score achieved by Oman as a state in the world competitiveness, 
corruption index, business and investment confidence index ahead of other GCC 
countries and developed nations. Thus, a problem is not within all department of 
government but the major issue of concern is how does MoF manages Oman SWF 
operations in an unplanned manner with single handed decision making. This allows 
Oman SWF employees to become complacent and reduce the accountability for their 
actions.  
 
On the other hand, these employees are citizens of Oman so they have a duty towards 
their country to perform better in the interests of Oman SWF. The interviewee told that 
you may find surprising results of what employees feel about Oman SWF within the 
SWF and other departments in the questionnaire survey.        
 
Interview 12 
 
Date: 03.01.2011   
Time: 11:00 am to 12:45 pm  
Interviewee: Dy. Chief Executive, Information Technology Authority    
 
This interviewee is in a top management of IT authority which confirmed that MoF has 
never sent any request to create a portal for Oman SWF as a separate entity. Also, MoF 
has never consulted them for any information on IT developments or appraisal of 
making investments in the technology companies for Oman SWF. Thus, for him MoF 
manages a very much closed loop transactions for SWF and rest of their work as well.   
 
Interviewee told that the issue of low credibility of Oman SWF in the form of very low 
governance and transparency emerges from the main issues of ‗no information 
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availability about Oman SWF‘ to Omani people or any other government department. 
Therefore, if the transparency or governance is the issue then it should be affecting to 
Oman first; hence, deveveloped countries should not worry.  The main objectives of 
Oman SWF should be wealth creation and transferring the benefits of that wealth to 
Omani people rather than any politically motivated investments in the foreign 
countries. However, the SWF looks to adopts a policy under MoF management where 
no one is ready to take any responsibility or accountability which ultimately reduce the 
advantages SWF can bring for its employees Omani citizens, Omani government and  
investors.  
 
This interviewee suggested that main challenges for Oman SWF are self-image, self-
policing, leadership, reporting and disclosure transparency and decision making 
autonomy from MoF. These challenges can be overcome by creating a distinction 
between local and foreign investment departments and having one separate board and 
two management teams. And, activities by these teams can be monitored and 
controlled by this investment board by way of governance, ethics and investment limits 
set out in the annual reviews of policy and strategic planning by this board. Board 
representation can be chosen from various government departments. This way 
autonomy in the professional decision making and management control both can be 
maintained for Oman SWF.    
 
 
Interview 13 
Date: 09.01.2011   
Time: 9:30 am to 11:30 am  
Interviewee: Economic expert, State council    
 
 
This interviewee is an economic expert in the upper house of parliament. According to 
Dr.Al-Jabri, SWF can be a major stabilising force for the economy of Oman. SWF 
profit mainly comes from buying undervalued foreign assets cheaply and then 
generating yield on when the market prices go up or the same assets are valued high. 
Since, global markets are in the down turn, Dr. Jabri does not advise for increased 
foreign investments as Oman SWF may lose its investments. Also, Dr. Jabri advised to 
create a local development fund separate from SWF which will be funded by SWF 
profits so in the time of low oil prices, there are money available for development and 
currency stabilization.  
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The only risk SWF poses to local people is over dependence on the profit of SWF for 
doing everything in the country. If SWF make Omani people rich with comforts then 
there may be implications on GDP growth in the long run as Omanis may become 
complacent in their work culture.  
 
Dr. Jabri discarded any national security threats posed by western governments saying 
that GCC region countries know how precious is the money received from Oil and 
Petrol export then it would not be wise to spend that money through SWF for political 
or security motives rather than financial goals by GCC central bankers.       
 
As an economic advisor for state council, Dr. Jabri told that SWF can not only benefit 
from Western govt. bonds or stock markets but SWF should take advantage of alternate 
assets, emerging markets‘ financial and technology firms, agricultural businesses in 
Africa and Latin America; thus increasing the geographical spread of the investments 
to reduce the risk of the investments.  
 
Interview 14 
Date: 16.12.2010   
Time: 1:00 pm to 2:45 pm  
Interviewee: Economic Researcher, Ministry of Finance    
 
Since this interviewee works within MOF, he has more information regarding SWFs. 
Mr. Badran said the problems cited by other departments such as governance, 
transparency and investment strategy are not the real problems to manage SWF. The 
major issue for MOF is to single handled manage the SWF attracts problems of 
allocating ministerial resources to SWF, creating international standards, having due 
diligence procedures, and delegating financial control to young employees. 
 
This type of problem requires support from other government departments such as 
central bank of Oman and human resource ministry (HRM). There is no written 
agreement between other government departments regarding how much they can 
contribute or so-operate to manage SWFs. There is no asset allocation limits specified 
by MOF; thus all investments happened on random basis and first come first serve 
basis.  
 
 352 
There is no annual cap on how much can be invested locally or in foreign assets. The 
reciprocity from the other government departments is necessary to leverage the 
resources to manage SWF.  
 
Thus the interviewee confirmed that there are issues within the management of SWF 
by MOF, however, the resources for MOF are not adequate and there are no 
agreements between the departments therefore other departments should not be 
criticising MOF for managing SWF on its own. MOF has on its part, issues in not 
being transparent and taking decisions for large investments without any appraisal. 
Because of this, employees of the SWF have no accountability for their actions and 
they are left with no active role in deciding what is good or bad for Oman SWF. The 
pressure is on MOF for creating a management board composition, ethical guidelines, 
avoiding political oversights, and linking the SWF to government budgets. However, 
there are issues of constitutional or policy restraints which do not allow MOF to make 
independent disclosures and create further implications.  
 
 
Interview 15 
Date: 16.12.2010   
Time: 9:30 am to 11:30 am  
Interviewee: Political researcher of Oman News Agency     
 
Dr. Aluraimi as a researcher and journalist confirmed that governance and transparency 
are not problems of only Oman SWF but to an extent every SWF around the world has 
been caught up in the same debate. From the perspective of information availability to 
investors, the problem of information not being available from SWF to investee 
companies or governments is a small issue. Companies around the world manipulate 
their accounts and publish forward looking statements to attract investments and 
maintain public confidence in their stocks. The transparency is 100% in that case but 
the legitimacy of the information is very low. No one is arguing about this legitimacy 
issue but everyone is criticising SWFs which are actually helping companies in the 
recession times to survive and stabilise. Therefore this interviewee suggested that 
governments of top multinational companies should not be lobbying for governance 
and transparency of SWFs.   
 
As for Oman SWF the real issue is not the transparency or governance, but robust 
investment strategy and financial control. This can be achieved by deploying 
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international experts and developing local talent to international standards. There is a 
lot of competition between GCC region countries to create stable non oil dependent 
economies. As one can see, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are in a 
race to develop their countries and follow the debt economy principles to attract every 
single company in their cities. Dubai is one of the best examples of this, however, debt 
economy development has its own perils so Oman government should find a balance 
between the two and appropriately utilise the SWF solely for economic and financial 
objectives.  
 
 
Interview 16 
Date: 16.01.2011   
Time: 10:00 am to 11:45 am  
Interviewee: Director of Investment Planning, Ministry of National Economy      
 
Mr. Albuloshi works as a CXO level executive for national economy and planning. He 
suggested that main function of the state council is to take part and to support better 
governance through its operating mechanism and fundamental principles such as to 
provide base for governance and transparency within the Oman SWF but there seems 
to be no one willing to do this job. Therefore, Oman SWF has governance and 
transparency is at the lowest possible level. In such situation, we can no pick up any 
employees and make them accountable or responsible for anything. Therefore, it is 
collective responsibility of MoF and other government agencies to make improvements 
in Oman SWF.  
 
As for national economic and investment planning, they have never received any 
information from MoF or SWF regarding the holdings in foreign assets. As an 
economic and investment planning expert, Mr. Albuloshi suggested that any shift from 
Europe and US markets to Asian and MENASA markets may look promising for now 
but not in the long run as these developing countries may sooner or later would be in 
the recession cycle as a result of global recession and credit crunch.     
 
The restructuring of Oman SWF requires detailed work and need two to five years of 
time to completely change the SWF.  
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Interview 17 
Date: 13.11.2010   
Time: 1:30 pm to 3:00 pm  
Interviewee: Al Shura council member 
 
This interviewee member in the parliament and debated the previous response of MoF 
of IMF call for GCC region SWFs to increase the governance and transparency. In his 
opinion, Oman SWF should not wait for the SWFs to take a lead either in the making 
foreign investments or creating world class standards.  
 
He suggested that Omani culture and values are famous around the world so this time 
we can make SWF also famous by creating international standards. Interviewee 
suggested that there is no need to create protectionism barriers as we would like to reap 
rewards of globalization. Oman is already global in terms of having more than 60% of 
its workforce from countries around the world as far as Canada and Japan. The Oman 
SWF‘s response to IMF and Santiago principles should have been positive and 
welcoming. However, Oman SWF should have conveyed that it is better to reduce 
protectionism by both parties: investee countries and SWF sponsoring countries.    
Oman SWF should take leadership of any international developments for SWF and set 
the standards even for the developed countries SWF. Interviewee agreed about setting 
up a common body to oversee all SWFs. This would reduce the number of laws and 
barriers prepared by respective governments of SWFs and investee countries.   
 
Interviewee is not suggesting changing the existing system all of a sudden; however 
recommends an incremental transition for Oman SWF to become a separate entity 
rather than being a department of MoF.  
 
Interview 18 
Date: 14.12.2010   
Time: 9:00 am to 11:00 am  
Interviewee: Royal Office    
 
Interviewee works with the royal office which looks after departments managed 
directly by His Majesty Sultan Qaboos. Interviewee has no access to MoF documents; 
however confirms that final decision for large investments are approved by Sultan 
having trust in the MoF proposals. On a random basis, work is delegated to see the 
facts and figures of the capital investments.  
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Mr.Albusaidi suggested that around the globe many SWFs are managed by finance 
ministries (MoF) and central banks, hence, MoF manages our Oman SWF is not a 
problem at all. The problem is how we control our finances and employee turnover. 
The cost of operating SWF is so high that MoF does not have resources to disburse 
only for SWF. This might be the reason why MoF is not utilizing the international 
experts or wealth management consulting from well known banks or investment banks.   
 
Interviewee confirms that MoF should be handling this inflow of finds to SWF 
appropriately as this money belongs to all Omani citizens. Therefore, MoF should have 
at least proper investment strategy so that profits can be realised on these investments. 
Our oil wealth is limited so planning should be done considering the future generations 
of Oman. The interviewee agreed that Oman SWF lacks the vision like Norway and 
Singapore who has accumulated more than 300bn within the last two decades. 
Therefore, it is up to policy makers in the Al-Shura and States council to decide how to 
preserve the benefits of oil wealth in terms of SWF profits or trade balances.      
 
Interview 19 
Date: 14.12.2010   
Time: 1:00 pm to 2:45 pm  
Interviewee: Royal Office     
This interviewee works in the royal office and is not direct stakeholder of SWF or 
MoF. However, once he was conveyed what are SWF and what benefits it can bring to 
Oman. He suggested that he wants Oman SWF to be restructured and the responsibility 
of Oman SWF to be given to trusted and knowledgeable officers in the government.  
Interviewee favoured that there should be independent counsel to manage the money 
which is almost 8 to 13 billion. This amount of money can change the face of the 
country or every industry within the Oman in few minutes. The industry developments 
is very much necessary as Interviewee confirmed that oil wealth is limited and must be 
used appropriately for years to come. This wealth is not owned by any one person and 
thus, any one managing SWF should have Oman and future Omani generations‘ 
interests.    
The interviewee was surprised to understand that Oman started SWF in same time with 
UAE and still have only US$ 8 to 13bn whereas ADIA has 100 times more assets than 
Oman SWF. Thus, interviewee suggested that we should restructure and govern the 
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Oman SWF far better than its current status. Our credibility should be improved as we 
are one of the well known in the GCC region and around the world for our values and 
quality of the culture. Interviewee stressed that governance, talent development and 
investment strategy should be the first priorities for making improvements or changes 
in the Oman SWF.  
 
Interview 20 
Date: 17.12.2010   
Time: 10:00 am to 11:45 am  
Interviewee: Internal Security   
This interviewee has not much information regarding SWF; however he works for an 
internal security of the majesty and country so understand the implications of what 
MoF is doing.  
He explained that any multi-million transaction has to be approved by either panel 
designated by Sultan or be approved by central bank of Oman. If MoF is not following 
this procedure then it is violation of constitution of Oman and existing laws.  
According to him, MoF should be not delegated authority to manage SWF anymore as 
they have created an issue of credibility out of it. First of all, a committee formed by 
Al-shura, states council, royal office and auditor general should take charge of SWF 
from MoF and then create a basic framework of how and who will be the governing 
and management team of SWF. This would automatically bring the governance, 
transparency and accountability to SWF. In this manner, SWF will be administered by 
many public figures and it will not be any more single decision maker‘s portfolio. This 
type of restructuring also will bring the trust of employees and Omani citizen in their 
SWF just like other countries population is proud of their SWFs, for example Norway, 
UAE and Saudi Arabia.       
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Appendix F  Final Questionnaire 
 
Dear Participant 
 
Ref.: ‗Analytical study of Sovereign Wealth Funds‘ Policies and Strategies: A Case of 
Sultanate of Oman‘   
 
This is a group of questions related to my doctoral thesis about „Sovereign Wealth 
Fund in the Sultanate of Oman‟. The information you provide will help to analyse the critical 
issues for improvement of the quality of sovereign wealth funds operations and management 
for Oman.  
 
Please respond to the question as frankly and honestly as possible since, your response 
will be kept strictly confidential. To ensure the utmost privacy, only the research team will 
have access to the information you provide as responses in the attached questionnaire.  
 
A formal approval has been already sought to launch this questionnaire within 
financial institutions in the sultanate of Oman. On the completion of the project, a set of 
recommendations would be prepared for Oman wealth funds‘ management to improve returns.  
 
Thank you very much for your time and co-operation. I greatly appreciate your 
organizations and your help in furthering this research endeavour. 
 
Kind regards 
Majid Al-Saidi    
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‘Analytical study of Sovereign Wealth Funds’ (SWF) Policies and Strategies:  
A Case of Sultanate of Oman’ 
This study is about the SWF of Oman. The following questions are designed to assess the 
factors and their impact on working of SWF.  
For most of the questions, a general Likert scale of 1 to 7 is adopted. Scale of 1 to 7 is 
categorised as 
1 = Strongly disagree with the statement given  
2 = Disagree  
3 = Disagree to an extent  
4 = Can not say  
5 = Agree to an extent   
6 = Agree  
7 = Strongly agree with the statement given  
Where there is no Likert scale option, other choices are given to select. Please mark your 
responses using cross, tick or circle marks on the number.  
There are no right or wrong answers for any questions so please do not have any fright to 
provide the answer based on your understanding, knowledge and experience. The questions are 
designed in the easy to understand words. However, feel free to seek any assistance for 
responding to any question.   
Your details are collected to analyse the responses for each management level and 
organizational groups. To maintain the confidentiality, it is collected separately on the next 
page 3.  
On completion, please keep the questionnaire in the reply envelope provided and seal it. This 
would be collected from you by a member authorised as part of the research team.  
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Respondent’s information 
 
 
Name: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(optional) 
 
 
Ministry/ Unit: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Reserved Funds' Related handled tasks: -------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Your designation in the company: -----------------------------------------------------------------------                 
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Questionnaire 
 
Section A : Current Status of Oman SWF 
 
1. You agree that following are the Main Objectives of Oman Sovereign Wealth Fund.  
(H6) 
 
To fund public expenditure 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
To promote long term consideration of oil revenues 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
To develop economy and industry within the country 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
To bring change through responsible investments 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
To increase return and value of foreign investments 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
To stabilize the currency of Oman 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
To increase the bilateral trade with selected countries 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
To achieve any political objective through investments 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
To meet the strategic demand of developed countries  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
 
2. Following is true in case of the present Structure of the fund: (H6) 
 
Purpose of setting up fund in unclear  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Objectives of operating SWF are ambiguous  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Ownership of the fund is of Govt. of Oman but it is 
largely controlled by Ministers in the Government  
1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Sources of funds for SWF are many but are not monitored 
or controlled  
1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Management style of the SWF is like govt. body and not 
like a professionally managed company  
1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
All decisions are superseded by Ministers and 
professional knowledge or experience is not utilized  
1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Conflicts are left unresolved within SWF 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
 
3. Currently, Investee Countries are selected based on: (H2) & (H5)    
 
Political reasons 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
National security  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Investment environment 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Availability of investment laws and regulations 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Strategic alliance with common interests 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Meaningful on long-term 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Strong growth and development 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
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Section B : Factors Affecting Oman SWF 
 
4. The following aspects form the major Governance Reform agenda for Oman SWF:   
(H1) 
 
Good Governance procedures are in place  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Appropriate Disclosure of information is in place within 
and outside the fund  
1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Decisions makers are fully accountable for investment 
decisions they make 
1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Managerial roles are clearly defined   1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
SWF managers take overall responsibility of SWF 
considering it as wealth of national population    
1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
 
5. You agree to following statements in terms of Transparency surrounding the 
investment process:  (H1) 
 
Government investments are regularly announced 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Investment returns are present in state public budget 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Regulators can review wealth fund reports  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Investment strategy use benchmarks  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Strategy limits the investments based on ratings  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Regular evaluation and follow-up is reported  
 
6. Oman SWF invests in the companies which follow Globally Accepted Laws of: (H1) 
& (H5)    
 
Human rights  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Child labour laws  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Equality and diversity laws  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Fair employee treatment criteria  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Pollution control limits  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Weapon control limits  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Money laundering regulations  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
 
7. You agree that following are true in case of Oman SWF Investments Rights in foreign 
companies as an investor:  (H2) & (H4) 
 
Having the right to vote 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Having the right to nominate and elect directors 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Having the right to trade shares freely 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Having the right to open and timely information 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
 
 
8. You agree that following attributes of Trade Balances affect SWF significantly. (H3) 
 
Volume of bi-lateral trade   1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Currency value changes through trade balances  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Trade balance effects on gross domestic production    1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
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9. Lack of Investment Planning affects the investment strategy in the form of: (H4), (H7), 
and (H8)   
 
Short term planning 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Decisions contain personal bias  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Decisions appraisals are merit based   1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Absence of development plans and goals 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Over dependence on specific persons for decisions 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Administration system is un-organized  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
There is lack of professional skills 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Lack of training funds for talent development  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
 
10. Oman doesn‘t Integrate Investments with other Gulf countries, especially their 
leading investors (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Qatar and Kuwait) due to: (H5), (H8) 
 
Political reasons 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Administrative and financial differences 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Unwillingness of the Sultanate 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Unwillingness of neighbouring countries 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
It is not helpful 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Difference in Size of investments and experience  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
 
11. Absence of a specific plan in place to shape the foreign investment is due to: (H4)  
 
Govt. departments have overlapping responsibilities   1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Lack of interest from Govt. 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Fear of risky foreign investment  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Liquidity needed within the country  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Political agenda is stronger   1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
 
12. Following drawback of Sponsoring Country Laws in Oman affect the growth of fund. 
(H5)   
 
It requires updating  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Old laws are inappropriate with global markets 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Current laws are very general  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Favours local investments over foreign investments  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Based on political objectives rather than investments 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
 
12. The following changes to Laws & Regulations will improve the investment process:                      
       (ST D1) 
 
Diversifying Investment options 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Applying common objectives to all funds 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Identifying means of follow-up & assessment 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Determining penalties for accountability 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Conducting specialized research studies 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
 
14. The foreign investments Allocation is done with the following objectives: (H7) 
 
Capital utilization 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Diversification of income sources 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
The achievement of sovereign status 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Integration with world markets 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
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15. Rejection of Foreign Investments is resulted from the following: (H5) 
 
Risk of low return  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Priority towards local investment 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Lack of  clear objectives  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Lack of sufficient information on global markets 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Absence of agencies in investment decision-making 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Risk of confiscation of capital invested 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Wars and unrest  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Bi-lateral trade relations  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
 
16. Foreign Investments are favoured on the basis of: (H7)   
 
Low risk 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Substantial financial returns  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Guaranteed growth potential 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Level of durability 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Carrying global demand 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Preferred by competing funds   1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Technology transfer objective  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
 
17. Globally Specialized Companies are approached for an investment opinion due to:     
     (H4), (H7) 
 
To do market research about global trends and 
competitors  
1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Non-availability of sufficient expertise 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
To increase returns on investments made 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
To reduce internal staff costs  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Absence of dedicated team to manage the process 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Lack of clear policies and investment objectives  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
If any other reason, please mention here ______________________________ 
 
18. Following scenarios are designed to develop the Investment Deal process further. 
(H7) 
 
Increase the volume of foreign investments 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Diversification of investments 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Investment in new countries 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Reduce the overall number of investment holdings  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Help of specialized firms like Banks and Consultants  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
 
19. Following dimensions affect the Operational Efficiency of the fund: (H7), (H8) 
 
Systematic Decision making process   1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Reliable decision making using professional managerial 
expertise  
1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Research based decision making  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
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20. The criteria upon which the Investment Decision is based are:  (H8) 
 
Volume of interest 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Margin of risk 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Financial guarantees 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Security and stability of the country invested in 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Return on investment  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Size of the deal  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Asset class of the investment  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
 
 
 
Section C : Change and Future of Oman SWF 
 
21. Oman SWF investment performance is evaluated based on : (D) 
 
Oman's policy towards Investment functions 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Oman's performance compared to other GCC funds  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
The proportion of funds invested against returns 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Comparisons with global financial institutions  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Performance of funds in the fields of development 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Divergence from plans 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Contribution of the fund in reducing budget deficit 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Rate of return achieved by fund    1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
 
 
22. Below are Possible Solutions to develop investment strategy which would make Oman 
SWF competitive and growing. (IST) 
 
Increasing importance of investment objectives  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Creating plans and specific goals 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Developing new laws and regulations 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Cooperation and integration with GCC countries  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Outsourcing global expertise from companies   1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Developing specialized human resources   1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Increase research for world markets 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Adopting the system of assessment  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
A heavy sanctions for transgressors  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
 
 
23. Following Changes may improve the Fund‘s current success rate: (IST) 
 
Increase the amount available to invest from current 
allocation limit of ‗15% of Oil revenue‘ to SWF  
1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Increase the overseas investments 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Increase the investment in emerging markets 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Increase the local industry's investment  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Bring Transparency level to international standards  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
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24. You agree that following issues have significant Impacts on the Progress of Oman 
sovereign wealth fund. And, we shall remove these weakening aspects.  (IST) 
 
Bureaucratic decision making hierarchy 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Risk aversion policy 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Absence of any regulatory system  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Lack of strategic planning  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
No usage of fund management skills    1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Non-research based investment decisions   1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Heavy emphasis on local investments  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Spending investments money for budget deficit  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Managing SWF from the finance ministry  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
 
 
25. You agree that following attributes may help to Improve the Success Rate of Oman 
SWF: (D) 
 
Development of local talent  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Strong cultural and religion integration of population  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Improving trade relations within GCC region 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Introducing new laws and regulations  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Availability of multi sources of funds   1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Increasing consumer markets in Oman 1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
Increasing governance and transparency of SWF  1    2    3    4    5   6    7 
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Section D: Investment Decision Making Process  
 
  Please select the most appropriate answers to decision making system of Oman SWF for 
each question from the alternatives provided. You may select more than one answer, in that mention 
your comments for selection.  
  
No Attribute  
1 
 
Do recipient country clients approach SWF first to start the negotiation?  
A: Yes, this happens in most cases   
B: No, it is very rare that they approach fund directly  
C: It depends on the opportunity and needs of either side. 
 
 
2 
 
Whom does the client contact first in case the amount involved is large?   
A: Government Ministry 
B: Top Management or Decision makers in SWF 
C: Departmental Managers in SWF 
D: Client‘s representative like consultant or investment banks contacts SWF 
 
 
3 
 
What documents are required to be submitted by clients initially? 
A: Project report           B: Company report  
C: Annual report           D: Investor presentations 
 
4 
 
Based on which criteria the opportunities are scanned for investment? 
A: Continuous stable income   
B: Short term liquidity and profit  
C: Currency stabilization  
D: Strategic assets  
 
5 
 
Which factors influenced the appraisal of the investment proposals?  
A: Strategic advantage over other competing SWFs 
B: Financial returns  
C: Bilateral trade with that country  
D: Political motives   
 
 
6 
 
What is the organizational hierarchy to finalize the investment?  
A: Client --> SWF top management --> Ministry --> SWF managers --> 
Client   
B: Client --> Ministry --> SWF top management --> Client  
C: SWF top management --> Ministry --> Client  --> SWF managers  
D: SWF managers --> Client --> Ministry --> SWF top management    
 
7 
 
Who manages the account post-investment? 
A: Government Finance Ministry                          
B: SWF managers  
C: Professional consultant / appointed advisor 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
Who is responsible for making Decision Making of investment deals?  
  A:Each investment unit            E: Specialized organization  
  B: An ad-hoc committee           F: Minister  
  C: Special taskforce team         G: Professional Manager   
  D: Financial institutions            H: External Portfolio Consultant  
9 
 
What is the reporting structure for deal monitoring or divestment? 
A: Ministry informs SWF management  
B: SWF management submits approval request to Government  
C: If other, please specify.   
 
10 
 
What is re-investment or utilization of return or profit from the 
investments?  
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A: Addition to SWF assets for re-investment  
B: Transfer to other Government accounts  
C: Direct allocation to government sponsored projects within the country  
 
 
11 
 
Why do SWF carry out divestment?  
A: Social responsibility reasons like pollution by that company  
B: Trade regulations in that country        C: Trade relations with that country  
D: Political relations with that country    E: Decreasing Assets value  
F: Decreasing currency exchange rate of that country  
 
 
You may provide your responses to the following last question in the space provided.  
Could you tell me about recent specific incidents of a sovereign wealth fund that you feel went 
very well and went badly? Describe these two incidents and explain that why did you choose 
this incident.  
A. Incident that went well:  
 
 
 
B. Incident that could have been improved:   
 
 
I would like to thank you for your valuable time and contribution in the research for 
Sovereign Wealth Fund of Sultanate of Oman and other countries. Your response is 
critical to further development and is really important. 
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Appendix G Global Sovereign Wealth Funds  
Country & Fund Name     Amount US$ bn Inception Main source  
United Arab Emirates Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA)  875  1976  Oil  
Singapore Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC)  330  1981  Non-commodity 
Norway Government Pension Fund - Global (GPFG)    322  1990  Oil 
Saudi Arabia Various funds      300  NA  Oil 
Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA)      250  1953 Oil 
China China Investment Company Ltd.     200  2007  Non-commodity 
Hong Kong Hong Kong Monetary Authority Investment Portfolio   140  1998  Non-commodity 
Russia Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation (SFRF)   127  2003  Oil 
China Central Hujin Investment Corp.      100  2003  Non-commodity 
Singapore Temasek Holdings      108  1974  Non-commodity 
Australia Australian Government Future Fund (AGFF)     50  2004  Non-commodity 
Libya Reserve Fund       50  NA  Oil 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority (QIA)      40  2000  Oil 
United States Alaska Permanent Reserve Fund Corporation (APRF)    40  1976  Oil 
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency (BIA)     35  1983  Oil 
Ireland National Pensions Reserve Fund (NPRF)      29  2001  Non-commodity 
Algeria Reserve Fund        25  NA  Oil 
South Korea Korea Investment Corporation (KIC)     20  2006  Non-commodity 
Malaysia Khazanah National BHD (KNB)      18  1993 Non-commodity 
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National Fund (KNF)      18  2000  Oil, gas, metals 
Canada Alberta Heritage Fund (AHF)     17 1976  Oil 
Taiwan Taiwan National Stabilisation Fund (TNSF)     15  2000  Non-commodity 
United States New Mexico State Investment Office Trust Funds    15  1958  Non-commodity 
Iran Foreign Exchange Reserve Fund       15  1999  Oil 
Nigeria Excess Crude Account       11  2004  Oil 
New Zealand New Zealand Superannuation Fund     10  2003  Non-commodity 
Oman State General Stabilisation Fund (SGSF)    8.2  1980  Oil, gas 
Chile Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (ESSF)     6.0  2007  Copper 
Botswana Pula Fund        4.7  1993  Diamonds et al. 
United States Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust Fund (PWMTF)    3.2  1974  Minerals 
Norway Government Petroleum Insurance Fund (GPIF)     2.6  1986  Oil 
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund        1.5  1999  Oil 
East Timor Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund      1.2  2005  Oil, gas 
Venezuela Investment Fund for Macroeconomic Stabilization (FIEM)   0.8  1998  Oil 
Kiribati Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund (RERF)     0.6  1956  Phosphates 
Chile Pension Reserves Fund       0.6 2007 Copper 
Uganda Poverty Action Fund       0.4  1998  Aid 
Papua New Guinea Mineral Resources Stabilization Fund (MRSF)    0.2  1974  Minerals 
Mauritania National Fund for Hydrocarbon Reserves     0.0  2006  Oil, gas 
United Arab Emirates Dubai Intern. Financial Centre Investments (DIFC)   NA  2002  Oil 
Angola Reserve Fund for Oil       NA  2007  Oil 
Total        3,190.00 
Memorandum items: Planned SWF projects 
China State Foreign Exchange Investment Corporation (SFEIC)   200  2007e  Non-commodity 
Russia Future Generations Fund of the Russian Federation (SFRF)   32  2008e  Oil 
Bolivia (Establishment of SWF planned)     NA  2008e  Oil 
Japan (Establishment of SWF presumed)     NA   Non-commodity 
Source: Kern (2007) at www.dbresearch.com 
